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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research question
Why do some governments pursue more ambitious investing programs in ed-
ucation than others? Under what conditions access to formal pre-university
schooling is secured to broad social sectors of the population? What political
and economic factors explain the existing national differences in human cap-
ital accumulation? These are the questions that I attempt to answer in this
study. The motivation behind them comes from an intriguing puzzle: while
there seem to be powerful economic reasons for the adoption of human capi-
tal enhancing policies, yet we observe a great deal of variation in educational
outcomes across countries and over time.
Human capital has long been considered one of the main sources of eco-
nomic growth. Different theoretical approaches of economic growth treats
human capital either as an additional production input or as a factor asso-
ciated directly with the rate of innovation (Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003).
Moreover, economists have also emphasized the presence of externalities from
schooling (i.e. investment in human capital). Besides the private returns to
education, it is argued that increases in education generate certain social
benefits that are not received by the direct investors. Skilled workers may
raise the productivity of their less educated co-workers. Increasing the pro-
1
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portion of educated people in the workforce may also enhance the adoption
of new technology. As these spillover benefits are not included in individual
decisions, this type of market failure may lead individuals to under-invest in
human capital so that the aggregate level of education in the society may
be lower than the socially efficient level. This has constituted one of the
central economic justifications for government intervention in the provision
of education (Poterba 1994; Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003).
Another important economic reason for the public support of education
concerns credit market imperfections (Poterba 1994). When capital mar-
kets are imperfect and individuals thus face borrowing constraints in their
educational choices, schooling is only available to those with a high enough
amount of wealth. Even if individuals do incorporate in their decisions both
the private and social gains of their education, they might not realize their
investments due to the lack of resources. Thus the fact that lower-income
groups cannot have a free access to credit against future earnings calls for
political intervention to reap the economy-wide benefits and the potential for
economic growth of increased human capital accumulation.
The importance of such market limitations hinges obviously on the exis-
tence of certain costs related with the acquisition of education. Although one
may think that the direct costs of pre-university education are relatively small
-since primary and secondary schooling is often free or greatly subsidized-,
the opportunity costs (foregone income) are much more significant, especially
in secondary level. It is then reasonable to claim that schooling decisions are
partly affected by the economic burden entailed in the attainment of educa-
tion.
These lines of economic reasoning are forcefully echoed by several inter-
national development organizations, which stress the beneficial role of edu-
cation for high growth. The World Bank, the Inter-American Development
Bank or UNESCO, among others, have undoubtedly backed the conventional
wisdom that expanding basic schooling is a prerequisite for prosperity and
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will foster economic development (Easterly 2002: 72). In a similar vein, the
policy reform package advocated by the so-called “Washington Consensus”
includes prioritizing education expenditure over other types of public spend-
ing more oriented to consumption when governments need to reduce fiscal
deficit (Williamson 1990).
However, despite all these international institutions’ claims and the eco-
nomic rationale for expanding the provision of education, the educational
performance of countries varies considerably. As an illustration of the large
cross-sectional variation, in 1990, the global distribution of secondary enroll-
ment rates1 has an average value of 52.12 percent with a standard deviation
of 31.49 percent. And the actual range of national performance is fairly wide
going from 4.9% (Tanzania) to 119.5% (Netherlands). If human capital ac-
cumulation is so good for growth, why is it the case that countries have not
completely converged towards high levels of education results?
A rather evident factor driving partially such educational disparities is
the wealth of the economy. The simplest explanation is that the amount
of resources available in the society will determine how many people can
acquire formal schooling as long as investing in education involves certain
economic costs. Or it defines the economic constraints facing governments
in their attempts to expand education.2 Yet, even after taking per capita
income into consideration, there are still substantial differences that need
to be accounted for. Figure 1.1 presents the magnitude of variation among
country-year observations with alike levels of GDP per capita.3
1These data are from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2000 ). For a
more precise definition of this variable (ENROLSEC), see Appendix B.
2One can also think in demand-side explanations. The increasing degree of industrial-
ization and the services sector growth entailed in the process of economic development have
changed the individual preferences concerning the acquisition of education. The accom-
panied structural changes of the labor market result in a stronger link between education
and job opportunities. Thus individuals would be more prone to invest in human capital
so that they could improve their positions in the labor market (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993).
3The figure is a box plot where the dots refer to the mean values of each income interval.
For each one-thousand dollars interval of GDP per capita, the box extends plus to minus
one standard deviation from the mean; and the vertical lines expands to the maximum
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As the figure clearly shows, the rate of secondary enrollment seems to be
positively associated with average income: the higher the value of the latter,
the greater the average percentage of young people enrolled in secondary
school. However, the story does not end here. For a given level of income
per capita, we usually observe a relatively sizeable degree of dispersion around
its corresponding educational mean. For instance, when average income is
between 5000 and 6000 dollars, the mean of enrollment is equal to 57% and
its standard deviation 18%.
Figure 1.1: Variance of secondary enrollment by per capita income
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and minimum values. The last box includes the cases with per capita income greater than
20000$. Six Middle Eastern oil countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates) are excluded -its inclusion would significantly drop the
enrollment mean in the highest income intervals. See Appendix B, variable INCOME, for
a definition of the GDP per capita data.
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What are the causal forces behind these remaining differences in human
capital accumulation? the argument put forward in this thesis contends that
education-enhancing policies, notwithstanding their efficiency consequences,
need to be politically sustainable. They must be in the interests of the po-
litically dominant groups in the society. The argument starts by recognizing
that any government intervention aimed to increase human capital may have
redistributive implications. It may benefit certain social groups at the ex-
pense of others. Even if increasing the number of educated people in the
population creates positive externalities (i.e. gains that are captured by all
individuals in the society), the distribution of the costs of such policy may
generate net “losers” and “winners.” Thus a potential conflict of interest may
arise between different societal actors. Individuals, in that case, are likely to
sustain divergent views about the policy to be implemented. In turn, if the
would-be “losers” of that intervention possess effective power to determine
public decisions, we should not expect that an educational-efficient policy,
although desirable for the economy as a whole, will be adopted.
There are two questions we ought to answer in order to know when an
educational promoting program is likely to be carried out. The first one
concerns the preferences over policies held by the relevant political groups.
To answer this question, this thesis follows the approach of the most impor-
tant political-economy analyses of education (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993;
Perotti 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). The costs and gains derived
from those public actions affecting schooling outcomes are assumed to be
economic. Policy preferences depend on the economic positions of individu-
als and thus the relevant groups, potentially confronted, are defined by their
income. The favorite policies of groups, the argument goes, are not fixed
but they may change as certain conditions modify, particularly, income in-
equality and per capita income. These two economic factors will determine
then the underlying structure of preferences and the nature of the political
conflict. Unlike the previous analyses, this thesis argues that the effect of
wealth inequality might be different depending on what part of the distri-
bution the wealth dispersion occurs. It is not the overall configuration of
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the distribution what shapes individual choices but which social classes are
impoverished or enriched as a consequence of the income spread. Simplifying
the number of economic groups to be the poor, the middle-class and the rich,
it is theoretically examined and empirically assessed the impact of increased
inequality between these three classes in pairwise comparisons.
The second question deals with the political method used to aggregate
such conflicting preferences into public policies. In the absence of a benevo-
lent educational planner, political institutions play a crucial role in the selec-
tion of proposals by distributing political power among the social groups in
conflict. They will determine thus whether the demands of those sectors of
the population against further expansion of education are politically accom-
modated. This thesis focuses on the most basic kind of institutions struc-
turing the decision-making process, namely the nature of political regimes,
and embraces a class-based model of politics. As discussed in the following
chapter, the growing literature on the relationship between education and po-
litical regime examines the impact of the regime type based on a dichotomic
category contrasting democratic and dictatorial systems. In this work, how-
ever, I further distinguish among dictatorships according to their ideological
orientation. They are separated into two types: left-wing or “populists” dic-
tatorships and right-wing ones. It is assumed throughout that the former
maximize the welfare of the poor, while right-wing dictatorships principally
accommodate the preferences of the wealthy. In line with the conventional
political-economy approach, conflicts over policies under democracy are re-
solved by majority voting so that either the person who dictates policy is
the median voter -who belongs to the middle class- or the winning coalition
encompasses the middle class as a member.4
By affecting the balance of power between social classes, the impact of
political regime on policies and educational outcomes is expected to change
with economic conditions. Political institutions is argued not to exert a
direct and constant effect but an indirect and conditional one. Given that
4See next chapter for a theoretical justification of this institutional classification.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
first the preferences of social groups hinges on per capita income and income
inequality and, second, institutions determine which group gets its demands
converted into public policies, the causal mechanism proposed in this thesis
-through which regimes influence schooling outcomes- is that institutions
shape the educational responses of governments to shifting economic states.
Hence the impact of the regime type is conditional on per capita income and
economic inequality.
In sum, this study offers an unified account centered around the gen-
eral idea that the wealth of the economy and its distribution among social
classes interact with political institutions to produce different patterns of
education. Depending on the joined configuration of these factors, different
expectations regarding policy and educational results arises. The substantial
differences in human capital outcomes shown above could be partly explained
then by the variation in economic and institutional conditions. The key ini-
tial assumption concerns the redistributive nature of those policies affecting
human capital accumulation, making societal actors hold different views of
the proper policy.
1.2 Plan of the study
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the main
accounts given to the more general question of the aggregate educational
performance of countries and, in particular, to the relationship between po-
litical regimes and human capital. It also presents the central insights of the
proposed argument and stresses their analytical relevance in view of the the-
oretical and empirical gaps of the literature. Two existing strands of research
are directly related with this work. The first one comprises several studies on
the political economy of education that have examined the effect of certain
economic factors on the political equilibria, reached in democratic systems,
with respect to education-related policies. Even though they acknowledge
the existence of preference heterogeneity around the collective educational
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choices, they do not explore whether different institutional mechanisms of
conflict resolution produce political equilibria with divergent consequences
for educational outcomes. The second strand of research deals directly with
the impact of political regimes on human capital. Its main flaw, however, is
that their explanations implicitly ignore the redistributive effects of human
capital accumulation programs.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the formal analysis of the argument. Various in-
teraction mechanisms are formally examined, which generates a series of spe-
cific hypotheses to be tested. It takes as a point of departure the main mod-
els of the political-economy literature on education (Saint-Paul and Verdier
1993; Perotti 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). These models attempt
to disentangle how wealth inequality and per capita income influence total
investment in human capital under an institutional scenario in which redis-
tributive policies are made by majority vote. By examining these models, the
purpose of this chapter is to analyze their implications for other institutional
frameworks. In other words, it tries to extend their logic to non-democratic
institutions and derive some clear-cut predictions with which to make com-
parisons across types of regimes. An additional extension of these models,
carried out in this chapter, is an evaluation of the differential impact of in-
equality increases in different parts of the income distribution.
To empirically test the predictions from the formal analysis, Chapter 4
introduces a new database on the ideology of dictatorships for all dictatorial
regimes from 1960 to 1996. Based on several indicators about the ideological
preferences of autocratic governments, a procedure is built to consistently
classify them according to whether dictators are located on the “left,” “cen-
ter,” and “right” of the left-right continuum. From secondary sources, several
indicators are founded concerning 1) the ideological orientation of the dic-
tator and his ruling party, and 2) the policies that are orthogonal to the
domestic policy space. After discussing various problematic cases in which
these indicators do not point to the same conclusion and justifying the deci-
sions regarding them, it is offered some descriptives of the data.
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Chapter 5 tests with quantitative data the empirical validity of the the-
ory. Using different econometric models, it checks the causal links whereby
regimes shape human capital investment and assesses the conditional impact
of political institutions. Two separate empirical analyses are carried out.
First, by exploiting the over-time variation of the data, it is examined the
effect of the regime type conditional on per capita income. Second, the in-
teractive hypotheses regarding economic inequality, per capita income and
political institutions are tested using time-series as well as cross-sectional
variation. The findings obtained through these analyses come eventually to
discriminate among the various formal models, which propose distinct po-
litical economy mechanisms relating redistributive politics and educational
outcomes. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the theoretical contribution of this
thesis and its main empirical findings.
Part I
Theory and Predictions
10
Chapter 2
The Institutional Link
As claimed in the introduction to this thesis, understanding the divergent ed-
ucational patterns of countries requires a comprehensive explanation based
on the interaction between political institutions and those factors shaping
policy preferences. On the one hand, given some primary interests of indi-
viduals like maximizing income, economic conditions determine the distri-
butional consequences of policies and thus individual preferences over them.
On the other hand, political institutions shape the balance of power among
conflicting interests. Therefore, to derive testable predictions about human
capital programs and, accordingly, about educational outcomes, we need to
take the combined effects of these two dimensions into consideration. Or put
it in another way, the effect of one cause depends on the other one. Unless
one of the dimensions is fixed, say the type of political institutions, we can-
not be certain about the relationship between education and, for instance,
income inequality.
In this chapter, I discuss the potential explanatory power of this approach
and its contribution to the existing literature related with the research pur-
poses at hand. The next section examines those explanations that link the
level and the distribution of wealth to aggregate educational outcomes. It
argues that these accounts fails to offer a complete account of human capital
accumulation because an important cause, political institutions, is missing
11
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from their comparative statics. This section also presents a theoretical jus-
tification for the proposed classification of political regimes into democracy,
left-wing and right-wing dictatorships. Finally, in Section 2.2, I review the
main arguments given, mostly from the political science literature, to the
relationship between political regimes and education. As shown below, my
theoretical approach differs from these studies in two relevant aspects: first,
it emphasizes the redistributive nature of education-enhancing policies and
incorporates the potential conflict among social classes over the policy to
adopt. Second, it suggests a fine-grained classification of non-democracies
according to their ideological orientation, which is taken as a proxy of the
regime’s core social bases of support.
2.1 A political-economy rationale for the causal
role of political institutions
Economic development and wealth inequality are frequently proposed as can-
didates to determine a society’s aggregate investment in human capital. Per
capita income (used as a proxy of economic progress) is always argued to ex-
ert a positive effect on education -an effect that has been indeed corroborated
by a number of empirical studies.1 The predictions concerning inequality as
well as its causal mechanisms have been, on the contrary, much more con-
troversial.
Besides the simple idea that wealthier countries can more easily ex-
pand education -because for instance state bureaucracies must be developed
enough to establish an effective system of public education-, some scholars
put forward more elaborated arguments about the underlying mechanisms
through which development enhances the educational prospects of society.
Galor and Moav, in their 2006 paper, build a theory based on the assump-
tion of a capital-skill complementarity in the production process. The rela-
1see Lake and Baum (2001), Pineda and Rodr´ıguez (2006), Brown (1999), Mingat and
Tan (1998) Perotti (1996), and Dasgupta (1993).
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tive importance of human and physical capital as engines of economic growth
changes with the increasing industrialization of the economy. In the early
stage of the industrialization process, the returns of human capital formation
are lower to those of physical capital. Economic growth hinges essentially
on the accumulation of the latter and human capital plays a limited produc-
tive role. In later phases of development, the increased capital accumulation
raises the importance of skilled labor in production due to the capital-skill
complementarity. Improving the skills of the workforce becomes essential for
sustaining profit rates and economic growth. The positive effect of human
capital on the productivity of physical capital in more developed countries in-
duces the capitalists “to support universal publicly financed education....The
support for public education is unanimous among workers and capitalists who
carry its prime financial burden” (2006: 86).2
In an attempt to understand the growth of the public sector in the last
century, Boix (2001; 2003 chapter 5) proposes a similar line of reasoning
when studying the role of the state in the provision of public education.
Echoing the modernization theory, he contends that the broad process of
economic development induces policymakers to supply certain public goods
such as infrastructures and skill formation. “At very low levels of (per capita)
income, public investment increases the marginal productivity of labor either
very slightly or not at all...However, beyond a certain income threshold, an
increase in the provision of collective goods and public investment has strong
effects on the productivity of factors” (2003: 177). Thus, governments will
2The historical evidence these author provide in favor of their theory shows, however,
some inconsistencies with their own argument. They examine the various educational
reforms that took place in some Western nations (England, France, Prussia and the United
States) during the different phases of the Industrial Revolution. Although the above
theoretical account seems to explain well the evolution of educational public programs
within countries, it is less compelling as an explanation of the national differences in
education observed specially at the beginning of the period. During the early decades of
the nineteenth century, Germany, France and North America were far ahead in promoting
public education than England despite its economic and industrial leading position. Faced
with this paradoxical historical evidence, Galor and Moav use ad-hoc reasons to account
for the former development of education in less-industrialized European countries. Social
control, religion or national cohesion are brought into play as the underlying motives of
rulers to promote education in nations with relatively industrial backward positions.
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systematically respond to rises in per capita income by expanding public
schooling.
However, even though human capital accumulation may generate larger
economic gains as countries grow, we should not conclude that politicians
automatically increases education neither that all citizens reach a consensus
over a policy fostering skill acquisition. This will be determined by the other
side of policy: the distribution of its costs. Given a certain allocation of the
financial burden entailed in the design of educational programs, it is reason-
able to think that those individuals who bear a greater share of the costs may
prefer a more limited state intervention. Moreover, as will be shown in the
next chapter, the magnitude of such costs from the standpoint of different
groups might change depending on other factors such as wealth inequality.
Hence in order to predict political preferences, we should examine the condi-
tions under which the benefits of the education-enhancing policy outweigh or
not its associated costs. There are no a priori reasons to expect that the net
effect of this policy in more developed countries is positive for all citizens.
It is possible that, under some inequality configurations, relative wealthier
groups oppose extending the access of schooling to lower-income groups al-
beit it generates social externalities. Suppose that the former groups have
effective power to impose their preferences, inequality will be then an inter-
mediary variable conditioning the responses of pro-wealthy governments to
economic development. This more promising story is in fact more consis-
tent to the stylized facts portrayed in Figure 1.1 (in the introduction to this
thesis) according to which, for a given level of per capita income, a lot of
variation remains among country-year observations of secondary enrollment.
As stated before, the predictions and causal channels of the impact on
aggregate education of inequality have been the subject of much debate. In
a very influential work, Galor and Zeira (1993) stressed a purely economic
mechanism leading to the hypothesis that equality promotes total investment
in human capital. When capital markets are imperfect and agents face bor-
rowing constraints, investment depends upon individuals’ wealth. Keeping
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everything constant, a more equal distribution of resources will help the less
aﬄuent groups of society to invest in education, and thus one should observe
a positive relationship between economic equality and human capital accu-
mulation. Yet if there are fixed costs of education, the empirical validity of
this expectation might be limited to wealthy countries as first suggested by
Perotti (1993). He puts forward the idea that opposite patterns of income
distribution are conducive to human capital accumulation at different lev-
els of per capita income. In poor societies, a higher dispersion of the few
existing resources may impede the rich (the potential investors in the econ-
omy) to invest in human capital. It might be necessary a certain degree of
wealth concentration for some individuals to be able to pay the fixed cost of
education.
Several empirical studies at country level have corroborated the existence
of a negative association between income inequality and education. Using
the share of the middle class (share of quintiles 2-4) as a measure of equality,
Easterly (2001) finds that secondary and tertiary enrollment expand signif-
icantly as this share increases. In a more recent article, Easterly (2006)
observes again that inequality (measured with the share of the top quintile
and the Gini coefficient) tends to reduce the level of secondary enrollment
rates. In line with the previous qualifications to the expected impact of
equality, Perotti (1996) provides evidence showing that the positive effect of
the share of the middle class (share of quintiles 3-4) is stronger in more de-
veloped economies. A graphical inspection of the association between gross
secondary enrollment (ENROLSEC) and the Gini coefficient (GINI) appears
to confirm that there is indeed a negative relationship between these two
covariates. As seen in Figure 2.1, the higher the degree of inequality, the
lower the educational performance of countries.3
The influence of inequality in education is unlikely to run exclusively
3For a definition of these variables and a description of the sources, see Appendix B.
This figure is based on the pool sample of all country-year observations for which data on
both variables are available.
CHAPTER 2. THE INSTITUTIONAL LINK 16
Figure 2.1: Inequality and secondary enrollment
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through economic or market mechanisms. Government policies, either in the
form of direct provision of education or redistributive transfers, have certainly
a large impact on the educational patterns of nations and may counteract the
effects of increasing inequality. After all, education specially pre-university
schooling is publicly financed in most countries. If the initial income distri-
bution shapes the incentives of policymakers to carry out educational expan-
sion programs, as argued in this thesis, an additional political mechanism is
missing in the explanation. Figure 2.2 shows the same correlation between
inequality and secondary enrollment as before but for the sample of democ-
racies and non-democracies.4 As the fitted curves indicate, while inequality
reduces monotonically predicted enrollment under democratic institutions,
we see that the negative effect of the former wanes at higher values of the
Gini coefficient in non-democracies. If the causal channels of the relationship
between inequality and education were only economic then this relationship
should be the same under all institutional settings. The fact that it changes
with the political regime in place tells us that there must be other political
forces mediating the impact of inequality. In short, albeit these differential
patterns may not reflect causal associations, still they offer some preliminary
information justifying the presence of some political mechanisms at work.
There have been significant efforts aimed to elucidate the political econ-
omy reasons underlying the effect of inequality (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993;
Perotti 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). Based on the median voter
model of politics, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) came to the conclusion that
inequality is expected to be positively related with education via the in-
creased pressure for redistribution. This model conceives public education as
a tool for redistribution. The size of the publicly allocated education among
the citizenry is collectively decided by majority voting and thus it reflects the
preferences of the median income. As a mean preserving spread of income
makes the median voter poorer, she will want a higher degree of redistribu-
4The indicator used to distinguish political regimes (REGH) is a dummy measure of
democracy developed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000). The lines
in the graph show the predictions for enrollment based on a quadratic regression of this
variable on the Gini coefficient.
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Figure 2.2: Inequality and secondary enrollment by political regime
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tion and thus inequality will be translated into more government expenditure
on education. However, the “facts” displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are hard
to reconcile with this argument.
Based on a majority voting decision rule as well, but adopting different
modeling strategies with regard to the education-related policies, Perotti
(1993) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) came to different conclusions.
The main implication of these models is that per capita income determines
the direction of the impact of inequality: it is hypothesized to be positive
among poor economies but negative in rich countries.
These two studies claim that the relationship between inequality and edu-
cation is contingent on the level of economic development. By keeping the in-
stitutional framework constant, they focus on a “one-level interaction effect”
between purely economic variables. More importantly, the political-economy
mechanisms they examine center around the preferences over taxation and
redistribution of the decisive voter (or the winning coalition) of democratic
institutions and how economic structure induce these preferences. This, how-
ever, raises the question that if there are conflicting interests around policies,
something assumed in these models, then who decides policies will have a ma-
jor impact on final outcomes. Thus the predictions regarding the interactive
effect of inequality and per capita income may change if the interests of in-
dividuals other than the median voter are protected in the political process.
A potential source of variation of the dependent variable is therefore omitted
from the analysis, namely those factors determining the distribution of power
between the politically relevant groups. To fulfill this gap and offer a more
comprehensive account of the educational patterns of countries, this thesis
brings the role of political regimes to the fore. The type of political regime,
according to the proposed argument, is the key feature of constitutions defin-
ing the political weight of societal actors.
There is a prominent tradition in comparative politics arguing that the
political institutions structuring the decision-making process have important
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implications for the allocation of power among social groups. From Aristotle
to the Founding Fathers, democracy was viewed as the government of the
poor, opposed to an oligarchy in which political power is controlled by the
few rich. In line with this reasoning, J.S. Mill argued that:
The egalitarian threats of mass society and democratic mass politics....would
necessarily lead to tyranny and “class legislation” by the propertyless, uneducated
majority. (J. S. Mill, quoted in Franzese 2002: 8)
Karl Marx also declared that:
[Democracy is] a political form that....exacerbate[s] social contradicions by
withdrawing political guarantees from the socially dominant and giving political
power to the subordinate. (Karl Marx, quoted in Franzese 2002: 8).
In more contemporary studies of democratization, political systems have
also been connected with the class structure of society by emphasizing the
social forces leading to democracy and the social basis of nondemocratic
regimes. Moore, in a very influential book about the Social Origins of Dic-
tatorship and Democracy (1966), explained the three “paths to the modern
world” (democracy, fascism and communism) as the result of the organization
of the agriculture-based groups and their interaction with the commercial in-
terests. The strength of the bourgeoisie and the middle class is the key factor
behind the emergence of democratic systems. Although embracing a simi-
lar approach, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) stressed the role
of the working classes in forcing transitions to democracy. As the politi-
cal power of lower-income groups increases, which is associated with greater
capitalist development, the likelihood of democratic regimes rises as well.
In this thesis, political institutions are viewed first and foremost as a
method of aggregating conflicting preferences to arrive at social choices fa-
voring certain groups over others. This view resembles the approach of the
recent political-economy analyses on the choice of regimes (Boix 2003; Ace-
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moglu and Robinson 2006). Drawing their substantive roots from the pre-
vious literature, these models offer a more formal treatment to the groups’
preferences over the type of political institutions as well as to the politi-
cal dynamics in each regime. In democracies, public decisions are set by
the majority voting rule and everybody votes on policies. Accordingly and
as long as individuals have single-peaked preferences in a one-dimensional
policy space, the median voter theorem tells us that the winning proposal
corresponds to the ideal point of the median voter. With political parties,
this theorem predicts also a convergence of the policy platforms announced
by parties toward the preferred proposal of the median voter. Either in a
Downsian model of political competition -where parties care only about win-
ning elections- or in a model a´ la Wittman -where parties care about the
interests of different constituencies as well-, politicians of different political
stripes have incentives to offer the ideal policy of the median voter, provided
that they have certainty about the behavior of voters (Roemer 2001).
Under this formalization of democratic politics, the identity of the median
voter hinges on the number of groups and their proportions in the popula-
tion. When the politically relevant groups are the poor and the rich, and the
former constitutes a majority of the population, the decisive voter is a poor
agent and thus democratically-reached choices are determined by the inter-
ests of the poor. Yet in more realistic analytical frameworks where the middle
class forms a distinct political actor participating also in the decision-making
process, the median voter is a member of the middle class if neither of the
three social classes represents a majority proportion greater than one half in
the population.5 In the formal models of this thesis, this latter framework
is generally assumed implying therefore that democratic institutions allocate
political power in favor of the middle class.
5This framework is also more consistent with the idea that “the presence of the middle
class may act as a buffer between the rich and the poor” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006:
274) increasing the occurrence of consolidated democracies. This is so because when the
median voter belongs to the middle class, the redistributive pressures of democratic politics
diminishes and, as a consequence, the rich are more willing to concede democracy.
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The conventional modeling approach of nondemocracies tends to see dic-
tatorships as an unified category defined by the absence of the majority
rule in which an “oligarchy” of rich individuals dictate policies (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2006; Wacziarg 2001; Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). For
instance, Acemoglu and Robinson presume that nondemocracies, “instead
of representing the wishes of the population at large, they represent the
preferences of a subgroup of the population: the “elite”....nondemocracy is
generally a regime for the elite and the privileged.” (2006: 17-18). Moreover,
although these authors do not a priori associate the nature of the elite to any
social traits or cleavages, they focus almost exclusively on models in which
the elite is identified with the wealthy. They actually assert that “there is
often a close association between what nondemocratic regimes do and what
the rich want” (2006: 119).6
Yet, understanding dictatorships as political systems that represent sys-
tematically the interest of the rich seems very far-fetched. There are cases
that certainly indicate the opposite. Perhaps the most outstanding experi-
ences against this view would be the Communist regimes. However, the list
of “left-wing” dictatorships does not end here. In many African countries,
the ruling party or the dictator has endorsed platforms with clearly socialist
or leftist tenets. This pattern is evident, for example, from the statements
made by party congresses during the tenures of Neto and dos Santos in An-
gola, Kerekou in Benin, Machel and Chissano in Mozambique or Nyerere in
Tanzania. In Latin America, we find also examples of dictatorships advo-
cating leftist programs like the regimes established under Velasco Alvaredo
in Peru, Ortega Saavedra in Nicaragua or Torrijos Herrera in Panama. For
instance, the military-dominated administration of Velasco Alvaredo (1968-
1974) approved the Plan of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed
Forces aimed at a “Social Proprietorship” in which all enterprises would be
either state or worker-owned and would be managed collectively (Banks et
6Truly, this statement is later subjected to the qualification that the poor sectors of
society may establish under certain conditions effective constraints on what these regimes
can do.
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al. 1997: 659). The list goes on and on including countries all over the world.
Actually, in a worldwide sample of all country-year dictatorships from 1960
to 1996, the percentage of leftist governments turns out to be higher, 46 %,
than that of right-wing regimes, 36% (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4).
More consistent with this evidence, the theory of political transitions
proposed by Boix (2003) starts from a class-based distinction of dictatorships
according to which there are two types of nondemocratic systems controlled
either by the poor or by the rich. In a “right-wing” autocracy, the wealthy
impose their optimal policies and repress the poor while in a “left-wing”
dictatorship the poor “rule after expropriating all the wealthy’s capital.”
(p. 23). However, although he theoretically examines the conditions under
which each type of political institution (democracy, right-wing and left-wing
dictatorship) is more likely to occur, he does not empirically distinguishes
among nondemocracies when testing his hypotheses with the data. More
important for our purposes, when he analyzes the distributive consequences
of institutions via an empirical examination of the size of the public sector,
he merges all dictatorial cases and, in line with the conventional approach
mentioned above, assumes that all of them serve the interests of the most
aﬄuent groups of the society.
Based on a new dataset that I have created about the ideological ori-
entation of dictatorships (see Chapter 4), this thesis contributes in under-
standing the impact on educational outcomes of different ideological types
of nondemocratic regimes. Summarizing, this work try to cover two impor-
tant gaps of the literature just reviewed. On the one hand, it is argued that
the nature of political institutions constitutes a key variable in any complete
account of human capital accumulation since it determines the relative po-
litical weight of individual preferences during the decision process. Albeit
there could be other mechanisms in the explanation of why political regimes
make a difference for education investment,7 here I concentrate and explore
7The next section reviews the main alternative mechanisms of the relationship between
political regimes and education that have been suggested in the literature.
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the causal link about the distribution of power among the social groups in
conflict. On the other hand, in an attempt to overcome the shortcomings
of the usual political-economy approach to dictatorships, I incorporate the
ideological positions of autocratic regimes in the theoretical and empirical
analyses.
The classification of institutions used in this thesis separates political sys-
tems depending on who controls decision power. From a class-based model
of politics, conflicts over public decisions under democracy are resolved by
majority voting so that the person who dictates policy is the median voter
-who is also the median of the income distribution. Dictatorships are di-
vided into two types: left-wing or “populists” dictatorships and right-wing
autocracies. It is assumed throughout that left-wing dictatorships maximize
the welfare of individuals who are poorer than the person with the median
income, while right-wing dictatorships maximize the welfare of individuals
who are wealthier than the mean income in the economy.
One may justify this classification of regimes as follows. Suppose that
there are two political parties distinguished by their ideology. One is on
the left protecting the interests of the poor. The other is on the right ad-
vancing the welfare of the rich. Under democracy, as both parties need to
appeal to the median voter in order to win elections, they confront electoral
constraints that lead them to moderate their positions toward the median in-
come’s ideal policy. By contrast, in dictatorships they do not encounter such
constraints. They can implement their favorite policy without risking any
electoral prospects. As a result, it is more likely that under nondemocratic
institutions they will consider just the interest of their own constituencies
when making decisions.
The presence of electoral constraints is, therefore, the key dimension to
distinguish democratic from nondemocratic regimes. Thus, if other con-
straints on rulers are equally binding in any type of regime, dictatorships
are less restricted in their choices of policies. This and the assumption that
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politicians are perfect agents of social classes lead naturally to the proposed
ideological distinction of dictatorships.8
2.2 The type of political regime and educa-
tion: an overview of existing accounts
The relationship between political regimes and education has been the sub-
ject of several investigations. Even though it has been studied from different
perspectives, the existing research points generally to a positive association.
Democracy is argued to be positively related with the aggregate education
level in the population. A first distinction of the studies dealing with insti-
tutions and human capital could be established along the lines of the causal
direction they emphasize.
There is first a body of research within the broader modernization theory
that explores the effect of increasing education on the incidence of democracy.
The basic story, advanced by Lipset (1960), is that the process of develop-
ment and industrialization increases the level of education in the population
-among other democracy-encouraging things. In turn, a better-educated pop-
ulation develops a kind of outlook more culturally compatible with demo-
cratic practices. Education triggers a change of individual values more in
accordance with democratic attitudes such as a higher level of toleration to-
ward different political views. Besides showing the theoretical weaknesses of
this account, some scholars have provided empirical evidence to the contrary
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2005). Perhaps the most rigorous
econometric analyses against the main hypothesis of the modernization the-
ory -the one that relates economic progress to the emergence of democracy-
8Certainly politicians may have personal interests such as maximizing their rents that,
in the absence of accountability institutions or electoral controls, may induce them to
ignore the welfare of their own constituencies. This may distort the expected policy
implications of different regimes when politicians are assumed to be perfect agents of social
groups. Yet my interest is to see to what extent institutions, formalized as a method of
allocating political power among conflicting group preferences, help to explain the cross-
country and over-time variation of aggregate educational outcomes.
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are Przeworski and Limongi (1997), and Przeworski et al. (2000). In both
studies, these authors challenge this hypothesis by showing that the strong
correlation between democracy and development that systematically appears
in the data is due to the positive effects of per capita income on the stability
of democracies and not on the odds of democratic transitions.9
The second strand of research is directly related with the purposes of this
thesis. Based on a dichotomic classification of political regimes, its principal
goal is to evaluate the impact of institutions on educational outcomes. Al-
though the main contributions within this literature stress slightly distinct
mechanisms, the overall conclusion is that democracies tend to carry out
more ambitious educational programs. Basically, these arguments can be
grouped into two main building blocks. In the first place, there is an argu-
ment about the virtuous effect of democracy rooted in the recurrent idea that
democratic politicians are less insulated from citizens’ demands than their
autocratic counterparts (Brown 1999; Lake & Baum 2001). Even though
these studies do not embrace a conception of democratic politics in which
citizens select directly the policies -as in standard median voter models-, they
still conceive the vote as an instrument in the hand of citizens to somewhat
guide government affairs. Elections compel politicians to take the prefer-
ences of citizens into consideration when setting public policies. As long as
policymakers need the support of a majority of voters to enter or stay in
the government, the former put into practice certain policies as a strategy to
build electoral coalitions of support. Now educational policy can be manipu-
lated to that end, and the more comprehensive it is, the higher the electoral
pay-off.
In contrast, dictatorial regimes lack institutional incentives that could
induce rulers to meet social demands. As there is not any institution that
makes the political survival of dictators dependent on the consent of people,
it is commonly asserted that they are more insulated from the pressures
9See Boix and Stokes (2003) for recent supporting evidence of the “endogenous democ-
ratization” view claimed by the modernization theory.
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of social groups and thus less likely “to shift resources toward education
in respond to popular demands for educational opportunity. To the extent
that society demands subsidized primary education, a less insulated state
is more likely to increase the level of educational opportunity available to
its citizens.” (Brown 1999: 684). Hence democratic regimes are expected to
have higher educational profiles than dictatorial ones.
The fundamental problem of this theory is that it implicitly assumes that
voters share similar preferences over the desired level of public educational
provision. The fact that all individuals may want to increase their own human
capital, it does not follow that they agree on enacting a particular educa-
tional policy or a specific tax-subsidy scheme. As already maintained, the
redistributive nature of education-enhancing public plans leads to a distribu-
tional conflict between social groups in which they hold opposing views about
the degree of state intervention in facilitating human capital investment and
about the fiscal burden needed to finance these state programs. Once we rec-
ognize the presence of this distributional conflict around educational policies,
a set of questions arises immediately, what are the relevant societal actors in
confrontation? what are their preferences? How do these preferences change
when the design of education-related policies or other important conditions
such as income inequality change? These questions will be answered in the
next chapter through an examination of several political-economy models
that acknowledge the existence of individual heterogeneity.
Another problem related with the previous one is that this theory pre-
sumes not only that citizens sustain similar preferences but also that they
always demand a larger size of educational public provision. Unless we are
willing to accept that policy preferences are exogenous and do not vary with
economic conditions, it is reasonable to think that social groups adjust their
favorite policies to different political economy contexts. In the next chapter,
we will see how per capita income and economic inequality are important ex-
ogenous factors that condition individuals’ most desired government action.
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The final point deals with the effect of political regimes proposed by
the theory grounded on the idea of the insulation of dictators. This theory
implies a direct effect of political institutions. In econometric terms, this
means that the variable of regimes enters into the equation independently
of other causal factors. The theoretical argument stresses an accountability
mechanism, which entails the existence of a conflict between politicians and
voters. Assuming that citizens desire always a high level of public educa-
tion, democracy compels politicians to respond to these demands. In turn,
autocrats do not face any electoral constraints that could motivate them to
accommodate such social pressures. Therefore, the empirical implication of
this hypothesis is that the type of regime influences educational outcomes
directly and independently of the rest of causes. The indicator of political
institutions therefore constitutes an independent variable that, in the case of
a dichotomic measure, changes the intercept of the regression line.
My argument, however, stresses a power-distribution mechanism among
the social groups in conflict. Political institutions determine outcomes by
allocating political power between conflicting interests. It follows logically
that it is not possible to draw predictions regarding the relationship between
democracy and education that can be applied across the board regardless of
particular conditions. Since the policy preferences of groups are not exoge-
nous but change with per capita income and inequality, as claimed above,
then the impact of political regimes may vary with these conditions. The
implications for econometric modeling is that the institutional variable in-
teracts with other factors and that institutions exert an indirect effect on
educational outcomes.
The second type of explanation within the literature that points towards
a positive impact of democratic regimes (Wacziarg 2001) starts from the as-
sumption that public education serves as an instrument of redistribution from
the rich to the poor. Accordingly, lower-income individuals would rather
larger educational subsidies than relatively more aﬄuent agents. Using a
democratic method of collective decisions would result, thanks to the politi-
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cal competition, in the adoption of the most preferred policy of the median
voter -who is the median income. On the contrary, dictatorial regimes tend
to approve those policies that benefit the well-off groups. Hence the con-
clusion that the democratic nature of institutions promotes human capital
accumulation. However, it is very unrealistic to presume that the wealthy
always dictate policies under dictatorships. As discussed above, there are
autocratic experiences in which dictators appeal to the poor as their bases of
support and openly maintain ideological positions more in accordance with
the interest of the less aﬄuent sectors of society. Another shortcoming of this
account is that individual policy choices are not revised when the economic
context changes. It is assumed that individuals hold the same policy views
independently of economic conditions.
From a historical perspective, Lindert (2004) offers a similar explanation.
In an attempt to account for the unlike historical paths followed by the West-
ern countries in extending formal education to the masses, he argues that the
degree of government decentralization and the presence of democratic insti-
tutions are the key causal factors. Yet the effect of these two variables is
contingent on the level of economic development since it determines social
demands for public schooling.
At early stages of development, citizens are not particularly concerned
with getting some formal education. Thus whether politics is open to most
social groups or decentralized to local units is something irrelevant for ed-
ucation policy. Schooling enrollment will be very low either because the
authoritarian political elite do not wish to extend education to middle and
poor income groups or because most ordinary citizens in a democracy do not
defend a public and universal educational provision.
Only when countries take off is when one may expect that these political
factors would unchain their impact on public schooling. As economies de-
velop, education becomes an valuable asset in the market and an important
source of income. Consequently, citizens start to demand a deeper involve-
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ment of government in the provision of education. The fact that institutions
are open to the political voice of these groups may have a significant pos-
itive influence in the degree of accommodating social pressures for public
education system.
Chapter 3
Tracing the Impact of Political
Regimes
In this chapter, I present the formal argument of this thesis. I first layout the
three main models of the political-economy literature on education (Saint-
Paul and Verdier 1993; Perotti 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995) that
elucidate how redistributive politics under democracy determines aggregate
investment in human capital. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the
theoretical implications of these models for other institutional frameworks. It
extends their logic to non-democratic institutions to derive predictions with
which to make comparisons across types of regimes.
In the absence of a common good, any solution -democratic or not- to
the heterogeneity of interests around policies entails a particular distribution
of policy costs and benefits. Since the choice of policies creates distribu-
tional conflicts, competing groups have strong incentives to use all resources
at their disposal to shape such distribution to their advantage. Thus the rel-
ative strength of social groups in the political process have a major impact
on final outcomes. If the type of political regime shifts the balance of power
among these groups or resolves who dictates policies as argued in the pre-
vious chapter, political institutions should play a crucial role in explaining
why some governments implement more ambitious education programs than
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others.
From this causal mechanism, we cannot generate however hypotheses
about regimes and human capital without knowing the policy preferences of
agents. It is not possible to draw a general theoretical expectation regarding
the relationship between institutions and human capital that can be valid
across distinct relevant situations. Since institutions determine which group
sets the policy, the effect of regimes on educational outcomes depend on the
preferences of the particular group in power. In turn, these preferences are
likely to change with certain conditions. In the formal models analyzed be-
low, it is examined how per capita income and wealth inequality influences
on the utility of individuals and therefore on their most desire education-
related program. Only if it is known the exact state of these two exogenous
factors, we can define the structure of individual preferences and accordingly
develop hypotheses about the expected education outcomes in different in-
stitutional scenarios. In addition, as agents adjust their optimal policies to
changes in conditions, then the expected policy and its subsequent results in
human capital accumulation under a particular institutional framework will
alter accordingly.
An expanding program of formal schooling may have distribute conse-
quences that not always go in the same direction. In some specific situations,
a policy aimed to promote the accumulation of human capital may induce a
distribution of resources from the rich to the poor. Yet, in other contexts,
increasing the rate of human capital stock may require a concentration of re-
sources in a small sector of society so that at least some individuals can afford
the costs of schooling. As shown below, the precise nature of redistribution
implied by the education-enhancing policy hinges on various pieces: the pol-
icy design affecting human capital, the presence of fixed costs of education,
and the economic conditions under which policies are taken.
But human capital accumulation may also have efficiency outcomes that
can be grasped by all individuals including the non-educated ones. For in-
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stance, as mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, a better-educated
population may speed the adoption of new technologies or skilled workers
may raise the productivity of their less educated co-workers. Does this side-
effect of human capital alter the nature of the distributional conflict around
education-related policies? This relies on whether agents internalize such
gain, that is, whether they incorporate these spin-off benefits in their utility
function. The second model examined in this chapter does this by assuming
the existence of externalities. As will be seen, the fact that education creates
positive externalities does not eliminate the possibility that a policy conflict
emerges. Individuals, when defining their induced-policy preferences, will as-
sess whether the gains obtained from allowing other groups to get educated
compensate the costs associated with such educational-enhancing program.
But certainly there are scenarios in which those groups bearing to a large
extent the fiscal burden of policy are more willing to promote human capital
accumulation precisely because of its positive externalities.
A final point on the assumptions of the formal models is worth noting.
Educational choices of individuals are driven completely by economic forces.
The costs and benefits of schooling are assumed to be exclusively economic.
In particular, in the last two models examined below, it is assumed that
the gain from education takes the form of increased earnings and that there
are some fixed costs of education that may prevent certain income groups
from investing in human capital. Thus the unique force determining whether
individuals get educated is whether they have sufficient funds at their dis-
posal. To simplify the modeling of individual educational decisions, cultural
or other demand-side factors that could shape agents’ schooling choices are
not considered in the formal models.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section examines a for-
mal model that rests on the standard view of redistribution along the lines
of Meltzer and Richard (1981) but in which the instrument of redistribu-
tion is public education instead of income transfers. Section 3.2 focuses on
a model which emphasizes the role of human capital externalities in deter-
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mining the equilibrium size of government redistribution when individuals
are liquidity-constrained and face both imperfect capital markets and fixed
costs in their educational investments. Section 3.3 highlights the excludabil-
ity of educational subsidies. The model considered in this section analyzes
the political-economy factors that explain human capital accumulation when
public expenditure on education can be targeted towards certain income
groups. Finally, section 3.4 concludes with a comparison of the predictions
obtained across models.
3.1 Public education as an instrument of re-
distribution
The first model examined here is the one from Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993).1
the main purpose of this model is to question the conventional idea that the
combination of democracy and inequality is bad for growth. According to
the standard approach, when collective decisions are taken through majority
voting and income distribution is rightward skewed, the decisive voter will
favor certain redistribution of wealth, generating adverse incentives for in-
vestment. By considering a model in which the instrument of redistribution
is public education, Saint-Paul and Verdier come to the conclusion that even
if increased inequality may imply pressures for higher taxes, this policy does
not need to have an undesirable effect on growth. In fact, whenever the pro-
ceeds from taxation are used to fund public education -increasing thus the
stock of human capital- income inequality might promote growth instead.
The structure of their model is the following. Consider a non-overlapping
generation model in which an individual i of generation t lives one period
and has one child. There is a continuum of agents within each generation,
and total population in each generation is normalized to 1. Individuals differ
in their endowment of human capital hit, which is the only source of income
1Saint-Paul, G., and T. Verdier. (1993). “Education, Democracy and Growth.” Jour-
nal of Development Economics 42: 399-407.
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inequality. Each individual i cares about his own consumption cit and the
human capital of his child hit+1, so that he maximizes a utility function
U (cit, hit+1), which is increasing and strictly concave in each of its argument.
The production function of human capital is
hit+1 = δ (1− z)hit + δgt, (3.1)
where 1− z is the exogenously determined amount of time parents devote to
the transmission of human capital to their children; gt is the size of publicly
provided schooling at time t and δ ≥ 1 is a productivity factor capturing the
extent to which public and private education contribute to the human capital
stock of a particular member of the younger generation -note that they are
assumed to generate the same productivity. Note also that public education
is supplied in an equal way, so all agents receive always an uniform amount
of public schooling regardless of their parents’ income.
In this model, human capital is the only factor of production, so
Yt = Ht. (3.2)
Yt is total output, and Ht the total amount of human capital actually used
in production, i.e. Ht = z
∫ 1
0
hitdi = zhˆt, where hˆt is the mean of the
distribution of skills in generation t. Equation 3.2 implies that the wage per
unit of human capital is one, and hence the income of an individual i is equal
to her human capital endowments multiplied by the time she devotes to work,
namely, hitz. Public education is financed by a proportional income tax τt
and is equally distributed among individuals, so that consumption cit is equal
to hitz (1− τt) and the educational subsidy gt each child obtains amounts to
τtzhˆt.
I now turn to the political equilibrium analysis. The only choice variable
CHAPTER 3. TRACING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL REGIMES 36
is the tax rate, which completely determines consumption, public education
and the aggregate level of human capital of the younger generation given the
exogenous parameters z and δ. Moreover, since tax revenues are allocated
by a per capita educational transfer to all agents, a higher tax rate implies
also a greater human capital stock hit+1 for each i. The preferred policy τ
∗
it
of each individual i is given by
τ ∗it = argmaxU(cit, hit+1) = argmaxU
[
hitz(1− τt), (1− z)δhit + δτtzhˆt
]
.
(3.3)
From the first order condition (and from an assumption that U is a homoth-
etic function)
τ ∗it = max
{
0, τ
(
hit/hˆt
)}
, (3.4)
being τ
(
hit/hˆt
)
the solution of
U ′h(τ)
U ′c(τ)
=
hit
δhˆt
, (3.5)
where U ′h and U
′
c denote the partial derivatives of the utility function with
respect to human capital and consumption.
Examining closer the implications of (3.5) for policy preferences, notice
first that as
U ′h
U ′c
= F
(
h
c
)
and F ′ (.) < 0, an increase of the actual tax rate will
ultimately reduces
U ′h
U ′c
by raising the human capital-consumption ratio, h
c
.
Therefore, as we move up along the income distribution -greater hit-, the tax
rate that satisfies equation 3.5 becomes smaller. The intuition for this result
is the following: since everyone gets the same amount of public education but
its price in terms of the consumption parents must give up is increasing in
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their income, this tax-education financing scheme involves a redistribution
from the rich to the poor. Because of these distributional consequences,
relatively wealthier people will prefer then a lower tax rate. In addition,
the utility return obtained from public schooling decreases with individual
earnings because, on the one hand, human capital yields decreasing returns
in utility and, on the other, the offspring of parents with higher amounts of
endowments start from the beginning with greater human capital due to the
private transmission of education. As a result, τ
(
hit
hˆt
)
is a negative function
of hit
hˆt
.
Consider first the political-economic equilibrium reached under democ-
racy, where everybody votes and the mechanism used to decide policy is the
majority rule. Since individual preferences satisfy the single-crossing prop-
erty, the voting equilibrium is given by the preferred tax rate of the person
with the median income in the distribution, hmt. Furthermore, the more
unequal is the income distribution, the higher the level of taxation. Sup-
pose that individual endowments hit are distributed log-normally according
to hit ∼ LN
(
hˆt, σ
2
)
, where σ2 is the variance of the log of incomes. Then
income equality can be seen alternatively as ∆ = hmt
hˆt
= e−2σ
2
, which is
inversely related to the variance. A mean preserving spread of income -a
spread keeping the mean of the distribution constant- will make the median
voter poorer relative to the average. Thus, and as equation 3.5 tell us, this
increase in inequality will be translated into a higher actual tax rate, more
government expenditures in education and a larger average stock of human
capital of the younger generation, hˆt+1.
What should we expect to occur in right-wing and left-wing dictatorships
compared to democracy? As mentioned earlier, the analytical strategy fol-
lowed here so as to distinguish among autocratic-institutional settings is to
assume a different objective function of dictators. By definition, the person
who decides policy in wealth-biased regimes tries to promote the interests of
those types wealthier than the mean of the distribution, whereas left-wing
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or “populist” dictators maximize the welfare of individuals located in lower
positions than the median. Given such classification, the political implica-
tions derived from applying this model to non-representative systems are
straightforward.
Ceteris paribus, and assuming that the median voter wants a certain level
of public education, then in right-wing dictatorships, as only the utility of
the more aﬄuent groups of the society is taken into account, the level of
taxation, τR, government spending and the average stock of human capital,
hˆR,t+1, are expected to be lower than in democratic institutions. Moreover,
increased inequality would reduce political support for public education. This
is because the constituency of wealth-biased regimes becomes richer, and
thus the cost to them of non-private schooling raises at the same time that
their gains go down. For exactly opposite reasons, we should observe that
governments in left-wing dictatorships enact higher tax rates and provide
more education to all agents than in democracies. Like in the democratic
case, inequality is predicted to exert a positive effect on taxes and human
capital accumulation when the Left governs unconstrained. Consequently,
the expected differences across regimes are: τL > τD > τR regarding policy,
and hˆL,t+1 > hˆD,t+1 > hˆR,t+1 for education outcomes. These predictions are
summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Predictions from Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993)
Regime Tax Rate/Human Capital ∂τ∂∆ ,
∂hˆt+1
∂∆
Democracy τD/hˆD,t+1 −
Left Dic τL/hˆL,t+1 −
Right Dic τR/hˆR,t+1 +
Note: ∆ indicates economic equality.
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3.2 Income redistribution and human capital
investment: The positive externalities of
education
The model studied in this section, Perotti (1993),2 considers education as
a discrete choice. In this paper, Perotti analyzes the impact of inequality
on investment in human capital -the source of growth- when the degree of
redistribution is determined by majority vote. He solves for the political
equilibria that may emerge in democratic institutions under different config-
urations of income distribution and per capita income. In contrast to the
previous model, here public policy redistributes only income and then indi-
viduals decide whether or not to get educated. Furthermore, there is a fixed
cost of investing in human capital and a positive externality from education.
Here is the essence of the model. There are two periods and three groups:
rich, middle and poor distinguished by their pre-tax income yR > y > yM >
yP , where y is average income. Each group represents a fraction λi of the
population, and λi < 0.5, i = R, M , P . So the median income is in the
middle class and is initially below the mean. There is no capital market, no
discounting and there are some costs in collecting taxes -avoiding thus the
possibility of a corner solution in the equilibrium tax rate, namely τ = 1.
In period 1, individuals can either invest a fixed amount e = 1 in edu-
cation (paying a cost of 1) or not. All investment must be financed out of
post-tax earnings and benefits the investing person with a constant increase
of her second-period income, δ > 1. Since δ > e, all individuals will want
to invest in human capital. There is also a social return to education in
the sense that the income of all individuals in period 2 is increased by an
amount equal to µE, where µ is a positive coefficient and E is the proportion
of agents who decided to be educated in period 1.3
2Perotti, R. (1993). “Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth.” Review
of Economic Studies 60: 755-76.
3Note that the aggregate-human capital measure E is not equivalent to that of the
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In the first period, individuals have to make also a collective decision over
the degree of redistribution. Taxes are proportional to pre-tax income and the
revenues collected are allocated through an equal transfer across individuals.
In period 2, agents consume. They have preferences over consumption ci,t in
period 1 and 2, so that the indirect utility function of an agent belonging to
group i is:
U = yi (1− τ) +
(
τ − τ 2) y − e+ (yi + δe+ µE) , (3.6)
where τ refers to the actual tax rate, −τ 2y captures the efficiency cost of
taxes, and (yi + δe+ µE) represents second-period income, which includes
earnings in the preceding period plus all educational returns.
In the absence of capital markets, agent i will invest in education if her
post-tax first-period income is higher than 1 -the cost of education. The size
of transfers determines therefore how many people acquire education and
which groups will eventually get educated. Thus, and as the proportion of
people investing in human capital increases the income of all is in second
period, when making their proposals individuals must take into account how
fiscal policy would affect the other agents’ educational choices. For that rea-
son, it is convenient to discuss briefly the relationship between the level of
taxation and the fraction of the population that eventually becomes edu-
cated.
The first thing to note is that this relationship depends upon the average
income in economy. In a wealthy economy, characterized by yR > y > yM >
previous model, hˆt+1. As seen before, hˆt+1 refers to the aggregate level of education
attained by the younger generation. In that model, education was a continuous variable
and individuals were allowed to make marginal decisions pertaining whether to obtain a
little more of education. By contrast, in Perotti’s model, individual-educational decisions
are discrete choices: either you invest a fixed amount in human capital or not. Therefore,
E refers to the proportion of educated people in the population.
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1 > yP , the rich and the middle class can afford the cost of education. Yet
the poor may acquire some formal schooling if and only if the actual tax rate
is high enough to make their post-tax income greater than 1. Consider now
a very poor economy defined by yR > 1 > y > yM > yP . Since per capita
income is lower than the cost of education, agents with pre-tax earnings less
than one will remain unskilled despite government redistribution. Moreover,
by reducing the wealth of all individuals above the mean, the effect of taxes
is largely to hurt potential investors instead. Hence, public redistribution
may encourage the accumulation of human capital when the economy is rich
enough, whereas it may hinder investment in poor countries.
In the remainder of this section, I solve for the political equilibria of the
model under different institutional settings. To that end, it is necessary to
know beforehand what is the desired tax rate of each income group. This is
found by maximizing (3.6) with respect to τ , which yields:
τi = max {0, argmaxU (ci,1, ci,2)} , (3.7)
where ci,1 and ci,2 are consumption in period 1 and 2 respectively. To start
with, for each individual i there is a optimal tax rate at which post-tax
income during period 1 is maximized, that is
τ ∗i = max
{
0,
1
2
(
1− yi
y
)}
. (3.8)
We see from equation 3.8 that τ ∗i is a decreasing function of
yi
y
, hence
τ ∗P > τ
∗
M > τ
∗
R = 0. Yet, as the actual tax rate determines how many
individuals are able to invest in human capital, which in turn alters second-
period income via the educational externality, µE, it may be the case that
τ ∗i does not maximize overall utility. If the optimal tax rate during period
1 (τ ∗i ) prevents certain groups from acquiring education -reducing thereby
CHAPTER 3. TRACING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL REGIMES 42
future income-, then when making her proposal individual i has to compare
her global utility at τ = τ ∗i with that from setting a redistribution program
consistent with human capital accumulation. Her final choice will be the
policy that yields the highest total gain. This point will be clearer below when
studying particular cases distinguished by the economic conditions under
which agents decide policy.
The level of taxation actually enacted in each type of regime depends
upon (i) the objective of who dictates policy and (ii) initial conditions in
economy. The first question has already been answered by assuming that
governments in different political systems try to promote the interests of dif-
ferent social classes. So in order to learn the expected pattern associated
with a certain institutional framework, we can just focus on how the person
who controls decision power determines the tax rate that maximizes his sup-
porters’ welfare without having to care about the other classes’ preferences.
And it is precisely during this process of finding out the ideal point of the
decisive actor when initial economic conditions start playing a crucial role. In
particular, this section explores the impact of average income and inequality
on policy preferences.
It was argued before that the degree of redistribution promoting invest-
ment in human capital varies with the wealth of the economy. Thus, when
the human capital-enhancing tax rate is at odds with first-period optimal
taxes, per capita income defines the nature of the dilemma confronted by
the decisive actor: whether she has to trade higher or lower taxes (than her
preferred one) for a larger stock of human capital. In light of the different
economic positions of potential investors, the short-run optimal degree of re-
distribution could be too excessive in poor economies but insufficient in rich
ones in order to increase human capital. As will be shown later, inequality
affects directly how politically-dominant groups resolve this dilemma.
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3.2.1 Rich economy
Let us examine first what would it happen in a rich economy (i.e., yR >
y > yM > 1 > yP ). Under this state of the economy, only the middle class
and the wealthy can afford education without government transfers. The
central question for future growth is then the education of the poor. Hence
one should expect that among wealthy countries the larger the size of public
redistribution, the higher the aggregate level of human capital in the society.
Suppose that τP is the smallest tax rate at which the poor reach a post-
tax income equal one. This tax rate is the smaller root of the solution to
yP (1− τ) + (τ − τ 2) y − 1 = 0. Assume further that τP is a feasible choice
in that there are sufficient resources to provide the lower class with formal
schooling and to pay the cost of collecting taxes.
I consider first the case in which conflicts over policies are resolved by
majority voting and everybody votes. The policy eventually reached through
this political method, as Perotti shows, corresponds always to the median
voter’s ideal point, who is too the median income in the economy.4 Thus it
is sufficient to analyze the middle class’s preferences in order to determine
the equilibrium outcomes in democratic institutions.
As pointed out earlier, τ ∗M constitutes the best choice for the present
consumption of the middle class. If τ ∗M ≥ τP , then this policy is also consis-
tent with the accumulation of human capital, maximizing thus overall utility.
However, if τ ∗M < τP , a yP type will not acquire education at τ
∗
M and accord-
ingly a conflict between first and second-period optimal taxes arises. The
median voter faces a intertemporal trade-off. If she proposes τP , the poor
get educated and her next period income goes up due to the externality ef-
fect. Yet she loses a certain amount of consumption in the short run relative
to τ ∗M by having to intensify the degree of taxation. Whether the gain from
setting τP , that is the externality return, compensates the ensuing loss in
first-period consumption will depend on income distribution; a factor that
4For a proof of this result, see Perotti (1993).
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determines the amount of first-period consumption loss.
In this model, total income is distributed among three groups within
which all individuals obtain the same level of income. This means then that
inequality is completely accounted for by the between-group dispersion. One
simple and convenient way of measuring inequality in this context would be
making pairwise comparisons between the income of the three types of earn-
ers. The convenience of using this particular method is that when studying
the consequences of a mean-preserving spread it enables us to be more precise
about the impact of inequality by identifying where exactly in the distribu-
tion the dispersion has occurred, which will be shown to be central for the
results. There are three possible comparisons to make so as to asses the in-
equality degree of a certain allocation: first, to look at the distance between
the poor and the middle class, keeping the income of the rich constant -let
this be denoted by ∆PM |R =
yP
yM
; second, concentrating on the ratio of the
middle class to the rich, given the income of the poor -which is denoted by
∆MR|P =
yM
yR
; and finally to look at the gap among the rich and the poor,
fixing the income of the middle class -denoted by ∆PR|M =
yP
yR
. Note that
the higher these income ratios, the more equal the society would be.5
Back to the dilemma the median voter is to deal with, and focusing on
∆PM |R as the relevant equality measure, the basic idea is that an increase in
inequality may reduce the median voter’s incentives to educate the poor. In a
very unequal economy, the middle class will have to pay more in taxes to fully
reap the gains stemming from the education of low-income types. First, since
the latter become poorer, the transfer they need to afford education (1− yP )
would be larger and so would τP . Second, as middle-income taxpayers are
wealthier, their taxable income goes up and therefore for a given tax rate
the absolute amount of income taken away from them increases too. As a
result of both forces, the cost of subsiding the education of the lower class
clearly raises from the perspective of a yM individual inducing her to choose
5In his paper, Perotti only makes the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect
to the distance between the middle class and the poor.
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unambiguously τ ∗M < τP , so that the less aﬄuent groups of the society cannot
invest in human capital. On the contrary, in a more equal society, exactly
the opposite occurs. The same two effects operate as well but now in reverse
directions making more likely either τ ∗M ≥ τP or that the middle class might
prefer τP if τ
∗
M < τP (see Table 3.2).
What patterns are non-democratic institutions expected to bring about?
In “populists” autocracies, dictators never confront a trade-off. The tax
rate that maximizes the welfare of the poor during period 1, τ ∗P is also the
optimal one for their future consumption. As by assumption τP is a feasible
choice in a wealthy economy, then it must be true that τ ∗P ≥ τP . In other
words, by enacting their first-period most-advantageous policy, the poor will
be able to afford education and hence it should be expected that under left-
wing dictatorships all groups will undertake their investments, regardless of
income inequality. With respect to wealth-biased regimes, notice that the
person with the decision power always has to meet a similar dilemma the
median voter faced in democracies. If he opts for a policy paying attention
merely to his constituency’s first-period consumption, i.e. τ ∗R = 0, the rich
will have to accept some income losses in the long run.
Does income inequality have any bearing on the way right-wing dictators
resolve this dilemma? Like in the case of wealthy democracies, here the
effect of a income spread -again, a larger gap between the median and the
poor, given the income of the rich- is mainly to discourage governments from
carrying out a policy that would promote human capital expansion. Again,
as the poor will need a greater transfer to afford education, high-income
individuals will have to sacrifice more present consumption for the former
to get educated. Certainly, the fact that the middle class becomes wealthier
means that the rich must bear a lower share in financing the education of
the less aﬄuent groups of the economy. But still well-off people will have to
pay more since taxation necessarily increases due to the impoverishment of
low-income agents.
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Comparing predictions across political regimes, we may establish the fol-
lowing conclusions -see columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.2. “Populists” dictator-
ships tend to redistribute more than any other regime allowing the poor to
invest in human capital, so that we should observe that everyone gets edu-
cated in wealthy countries with authoritarian governments controlled by the
Left. Recall that τ ∗P > τ
∗
M > τ
∗
R = 0 and τ
∗
P ≥ τP . In more equal societies,
democracies approach the educational pattern of previous regime. When the
middle class is poorer and the poor are better off, the median voter may
support higher taxes up to the point low-income types can afford the cost
of education, and thus one should observe that under this political-economic
context all social classes get educated as well.
In a more unequal economy or equivalently when the distance between
the median and the poor enlarges, the decisive voter in democracy may worse
off enacting the human capital-enhancing policy since its costs to her have
increased. As a result, only the middle and high income types are expected
to obtain formal schooling. Finally, right-wing regimes’ educational perfor-
mance is predicted to approach that of democracies. Only if the ex-ante
distribution of income is equal enough, the poor could invest in human capi-
tal. Otherwise it is too costly to the rich to endorse a redistribution package
that enables low-income individuals to meet the expense of education. How-
ever, since the cost of setting τP is always higher for the wealthy than for the
middle class, the value of τP at which ”wealth-biased” policy makers may
want to promote human capital must be lower than that of their democratic
counterparts, given a fixed externality return. Put it in another way, the
minimum level of income equality necessary for the poor to get educated has
to be greater in right-wing regimes than in democracies.
So far I have focused on ∆PM |R when exploring the impact of income
inequality on the equilibrium outcomes under different institutional arrange-
ments. Yet, if inequality is assessed by looking at ∆MR|P or ∆PR|M instead,
results radically change from what has been put forward up to now. To be
sure, the mechanism through which inequality shapes the incentives of gov-
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ernments in promoting human capital is always the same no matter what
particular measure is adopted: changes in the income distribution only affect
the cost of educating the poor. But whether this cost increases or decreases
from the standpoint of a particular group depends upon where in the distri-
bution the dispersion occurs. For that reason, it is important to analyze how
institutions and politically-relevant actors respond alternatively to variations
in ∆MR|P and ∆PR|M .
As pointed out earlier, ∆MR|P quantifies the distance between the middle
class and the rich for a given income of the poor and for a given average.
The smaller this distance, the higher the value of ∆MR|P , and the more equal
the economy would be. For the purposes at hand, the key consequence of
an increase in equality in this part of the distribution is that the middle
class has to bear a increased burden in subsidizing the least well-off people’
investment, whereas the rich’ contribution declines. This is so because the
taxable income of middle and upper earners goes up and down respectively
with equality - and remember that taxes are proportional to income. It is
reasonable to think therefore that while the middle class is less prone to
supporting the human capital-enhancing policy, the more aﬄuent groups of
the society are more disposed to do so.
Accordingly, among wealthy democracies tax policy and human capital
should be negatively affected by the level of equality between the middle
class and the rich, and positively related in wealthy right-wing dictatorships.
Yet if the poor manage to invest under the latter institutions, then they also
should get educated under democratic ones given that, once more, it is always
the case that taxes are more costly to the upper class than to the median
voter. Do “populists” dictators react in any way to changes in ∆MR|P ? As
shown in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.2, there is no reason to expect any
adjustment at all. Since the lower class’s initial economic position remains
unchanged, so does its first-period optimal tax rate, and thus everyone can
still afford education.
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Taking into consideration ∆PR|M as the relevant equality indicator, a
more equal economy would be characterized by a higher concentration of
incomes around the mean. As before, the response of governments to a more
imbalanced income distribution may be contingent on the politics of the
alternative institutional arrangements in place. When the decision-making
process sticks to democratic rules, increased equality has a positive effect
on equilibrium outcomes -see columns 7 and 8 in Table 3.2. Notice that
the argument stated before to explain how wealth-biased regimes respond
to variations in the gap between the middle class and the poor holds here.
The idea is that low-income types now require a smaller degree of public
redistribution in order to invest in human capital so that the middle class is
to pay less for these investments to take place.
Likewise, under wealth-biased regimes income equality generates upward
pressures on taxes and human capital. Right-wing dictators are induced to
increase taxation, first, because the poor need a lesser amount of transfer.
And second, because as the rich fall closer to the middle class, their contri-
bution to financing public education would be smaller. Finally, faced with
an increased equality, “populists” dictators are expected to cut down the de-
gree of taxation -as a consequence of their constituencies’ improved material
conditions, which leads by (3.8) to a lower τ ∗P -, yet the rate of human capital
accumulation should remain constant, as it is still true that this tax rate
must be equal or greater than τP .
3.2.2 Poor economy
Consider now the case of a poor economy (i.e. yR > 1 > y > yM > yP ).
Since average income is located below the cost of education, those individuals
with sufficient resources to afford education on their own -namely the rich-
are the only potential investors in economy. Instead of promoting investment
of relatively poorer individuals, here the size of government redistribution is
hypothesized to endanger the investment ability of high-income agents by
reducing their income. Hence, the best case for human capital accumulation
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takes place when the latter are wealthy enough and taxes are bounded to a
low-value range. Note that if yR < 1, all regimes will eventually arrive at a
similar equilibrium in which nobody can acquire formal schooling. Assume
from now on that yR > 1. Suppose also that τ˜R is the highest tax rate at
which the post-tax income of the rich is equal to the price of education.6
Let us examine the political-economic equilibrium in democratic institu-
tional frameworks, which as stated earlier corresponds always to the median
voter’s ideal policy. For the sake of clarity, imagine for instance a society
starting with an unequal distribution of income. I concentrate first on the
distance between the middle class and the poor, given the income of the rich,
which has just been assumed to be greater than one. So this economy is
characterized by a mass around high income, a mass just below the mean
and a mass of very poor.
Under this configuration of the income distribution, the median voter
may favor a limited degree of taxation such that τ ∗M ≤ τ˜R since she is close to
the mean and since there are some efficiency costs of collecting taxes. If that
is the case, then the pivotal voter’s political decision problem is solved: her
desired tax rate does not prevent the rich from investing in human capital
increasing accordingly future growth.
Imagine that for some reason inequality decreases in the sense that the
gap between the middle class and the poor shrinks. As the decisive voter get
poorer, she will want to tax away more income of the rich. Consequently,
it is possible that now the rich cannot invest in human capital at the me-
dian voter’s preferred policy so that the latter faces again a intertemporal
trade-off. However, the nature of the dilemma has changed. Now she must
trade less redistribution during first period for more long-term consumption.
Income inequality will determine once again the net benefit to the median
voter from deviating from her first-period optimal tax rate.
6This tax rate is the larger root of yR (1− τ) +
(
τ − τ2) y − 1 = 0.
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In a poor democracy, unlike what occurred in its wealthy counterpart,
the less favorable configuration of below-the-mean income distribution for
investment is an equal allocation of resources. The basic idea behind this
hypothesis is very simple: as an increase in equality implies that the pivotal
voter get poorer, the net transfer she can get from redistribution increases
and also her post-tax income is maximized at a higher tax rate. Therefore,
other things equal, it becomes more costly to her to limit taxes so that high-
income individuals can still afford education. In sum, increased equality not
only leaves the decisive voter in a quandary but it also makes her less prone
to promote human capital accumulation (see Table 3.3).
Regarding non-democratic institutions, it is clear that the person who
controls political power in a right autocracy always defends a zero tax rate.
This is so because it enhances both the short-run welfare and the investment
ability of his supporters.
In contrast, populists dictators will always redistribute some income of
the rich. Moreover, if their constituency’s ideal policy, τ ∗P is greater than τ˜R,
then they will confront the aforementioned trade-off. Yet, a lower dispersion
of income below the mean may induce them to reduce taxation so that the
upper class can afford education. Since the poor’s starting economic position
improves with equality, the net gain they obtain from redistribution goes
down, and so does their preferred tax rate. As a result, they will have to
sacrifice less post-tax income in order to reap the benefit from the education
of the rich. But if the latter get educated indeed in left dictatorships, they
should be able also in democracies given that restraining taxes is under any
condition less costly for the middle class than for the lower class.
Having determined the policy equilibria in each type of regime, the pre-
dicted differences across political systems can be summarized as follows -see
Table 3.3, columns 3 and 4. First, unlike other regimes, wealth-biased dic-
tatorships are expected to preserve the initial allocation of resources so that
the more aﬄuent members of the society can invest in human capital. Under
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these institutional settings, inequality is hypothesized to have no impact on
fiscal policy and educational outcomes.
Second, in more unequal economies, whenever faced with a trade-off, the
decisive voter in democracy seems to be more willing to trade a moderate level
of taxation for more future consumption, whereas “populists” dictators tend
to impose their desired policy at the expense of educational attainment -note
that income inequality means that the lower class becomes poorer increasing
the cost of letting the rich invest. Of course, the opposite results are predicted
in more equal societies. While a less dispersion of income undermines the
median voter’s incentives to undertake a redistribution program such that
the upper class can still obtain education, it makes left authoritarian rulers
more disposed to do so.7 Therefore, human capital accumulation should
be negatively affected by income equality across democracies but positively
affected under left-wing dictatorships.
Making comparative statics with respect to one of the other two measures
of income equality, ∆MR|P =
y
M
yR
, the expected patterns of most institutional
settings completely change. Other things equal, when the distance between
the middle class and the rich is smaller, an important obvious consequence is
that the human capital-enhancing tax rate (τ˜R) declines, increasing thus the
cost of allowing the rich to be educated in those regimes in which politically-
dominant groups usually sustain preferences for greater government redis-
tribution. To reap the social returns of education, those groups now must
sacrifice a extra amount of today’s consumption by having to impose a more
restricted level of taxation.
By virtue of this mechanism, a dictator maximizing the welfare of low-
income earners would be more prone to opt for the most advantageous short-
term policy of his supporters. It should be the case that in poor left au-
7However, if it is the case that the fiscal policy implemented in democratic institutions
actually impedes high-income agents to acquire education, one should observe the same
in “populists” regimes.
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tocracies the more equal the economy, the lower the net gain their political
supporters obtain from the investment of the wealthy. And, above a certain
point, the degree of taxation should be subjected to positive jumps, reducing
subsequently the human capital stock.
In addition, a more balanced income distribution among high and middle
types means that the median voter profits less from the redistributive game
so that her optimal taxes during first period decline. Hence she will have
to give up less post-tax income in period 1 in order to seize the educational
externality. However, due to the previous offsetting effect, it is hard to predict
what would be the respond of democratic governments to increased equality,
as shown in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.3. Unless the causal impact of these
two competing pressures can be measured separately, the net effect of an
increase in ∆MR|P will be indeterminate.
With regard to wealth-biased regimes, the only variable that might change
with equality is human capital accumulation. Taxes remain constant but for
high enough values of ∆MR|P it may be the case that the income of the rich
falls to a level at which they cannot afford to be educated.
To conclude with this model, I briefly examine the impact of ∆PR|M on
policies and outcomes. As we can see in Table 3.3, columns 7 and 8, the
fact that the gap between the poor and the rich narrows generates identical
results as before but for different regimes. The argument just developed for
left autocracies applies now for democracies and the other way around: what
has been said for democratic cases holds here for “populists” dictatorships.
Therefore, while democratic rulers are expected to increase taxes when in-
come distribution is more concentrated around mean, it is unclear how left
dictators will react to that. Finally, in right-wing regimes, equality produces
the same effects as before and for the same reasons.
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3.3 Income redistribution and human capital
investment: The excludability of educa-
tional subsidies
This section deals with the model of Fernandez and Rogerson (1995).8 These
authors analyze how the interactions between income distribution, economic
development and democratic institutions affect the extent to which educa-
tion is subsidized, which in turn determines not only the proportion of the
population that invests in human capital, but also the identity of investing
groups. As in the preceding models, they consider only the impact of the
institutional dynamics engendered in democracies. Their main innovation is
that policy benefits are not distributed equally among all individuals. While
taxes are proportional to income, transfers take the form of an educational
subsidy that is received only by those individuals who eventually decide to
go to school.
Here are the essentials of the model. There are two periods and three
groups of agents: R, M and P differentiated by their initial income yR > y >
yM > yP . Total population is normalized to 1. The fraction of the population
belonging to group i is denoted by λi and let ρi represent the proportion of
educated members in group i. People care about their private consumption
during the two periods and there is no discounting.
In period 1, each agent decides whether to invest a fixed amount of human
capital. The educational decision is a discrete choice that takes value 1 if an
agent obtains education (paying a cost e), 0 otherwise. Education benefits
only the investing person by increasing her second-period income. If an
agent i get educated, then in the next period her income will be f (yi). If
she remains unskilled, then she will earn a second-period income yi. It is
assumed throughout that f (yi) − e > yi, assuring that all individuals want
8Fernandez, R., and R. Rogerson. (1995). “On the Political Economy of Education
Subsidies.” Review of Economic Studies 62: 249-62.
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to receive formal schooling. In contrast to the model just discussed, the fact
that a individual invests in human capital does not produce any positive
externality on the other agents’ welfare. In period 2, individuals consume.
There are no capital markets. And as the affordability of education is
the only reason of whether an individual will be able to acquire education,
first-period income constitutes hence a key determinant of individual choices.
Another factor encouraging investment is the extent to which education is
publicly financed. In this model, a proportional tax τ on period-one income is
used to partially subsidize educational costs. Yet tax revenues are allocated
only among those who eventually get educated. Therefore an member of
group i will invest if and only if
(1− τ) yi − e+ s(τ) = 0, (3.9)
where s(τ) is the government subsidy.
To establish the expected degree of taxation emerging in each type of
regime -which ultimately affects the size of educational transfers and the
fraction of the society investing in human capital-, first we have to solve for
the desired policy of each income group. As just mentioned, the tax-transfer
scheme of this model departs from a standard redistributive program in that,
although everyone contributes to sustain public schooling with a proportion
τ of their incomes, transfers are targeted at those who actually go to school.
Hence, when making their proposals, individuals must figure out not only the
tax-induced subsidy but also, using equation 3.9, whether or not they will
be qualified to receive it. Before specifying policy preferences, it is necessary
then to analyze the relationship between fiscal policy, the government transfer
and the proportion of people that obtains education.
With a tax rate τ , the revenues collected are equal to τ
∑
λiyi = τy,
where y is average income. The subsidy assigned to each person who get
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educated is
s(τ) =
τy
N(τ)
, (3.10)
where N(τ) represents the mass of people investing in education. Note that
s(τ) and N(τ) should be mutually consistent in the sense that for a given tax
rate, N(τ) brings about a certain s(τ) and this s(τ) makes it possible that
exactly a mass of N(τ) can meet the expense of education. To determine
consistently the values of these two variables we solve:
Max j s.t : (1− τ) yj − e+ τy(∑
i<j λi
) > 0, (3.11)
where i and j are equal to 1 (representing the rich), 2 (standing for the
M group) and 3 (for the poor). Given this j we find the greatest value of
ρj ∈ (0, 1] such that
(1− τ) yj − e+ τy(∑
i<j λi + ρjλj
) = 0. (3.12)
Thus ρj(τ) corresponds to the fraction of members in group j that becomes
skilled when τ is enacted.9 From (3.11) and (3.12), it is clear that if an
individual of type j manages to pay for education, then so do all individuals of
type i for all i < j, i.e. if an agent of the middle class can invest in education,
9For the sake of clarity, we illustrate this relationship with an example. Suppose that
the actual tax rate is τ . If everybody went to school then the subsidy would be: s1 = τy.
Imagine that individuals with low incomes cannot afford to be educated given s1 because
(1 − τ)yP − e + s1 < 0. As a result, they do not obtain education, do not receive the
subsidy and the actual subsidy goes up, s2 = τyλR+λM =
τy
1−λP . Therefore τ implies an
educational transfer s2 = τy1−λP and only the rich and middle class can invest in human
capital.
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so can all high-income agents. Finally, if 0 < ρj(τ) < 1, a member from
group j must just be able to afford to be educated, i.e. e− s(τ) = (1− τ) yj.
Whenever that happens, it is assumed that a proportion of people ρj(τ) is
randomly selected from group j.
Having determined the per student subsidy, s(τ) and the ρi’s implied by
each τ , each individual when computing her ideal policy tries to maximize
her consumption in both periods, that is,
EUi (τ) = (1− τ) yi + ρi (τ) [s (τ)− e+ f (yi)] + (1− ρi (τ)) yi. (3.13)
As ρi (τ) is a random variable, this equation expresses an expected utility.
Notice that if equation 3.9 is not satisfied for an agent i given the tax rate
and the subsidy, then her expected utility is equal to (1− τ) yi + yi: she
pays taxes but does not get anything in return. In short, she is financing the
education of other agents.
To simplify the characterization of the EUi’s, let τi be the maximum value
of τ ∈ [0, 1] at which ρi (τ) is equal to zero. If yi > e, let τi equal zero. Thus
τM refers to the maximum tax rate at which it is still not feasible for any
member of the middle class (and also of the poor) to be educated. Lastly,
define τi as the smallest value of τ ∈ [0, 1] at which ρi (τ) = 1. Taking into
account these definitions, Fernandez and Rogerson introduce Proposition 1
that provides a complete description of how the EUi’s respond to increased
taxation.
Proposition 1.
i EUi (τ) is continuous and EUi (0) < EUi
(
τi
)
for τi ∈ (0, 1]∀i.
ii EUR (τ) is increasing and concave on
[
0, τR
]
, linearly increasing on[
τR, τM
]
with marginal utility of
(
y
λR
)
− yR, linearly decreasing on
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τM , τM
]
with marginal utility yM−yR, linear on
[
τM , τP
]
with marginal
utility of
(
y
λR+λM
)
− yR, linearly decreasing on
[
τP , τP
]
with marginal
utility yP − yR, and linearly decreasing on
[
τP , 1
]
with marginal utility
y − yR.
iii EUM (τ) is linearly decreasing on [0, τM ] with marginal utility of −yM ,
increasing and concave on
[
τM , τM
]
, linearly increasing on
[
τM , τP
]
with
marginal utility of
(
y
λR+λM
)
− yM , linearly decreasing on
[
τP , τP
]
with
marginal utility of yP − yM , and linear on
[
τP , 1
]
with marginal utility
of y − yM .
iv EUP (τ) is decreasing on [0, τP ] with marginal utility of −yP , increas-
ing and concave on
[
τP , τP
]
, and linearly increasing on
[
τP , 1
]
with
marginal utility of y − yP .
The first thing to be noted is that, as discussed below, the utility functions
of individuals may have more than one maximum. And as the desired policy
of any group necessarily corresponds to a local maximum of its EUi (τ), then
there may be more than one candidate for preferred tax rate. To identify
such potential candidates we can use Proposition 1.
Consider first the utility of the rich. Over the interval
[
0, τM
]
, the tax rate
that maximizes expected utility is τM . On the one hand, between zero and
τM , utility always increases with taxes. Initially increased taxation makes
possible that a larger proportion of high-income individuals could afford ed-
ucation, provided that τR > 0. After all of them get educated, higher taxes
will increase their first-period consumption since more resources are being ex-
tracted from the other classes to finance the education of the rich -recall that
only the rich receive the educational transfer. On the other hand, EUR (τ) is
always decreasing all over the range
[
τM , τM
]
. For a marginal increase of the
tax rate, the subsidy increases by yM and the tax payment of a high-income
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agent increases by yR, yielding a marginal utility yM − yR.10 In sum, if a
wealthy type had to select a policy among all alternatives between 0 and τM ,
she would opt for τM .
Over the range
[
τM , 1
]
, if
(
y
λR+λM
)
> yR, then τP is the tax rate that
maximizes utility in such interval and it is also a local maximum of EUR (τ).
First, at any tax rate between τM and τP , tax revenues are allocated only
among the middle class and the rich since the less aﬄuent members of the so-
ciety still cannot meet the expense of education. Thereby a marginal increase
in taxes makes the subsidy goes up by y
λR+λM
, and if that is greater than yR
(the marginal increase in the tax payment), then the expected utility of the
rich is always increasing throughout
[
τM , τP
]
. Second, over the range [τP , 1],
EUR (τ) is always decreasing. The basic idea is that now income redistri-
bution approaches a standard scheme in which wealthier agents help cover
the educational costs of relatively lower-income individuals. Consequently,
τP would be the policy selected if the rich were to choose a tax rate between
τM and 1. Yet for that to be the case, it is necessary that
(
y
λR+λM
)
> yR,
otherwise their utility would be always decreasing in that range.
Regarding the expected utility of the middle class, there are three possible
values of τ at which EUM (τ) may be maximized: 0, τP and 1. Firstly, if the
actual policy is equal to or less than τM , middle-income agents cannot afford
to be educated and hence do not acquire the government subsidy. But as
they do contribute in financing public schooling, it follows that they would
prefer a tax rate of zero to any one equal to or less than τM . Secondly, over
10Recall that for any tax rate between τM and τM , the middle class is just able to pay
the price of education, so
(1− τ) yM + s (τ)− e = 0.
Solving for the subsidy, we obtain
s (τ) = e− (1− τ) yM .
Substituting this equation into the expected utility of the rich, we get
EUR (τ) = (1− τ) yR − (1− τ) yM + f (yi).
Therefore, with a marginal increase of the tax rate, utility will decrease by
∂EUR
∂τ = yM − yR.
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the range
[
τM , τP
]
, τP is the tax rate that maximizes utility and represents
thus a local maximum of EUM (τ). Between τM and τP , the expected utility
of the middle class always increases with taxes. At first, increased taxation
makes it more likely that a middle type can invest in human capital, i.e. ρM
get larger. Once all members of the middle class obtain education -that is, at
τM - their utility keeps growing up to τP given that the marginal increase in
the subsidy y
λR+λM
is necessarily greater than their marginal tax payments,
yM inducing thus a larger first-period consumption. On the other hand, when
some members of the lower class start going to school, EUM (τ) declines with
taxation. Following a similar argument as in footnote 10, over the interval[
τP , τP
]
, the utility middle-income agents obtain from a marginal increase in
taxes is yP − yM , which reduces their overall expected utility.
Finally, if y > yM -which usually is true for most actual income distributions-
then 1 is also a local maximum of EUM (τ) in the range
[
τP , 1
]
. Throughout
this policy interval, yM individuals’ utility is always increasing since, at the
margin, they get a subsidy y, which is higher than what they have to pay,
yM .
Focusing lastly on the expected utility of the poor, it is easy to see that if
the less aﬄuent members of the economy were to decide among those policies
at which they still cannot pay the cost of education, i.e. [0, τP ], they would
choose a tax rate of zero -utility always decreases throughout that interval.
Yet, once they get qualified to receive the government subsidy -and noting
that EUP (τ) always increases over the ranges
[
τP , τP
]
and
[
τP , 1
]
-, they
would prefer a tax rate of one. With a complete redistribution of resources,
low-income individuals maximize their expected utility as the income transfer
they obtain, y is greater than their tax payments, yP . Summarizing the
possible candidates for desired policies of each social class, we have then
τR = {τM , τP} for the rich, τM = {0, τP , 1} for the middle class, and τP =
{0, 1} for the poor.
I now turn to the equilibrium analysis in different institutional settings.
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The degree of taxation implemented in each type of regime depends upon
(i) the objective of who dictates policy and (ii) the particular states of the
economy. Economic conditions crucially matter for equilibrium taxes be-
cause, by restricting the model’s parameters, they determine which desired
policy candidate maximizes overall utility. Political regimes are defined as
usual. In “populists” autocracies, dictators care only about the welfare of
individuals located in the lower tail of the wealth distribution. In right-wing
dictatorships, policy makers follow the favorite policy of the rich. And, in
democracy, political decisions are made by majority vote.
Fernandez and Rogerson analyze only those cases in which λi < 0.5 for
all i -thus the sum of any two groups encompasses a majority of voters-, and
consider that for a tax rate τ to be a majority voting equilibrium it must
win against all alternatives. As a result, they show that at least one of the
EUi’s has a local maximum at τ . Another important point is that there
is no guarantee that the equilibrium tax rate corresponds to the median
voter’s ideal policy given that individual preferences do not always satisfy
the conditions ensuring such outcome -i.e. the single-crossing property. Yet
it turns out that in most cases in which there is an equilibrium, the middle
class is a member of the winning coalition.
3.3.1 Poor economy
Consider first a poor economy characterized by y
λR+λM
> e > y > yM > yP
and yR > e. In words, under these economic conditions only the rich manage
to pay educational costs with their own earnings. Average income is less
than the cost of education, so that there are no sufficient resources in the
economy for everyone to acquire education. But the middle class will be able
to invest in human capital as long as a certain level of wealth redistribution
is undertaken.
In poor countries, left-wing dictatorships are expected not to pursue a
positive tax rate. From Proposition 1.(i), we know that for zero to be the
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global maximizer of EUP it is necessary that there is no a tax rate at which
all members of the poor can invest. As e > y, this necessary condition is
satisfied, and thus zero may constitute the most desired alternative. Yet
it remains to determine whether the economy is wealthy enough to send at
least a proportion of members from the lower class ρP , along with the rich
and the middle class, to school. Let further assume however that even if that
were the case, this fraction is so small that a yP agent would be worse off if
it were enacted the degree of taxation needed to allow those poor individuals
to afford education.11 It follows then that the welfare of low-income types
would be maximized at a zero tax rate. And as a result, we should observe
that solely the rich get educated under left-wing regimes.
In right-wing autocracies, both τM and τP may emerge as the equilibrium
policy. After imposing the aforementioned restrictions concerning the wealth
of the economy, the two tax rates that may maximize the welfare of the rich
are still feasible choices. The lack of resources, therefore, is not a binding
constraint for right dictators when deciding among their supporters’ preferred
policies. Nevertheless, additional conditions must be provided to state which
tax rate will be eventually implemented. These conditions refer to income
inequality, and as shown below, they determine first whether τP is a local
maximum of EUR and, in that case, what policy yields the highest benefit
to the rich.
According to Proposition 1, τP is a policy candidate for the rich if and only
if yR <
y
λR+λM
. This inequality simply says that, at the margin, the subsidy a
high-income individual receives to cover partially her educational costs must
be greater than what she has to pay in taxes. Otherwise, enacting τP reduces
her first-period consumption and hence there is no point of supporting it.
Rewriting this requirement in terms of the distance between the income
11That is, EUP (τ) < EUP (0) where EUP (τ) = ρP [f(yP )] + (1 − ρP ) [(1− τ)yP + yP ]
and EUP (0) = 2yP . Solving the above inequality for ρP , we obtain
ρP <
2yP
f(yP )+τyP−2yP ,
which must hold for the assumption just made to be true.
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of each group, we find that
(yR − yM)
yP
λM
λP
< 1. (3.14)
So the relative economic positions of groups as well as their relative pro-
portions in the population define the conditions under which the most aﬄuent
members of the society profit from a redistribution program that extracts as
many resources as possible from the poor and incorporates the middle class
in the allocation of tax proceeds. Hence income inequality is a decisive factor
to take into account so as to know when τP will be a policy candidate. Note
that when equation 3.14 does not hold, τM automatically becomes the unique
maximizer of the expected utility of the rich: it is in their interests to limit
the degree of taxation so as to prevent the middle class from obtaining the
subsidy, even though a smaller wealth amount can be now extracted from
the lower class.
As before, I will explore in turn the impact of an income spread between
the poor and the rich, ∆PR|M , among the middle class and the rich, ∆MR|P ,
and lastly among the middle class and the poor, ∆PM |R.12 But before pro-
ceeding to this task, and in order to understand the causal links behind the
hypotheses that follow, it is convenient to be more precise about the costs
and gains to high-income agents of setting τP ; something that is not spelled
out in the Fernandez and Rogerson’ paper.
To keep matters simple, imagine an economy with only three individuals
with income yR > yM > yP . A right-wing dictator, seeking to maximize the
welfare of the rich, has to decide whether to impose a proportional income
tax τ such that tax revenues are split equally among the two persons with the
12Unlike this thesis, Fernandez and Rogerson do not examine the differential impact of
wealth inequality when it occurs in different parts of the distribution. They focus instead
on the proportions that some income groups represent in the population.
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highest income. This decision depends upon whether the amount of income
taxed away from the rich type, τyR is lower than the transfer she receives
τyR+τyM+τyP
2
. Thus if τyR+τyM+τyP
2
− τyR > 0, or equivalently, if
τyP
2
>
τyR − τyM
2
, (3.15)
then τ will be implemented.
By examining closer equation 3.15, we see that the direction of the wealth
redistribution involved in this tax-transfer scheme is actually twofold. On the
one hand, there is a net transfer of resources from the poorest person to the
middle and rich individual. In this distributional game, the person with the
highest income is a net winner: she obtains half of the total income taken
out of the poorest agent. The term on the left-hand side of (3.15) captures
that, which can be interpreted as the gain the most aﬄuent agent derives
from enacting policy τ . On the other hand, as the rich and middle individual
both contribute to tax revenues with an equal proportion of their earnings
and the collected proceeds are shared equally among them, there is also a
redistribution from the wealthiest person to the middle type. Here the rich
individual loses part of her income, which may be thought of as the cost
to her of policy τ -that is captured by equation 3.15 in its right-hand side.
Therefore, the wealthiest person will support τ as long as what she gets from
the poorest one is larger than her net transfer to the middle agent.
Now we are in a better position to understand how income inequality
determines whether or not τP is a policy candidate. If inequality is defined
by the distance between the rich and the poor, we should expect that in
a very unequal society high-income individuals do not want to share the
proceeds from taxation with the middle class. That is what (3.14) leads us
to conclude. By equation 3.15, we know why this is the case. Since the
income of the poor is lower, extracting resources from them becomes less
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profitable. In addition, as the rich are wealthier, incorporating the middle
class in the winner side of the redistributive game is more costly from the
viewpoint of a yR individual. Both mechanisms unambiguously induce high-
income agents to support a inferior tax rate τM that excludes the middle
class from education. And, therefore, only the rich are expected to invest in
human capital under these inequality conditions.
The same hypothesis comes out when the gap between middle and high-
income groups is taken into consideration. As displayed in equation 3.14,
as inequality increases in this part of the wealth distribution, right-wing
authoritarian rulers should be less prone to adopt τP . The idea is that
the cost to the rich of setting τP (i.e. the transfer to the middle class)
get larger because both the income of the former has increased and that of
middle earners has fallen. So, again, we should observe that under inequality
conditions only the rich get educated.
By contrast, a change in the distance between the middle class and the
poor produces an ambiguous effect on the net benefit high-income individuals
derive from τP . For instance, increased equality among these two groups leads
to an increase of the net transfer the upper class has to give to the middle
class. Yet the income amount that can be extracted from the poor goes up
given that their material conditions have improved. As both forces run in
opposite causal directions, the overall impact of income inequality on policy
preferences remains indeterminate.
So τP constitutes a policy candidate under “wealth-biased” regimes only
when the economy is equal enough -except for the latter case. However, it is
still true that τM is also a local maximum of EUR (τ). The rich always benefit
from the tax-transfer scheme enforced by τM no matter what circumstances
occur. In order to see then which tax rate will arise in equilibrium, one needs
to compare their induced expected utilities. A high-income individual will
prefer τP if and only if EUR (τP ) > EUR (τM), that is
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(1− τP ) yR+ τPy
λR + λM
−e+f (yR) > (1− τM) yR+ τMy
λR
−e+f (yR) (3.16)
or if
yM − yP + τP (yP − yR)− τM (yM − yR) > 0. (3.17)
Once again, the relative economic positions of groups play a crucial role
in ordering policy preferences, so that the tax rate put into practice will
depend ultimately upon income inequality. To know what conditions favor
that τP is the most desired alternative, I will examine how the term on the
left-hand side of equation 3.17 responds to increased equality. Let’s call this
term the function g, so
g(yR, yM , yP ) = yM − yP + τP (yP − yR)− τM(yM − yR). (3.18)
As this function increases, the utility derived from τP grows in comparison
to the gain generated by τM , encouraging right dictators to opt for the former.
Now consider, for instance, a mean-preserving change in ∆PR|M , that is, in
the ratio of the poor types’ income to the income of the rich. How does the
function g react to that? Answering this question requires evaluating the
total differential of g when only yP and yR are allowed to change, namely
dg =
∂g
∂yR
dyR +
∂g
∂yP
dyP , (3.19)
which yields13
13Here are the details used to calculate (3.19). First, take the partial derivative of g
with respect to yR using (3.18). This yields
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dg = (τM − τP )
(
dyR − λP
λR
dyP
)
. (3.20)
Therefore, in more equal societies, it should be in the interest of the most
aﬄuent members of the economy to enlarge the size of income redistribution
even though that would imply sharing tax revenues with relatively poorer
individuals. When income equality increases or, equivalently when yP goes
up - so dyP is positive-, and yR decreases -so dyR is negative-, it follows from
(3.20) that the function g should increase as well (recall that τP is greater
than τM). Hence it can be claimed that increased equality among low and
high-income individuals makes τP not only a policy candidate but also the
one actually enacted in right-wing regimes.
A similar conclusion is arrived at if it is considered instead a change in
∆MR|P . In this case, by using the same procedure as before, the total differen-
tial of g -when only yM and yR can change- is equal to (τM − τP )
(
dyR − λMλR dyM
)
.
So, once more, as the gap between the middle class and the rich get smaller,
right authoritarian rulers would rather to raise the degree of taxation up to
the point at which for any further increase in taxes some members of the
poor may be able to afford education. All these hypotheses are summarized
in Table 3.4.
∂g
∂yR
= (τM − τP ).
In order to evaluate ∂g∂yP , note that
∂g
∂yP
= ∂g∂yR
∂yR
∂yP
= (τM − τP )∂yR∂yP .
As we are dealing with a mean-preserving change in the distance between the rich and the
poor keeping everything else constant, it has to be the case that
dy = 0 = ∂y∂yR dyR +
∂y
∂yP
dyP ,
where y = λRyR + λMyM + λP yP . Then
dy = 0 = λRdyR + λP dyP ,
which implies that
dyR
dyP
= ∂yR∂yP = −λPλR .
Putting all pieces together, the result in (3.20) is obtained.
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Finally, it is not possible to predict what would it happen if there is
some variation in the distribution of income below the mean. Depending on
the particular values of parameters, the impact of a decline in the distance
between the middle class and the poor may be totally different. As a result,
there is no prediction that can be made for the general case.14
Let’s examine the political-economic equilibria emerging in democracy.
To do so, it has to be determined previously the middle class’s ideal policy.
In poor economies, the most desired policy of a middle-income individual is
τP . First, as she prefers the tax rate that allows all members of her class to be
educated, i.e. τM , to any lower one, and as utility always increases between
τM and τP , it is evident that she will support τP over any less-intensive
redistributive policy. Second, τP is preferred to any higher tax rate. Recall
that the economy is not wealthy enough to provide education to everyone,
so at τP the only effect of an increase in taxes is that some poor agents may
receive the educational transfer. And since, according to Proposition 1, that
reduces the utility of middle-income individuals, they have good reasons to
oppose such upsurge in taxation.
Taking into account group preferences, the majority voting equilibrium is
expected to change with income inequality. There are two relevant scenarios
to be distinguished. Under equal conditions (either if one considers ∆PR|M
or ∆MR|P ), τP wins against all alternatives in pairwise comparison.15 Both
14The problem is that in the differential of
dg = ∂g∂yM dyM +
∂g
∂yP
dyP = ∂g∂yM dyM +
∂g
∂yM
∂yM
∂yP
dyP
= ∂g∂yM
(
dyM − λPλM dyP
)
,
where
∂g
∂yM
= 1 + λRy(2yM−e−yR)+λ
2
R(eyR−y2M )
(y−yMλR)2 ,
we do not know the sign of ∂g∂yM , unless we identify the parameters values. Note that, in
evaluating this derivative, the effect of yM on τM has been taken into account since, by
using equation 3.12 in the text, τM = e−yMy
λR
−yM .
15By focusing on the relative fraction of each group λi in the population, Fernandez and
Rogerson come to the opposite conclusion that inequality favors the adoption of τP . They
explore the political implications of economic inequality through changes in λi, whereas
this work focuses on the income differences between groups.
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the rich and middle class prefer τP to any other option, so that they will
be able to form a stable coalition in favor of it. In unequal conditions, the
actual tax rate should be zero. Now the most preferred policy of the rich
is τM , while the other groups still sustain the same preferences. Obviously,
zero beats τM given that the middle class and the poor desire no taxation
at all to any policy at which both groups pay taxes but do not get anything
in return. In addition, as in very unequal societies high-income individuals
are worse off enabling the middle class to get educated, a political alliance
between the rich and the poor will come out in order to promote a zero tax
rate against τP .
16
Comparing the political-economic equilibria across regimes, one may draw
the following conclusions -see Table 3.4. In those poor countries in which
the gap between lower and upper-income earners -or between the rich and
middle class- is very large, we should not observe any difference among types
of regimes regarding human capital: only the most aﬄuent members of the
society get educated. Yet right-wing dictatorships, unlike other types of
regime, tend to impose a certain degree of taxation so as to finance partially
the education of the rich.
In more equal countries, democratic and “wealth-biased” regimes are ex-
pected to display identical patterns in both human capital accumulation and
income redistribution. For the very interest of the rich, right dictators are
more prone to increase taxes up to τP , so that the middle class will be able
to afford education. Likewise, in democracy a stable coalition between high
and middle-income agents arises in support of a redistribution program that
extracts as many resources as possible from the poor and enables the middle
class to invest. “Populist” autocracies, however, should continue to show the
same pattern as before.
16As in the case of right-wing dictatorship, the impact of increased equality between low
and middle-income agents on equilibrium outcomes is indeterminate due to its ultimate
unknown effect on the rich’ preferences.
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Therefore, by focusing on ∆PR|M or ∆MR|P , income equality is hypothe-
sized to have a positive impact on tax rates and human capital in democratic
and right authoritarian institutions. Yet, in left dictatorships, we should ob-
serve that governments do not respond in any way to increased inequality.
Due to the wealth of economy, the poor people have already a unique ideal
policy. Hence there is no room for the ex-ante income distribution to shape
policy preferences.
3.3.2 Rich economy
In a rich economy, characterized by yR > y > yM > e > yP , there is more
than sufficient resources to send everyone to school. The upper and middle
class have enough money to pay the cost of education but the poor need
certain level of public financing in order to invest in human capital.
Under these economic conditions, it is expected that “populists” autoc-
racies carry out a complete redistribution of income. It is clear that a left
dictator will enact at least a degree of taxation that enables the poor to afford
education. Yet the reason why he is expected to accomplish an equal alloca-
tion of resources is that increased taxation, once all poor agents get educated
(i.e. at τP ), exerts a positive effect on their first-period consumption. Note
that this model assumes that taxation does not produce deadweight loses.
Since the marginal increase in the government transfer, y, is greater than a
poor individual’s marginal tax payment, yP , her disposal income increases
with taxes and is maximized at τ = 1 -notice that the subsidy is an income
transfer, so it can be used for consumption after the cost of education has
been covered.17
With regards to right-wing regimes, they should display basically the
same patterns as in the case of poor societies. First, as the wealth of economy
17Remember that at τP all members of the lower class are able to afford education, but
they exhaust all their resources in investing in human capital so that their first-period
consumption would be
(
1− τP
)
yP − e + τP y = 0. If taxes keep growing, it is clear that
this equation starts being positive since y > yP , and it is maximized at τ = 1.
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makes no difference in the policy preferences of the rich, both τP and τM -
the possible local maximum of EUR- may eventually occur in equilibrium.
Yet income inequality will determine which policy will be actually put into
practice.
A more balanced income distribution between low and high-income indi-
viduals, or between the rich and middle class, induces right policy makers
to opt for a tax rate at which public revenues have to be shared with the
middle types. Note that whenever the rich profit from setting τP -which is
true in more equal countries as seen earlier-, they will prefer it given that
τM = 0 -recall that yM > e. Another important point worth mentioning is
that increased taxation does not have any impact on human capital accu-
mulation: only the rich and middle class invest in human capital no matter
what policy is enacted. Taxes do not serve to help the “uneducated” poor to
pay the costs of education but just to redistribute income toward the most
aﬄuent groups of the society. Table 3.5 displays these predictions.
Before proceeding to the equilibrium analysis in democracies, let us ex-
amine the middle class’s preferred policies. The first thing to be noted is
that τP continues to be a policy candidate: it generates the highest utility
compared to that of any tax rate between zero and τP (the minimum tax rate
at which all members of the poor get educated). In addition, as the economy
is wealthy enough to send everybody to school, one is also a local maximum
of EUM . By Proposition 1, if yM < y, the welfare of a middle-income in-
dividual increases with taxes once all poor agents invest, and is maximized
over this policy interval at τ = 1. Therefore, when making her proposal, a
yM agent faces a dilemma between restricting the degree of taxation so that
the poor are excluded from obtaining the subsidy versus increasing the size
of government redistribution -so that she gets a greater income transfer from
the rich- but having to share tax revenues with more individuals. Of course,
she will prefer the policy that produces the greatest benefit to her. Thus her
policy proposal will be τP if and only if EUM (τP ) > EUM (1), that is
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(1− τP ) yM + τPy
λR + λM
− e+ f (yM) > y − e+ f (yM) , (3.21)
or if
e− y + (1− τP )(yM − yP ) > 0. (3.22)
Equation 3.22 provides the conditions under which it should be in the
interest of middle-income agents to pursue τP instead of a complete redistri-
bution of wealth. Some of these conditions refer to income inequality and,
in particular, the economic position of the middle class relative to the mean
appears to be a key determinant of its decisions. It is easy to see from (3.22)
that when the income of a yM individual is sufficiently high, limiting taxes
so that she gets the most out of the poor is better for her than confiscating
all resources and include the poor in the distribution of benefits. Hence, as
shown below, any mean-preserving change in income inequality that makes
the middle class more aﬄuent may wane its support for increased redistribu-
tion.
Consider first an increase in the distance between yM and yP . To see
how that affects policy preferences, let’s call the term in the left-hand side
of equation 3.22 the function q, so
q(yM , yP ) = e− y + (1− τP )(yM − yP ). (3.23)
Taking the total differential of q, we find that as the gap between the middle
class and the poor broaden, q increases by (1− τP )
(
dyM − λPλM dyP
)
. So
it is possible to conclude that the larger the distance between these two
groups, the better the case for τP being the most preferred policy of middle-
income individuals. Likewise, when ∆MR|P increases, the latter will be more
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prone to support a limited tax rate that exclude the poor from education.
The reason for this result is that further equality in this part of the income
distribution will make a yM type richer, which in turn increases the function
q by (1− τP )dyM . Finally, any variation in the ratio of the poor’ income to
that of the rich produces an undetermined effect on preferences. Note first
that ∆PR|M influences q only through yP . The problem lies then in that we
do not know how the function q responds to changes in yP .
18
Having determined each group’s ideal tax rates, we have all pieces to
proceed to the equilibrium analysis in democracy. As it can be seen in Table
3.6, the fact that the preferences of certain classes are affected by income
inequality means that the majority voting equilibrium varies with inequality
as well. Furthermore, fiscal policy is expected to be adjusted differently
depending upon where in the distribution the dispersion occurs.
If we concentrate on the distance between the rich and the middle class,
inequality is positively related with the degree of taxation. In those democ-
racies with larger income disparities, the preferred policy of middle types
will be one; so a steady pro-more-redistribution coalition will arise between
them and the poor in support of a even allocation of resources. When high
and middle-income individuals are closer, τP , sustained by the more aﬄuent
groups of the society, beats any other proposal.
By contrast, income inequality between the middle class and the poor may
be inversely related with the level of taxes. In unequal societies, the existence
of a voting equilibrium is a function of the rich’ preferences. If their desired
policy is τP , then they along with the middle class may enact it. But if they
favor τM = 0 instead, then there would not exist any equilibrium.
19 In more
18Taking into account the effect of yP on τP , the partial derivative of q with respect to
yP is
∂q
∂yP
= y(λR+λM )(yM+e−2yP )+(λR+λM )
2(y2P−eyM )
[y−yP (λR+λM )]2 − 1.
So unless we identify the parameters values, the sign of ∂q∂yP is unclear.
19In this situation, group preferences would be the following:
Rich: τM = 0 > τP > 1
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Table 3.6: Equilibrium Policy in Rich Democracy
Conditions Policy Preferences Equilibrium
The rich Middle class The poor
∆PR|M
equal
unequal
τP
τM = 0 τP or 1 1
τP or 1
1 or NE
∆MR|P
equal
unequal
τP
τM = 0
τP
1 1
τP
1
∆PM |R
equal
unequal τP or τM = 0
1
τP
1
1
τP or NE
equal democracies, however, it will be accomplished a total redistribution of
wealth. Since both the poor and the middle class prefer this policy over all
possible ones, they can enforce it through majority voting. Consequently, it
is possible to observe a systematic increase in taxation as the gap between
yM and yP shrinks.
Taking into account ∆PR|M finally, it is hard to predict how democratic
governments will react to increased inequality. Regardless of the initial
wealth distribution, more than one tax rate may emerge in the steady state.
As seen in Table 3.6, this result stems from the fact that the preferences of
middle-income earners are unpredictable.
After examining the equilibrium outcomes in each type of regime, it can
be claimed that the particular institutional framework in which political de-
cisions are taken makes a difference for both the degree of taxation and
human capital accumulation. Comparing education patterns across political
regimes -see Table 3.5-, we find that while “populists” dictatorships tend to
Middle: τP > 1 > 0
Poor: 1 > 0 > τP
where > means “is preferred to.” Given these preferences, voting leads to a majority cycle.
In pairwise elections, τP wins against 1, then 1 wins against 0, but 0 wins against τP .
Therefore, a majority voting equilibrium does not exist with such structure of preferences.
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send everyone to school, “wealth-biased” autocracies are expected to exclude
the poor from education. Moreover, these differences should remain constant
under any configuration of the ex-ante income distribution. In other words,
inequality is predicted to have no impact on human capital in none of these
political systems.
Yet democracies are expected to approach the pattern of left or right
dictatorships depending upon income equality and in which part of the dis-
tribution the contraction occurs. Ceteris paribus, in those countries charac-
terized by a low dispersion between yM and yR, democracies should display
the same outcomes as right-wing dictatorships. On the contrary, we should
observe that democratic institutions, like left-wing regimes, enable all income
groups to be educated as the middle class and the poor get closer. However, if
∆PR|M is considered instead, we do not know if the lower class will eventually
invest in human capital whatever the inequality conditions are.
3.4 Comparing across models
In this section, I go over the main results of previous sections and try to
discern the substantive reasons behind the divergent predictions arrived at
on the basis of each of these models. For the purposes of comparison, I will
start by discussing Saint-Paul and Verdier’ contribution separately, although
some linkages are set with the other proposed explanations. Then a more
integrated-systematic comparison will be made between the last two models
due to their similar structures, which makes them particularly appropriate
for a meaningful comparative analysis.
In line with the conventional approach to redistributive politics, the polit-
ical decision to be taken in Saint-Paul and Verdier’ model was a proportional
income tax with which to fund an equal amount of public education for all
citizens. As this policy implies that relatively wealthier agents finance part
of the education of poorer ones, the latter tend to support higher taxes and
more government spending on education than the former. This preferences’
CHAPTER 3. TRACING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL REGIMES 79
configuration, along with the definitions given of different types of regimes,
brought about divergent educational patterns among political systems. Left-
wing autocracies were predicted to show the highest level of education at-
tained by a particular generation, while right-wing dictatorships the lowest
one. In turn, the accumulation of human capital in democracy was expected
to be somewhere in between.
Another important conclusion drawn from this model is that this insti-
tutional ranking should remain constant under any economic background.
Given that, whatever the degree of inequality or that of economic devel-
opment, individuals with more human capital endowments always prefer
a smaller size of publicly provided schooling than those with fewer assets,
one might expect that the relative performance of institutions -which trans-
late the preferences of certain economic groups into policy- constantly shows
“populists” autocratic governments at the top of the aggregate-educational-
attainment distribution followed by democratic ones, and “wealth-biased”
dictatorships at the bottom.
Yet income inequality amplifies the educational differences among regimes.
In particular, the distance between democracy and left-wing regimes, on the
one hand, and right-wing political systems, on the other, get larger as income
distribution spreads out. The reason for that result lies on the fact that the
effect of inequality on equilibrium outcomes is contingent on the particular
institutional framework in place. As pointed out earlier, while both demo-
cratic and populists governments respond to increased inequality by raising
taxes and spending more resources on education -since their politically dom-
inant groups or decisive voter becomes poorer-, “wealth-biased” regimes do
the opposite -as a consequence of their supporters’ improved economic po-
sitions. Therefore, it may be claimed that the more imbalance the income
distribution, the larger the differences among regimes.
Compared to the other models, the main lesson of this work is that when
education policy involves a cost-benefit scheme that systematically benefits
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relatively poorer agents at the expense of wealthier individuals, it may be
reasonable to think that policy preferences will follow the above structure.
Thus, and given the proposed classification of regimes, not only political sys-
tems would exhibit distinct educational profiles, but also the aforementioned
ranking should prevail no matter what economic conditions happen to be.
Changing the cost-benefit allocation among social groups will alter their pol-
icy preferences and equilibrium outcomes. For instance, if the education of
the poor generates positive side-effects on well-off agents’ income (which is
the case in the presence of human capital externalities), then the latter may
favor policies that redistribute income to people facing financial constraints
in their investments. As a result, regimes might reach similar levels of human
capital accumulation.
There is an important shortcoming of the Saint-Paul and Verdier’ model
that concerns how social classes determine their indirect preferences over
policies, and ultimately the actual educational patterns of regimes. The
assumption that all individuals receive a uniform amount of public education
regardless of their wealth seems to be at odds with the empirical evidence.
It is well-known that the middle class is by far the group that benefits the
most from publicly provided schooling. If we incorporate this fact through,
for example, making possible that the distribution of policy benefits can be
targeted at certain groups, then predictions may completely change. Now the
preferred degree of taxation may not diminish monotonically with individual
incomes. Actually, as demonstrated in the last model, there are situations in
which the less aﬄuent groups of society are expected to want less taxes and
education subsidies than wealthier ones, leading to a reversal of the previous
performance ranking of institutions.
I now turn to an analysis of the hypotheses advanced from the models of
Perotti and Fernandez & Rogerson. This analysis will be carried out in turn
for rich and poor countries.
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3.4.1 Rich economy
As defined in both models, in a rich economy there are enough resources
to send everyone to school. To invest in human capital individuals must
have sufficient assets to pay the fixed cost of education. All members of
middle and high-income groups can afford it by their own, but the poor
need some publicly allocated transfers of income to do so. It follows then
that redistributive politics, when it has actual consequences on educational
outcomes, can make a difference only in the education of the lower class.
And also that among wealthy countries the single source of cross-national
variation in human capital accumulation must be whether or not the poor
get educated.
So here the relevant theoretical question would be under what conditions
it may be reasonable to expect that low-income types can afford education?
In what economic-institutional contexts governments are expected to reallo-
cate income in such a way that enables the former to do so? As shown below,
the predictions one may develop from these two models sometimes diverge or,
when the same, they may be driven by different political economy dynamics.
Let us start with right-wing regimes. As seen in Table 3.8, while according
to Fernandez and Rogerson’ framework right dictators will never enforce a
policy that would help the poor become educated , following the logic of
Perotti’s one a more balanced income distribution may lead “wealth-biased”
regimes’ supporters to promote such policy. Since in Perotti human capital
creates positive externalities, there might be situations in which the social
return produced by the investment of the poor compensates the short-term
consumption losses the rich have to bear in subsidizing low-income types’
education. In particular, it turned out that equality in any part of the income
distribution makes that to be the case. Whether because it reduces the
size of the transfer the poor need to afford education -since they are better
off- or makes smaller the rich’ contribution -since their taxable income goes
down-, the cost of educating the former clearly declines with income equality
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from the standpoint of a yR individual. Hence, in very equal societies, right
autocratic governments tend to raise the degree of taxation so as the poor
can invest in human capital.20
In contrast, if the proportion of educated people in the population does
not have any side-effect on individual incomes -as it is assumed in the model
of Fernandez and Rogerson-, then there is no point for the rich to make any
transfer to the poor. Actually, the very fact that in this model the lower class
can be excluded from education and thereby from the distribution of public
subsidies, may lead the wealthy to be in favor of a moderate tax rate but
to extract resources from the poor rather than to help them overcome the
cost of education. As discussed in the previous section 3.3, income equality
between the middle class and the rich, or between the poor and the rich,
induces right dictators to impose such redistributive scheme.
Table 3.7: The Effect of Inequality on Taxes and Human Capital. Rich
Economy
Model Regime Income Equality
∂τ
∂∆PM|R
∂HC
∂∆PM|R
∂τ
∂∆MR|P
∂HC
∂∆MR|P
∂τ
∂∆PR|M
∂HC
∂∆PR|M
Perotti
Democracy + + − − + +
Left Dic − 0 0 0 − 0
Right Dic + + + + + +
F-R
Democracy + + − − ≶ 0 ≶ 0
Left Dic 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right Dic ≶ 0 0 + 0 + 0
Note: F-R refers to the model of Fernandez and Rogerson.
20Note however that if the poor cannot invest in democracies, neither can they under
“wealth-biased” systems since it is always the case that educating the poor is more costly
to the rich than to the median voter.
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Consider now left-wing regimes. From Tables 3.7 and 3.8, we see that
when policy makers take their decisions considering only the welfare of the
poor, both models predict that the latter get educated under any configu-
ration of the income distribution and, except for some instances in Perotti’s
model, taxes do not change with inequality. In wealthy countries, there are
enough resources to send the poor, along with the other classes, to school.
So populist dictators will enact at least the necessary redistributive package
for low-income agents to invest in human capital given that in both models
individuals profit from their own education. Once the poor become edu-
cated, they would continue to support any increase in taxation that makes
their post-tax revenue greater. If taxes are nondistortionary, their disposable
income will always be maximized at τ = 1. This is the case of Fernandez
and Rogerson. With costs of collecting taxes -as supposed in Perotti-, then
their optimal tax rate (τ ∗P ) will be lower than one and decline with their
income as indicated by equation 3.8. Therefore any variation in the distribu-
tion of wealth that involves an improvement of the poor’ economic position
is expected to be negatively related with the degree of taxation.
Let’s examine finally democratic regimes. When the size of redistribution
is chosen by majority voting, most of the hypotheses relating to the inequality
conditions under which the least well-off people manage to invest are the
same in both frameworks. The smaller the gap between low and middle
income individuals, or the larger the gap between the rich and the middle
class, the more likely the poor get educated. Yet the causal mechanisms
behind these associations are completely different. The reason of that lies on
the models’ different modeling strategies regarding whether there are human
capital externalities and costs of collecting taxes, and whether all agents
participate in the distribution of policy benefits.
Along the lines of the Meltzer-Richard’ classical approach to redistribu-
tion, in Perotti everyone pays a proportion τ of their income in taxes and the
proceeds collected are distributed as a per capita transfer among all citizens.
Increased taxation produces efficiency costs, which avoids that all individu-
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Table 3.8: Tax Rate and Human Capital by Regime and
Income Inequality. Rich Economy –Continued
Model Regime Income inequality
∆PR|M
Equal Unequal
Perotti
Democracy τ∗M (≥ τP ) or τP , λR + λM + λP τ∗M (< τP ), λR + λM
Left Dic τ∗P , λR + λM + λP τ
∗
P , λR + λM + λP
Right Dic τP , λR + λM + λP τ∗R = 0, λR + λM
F-R
Democracy ? ?
Left Dic 1, λR + λM + λP 1, λR + λM + λP
Right Dic τP , λR + λM τM = 0, λR + λM
Note: F-R refers to the model of Fernandez and Rogerson.
als below the mean prefer a fully equal allocation of resources. Moreover, it
makes preferences over the level of taxes a decreasing function of individual
incomes. Hence not only the middle class will always favor a lower taxation
than the poor, but also it is possible that a conflict between its desired tax
rate and the human capital-enhancing one may arise. Or, put it in another
way, it is possible that in some circumstances educating the poor may involve
some income losses to middle types.
However, as there exist human capital externalities, the median voter
may still get a net benefit from letting the least aﬄuent group of the society
to acquire education even if a certain amount of consumption has to be
sacrificed in the short run. Whether that is the case or not will depend upon
the initial distribution of income. Income inequality plays a crucial role here
because it determines how costly it is to the decisive voter that the lower
class can eventually go to school. In particular, any change in the ex-ante
wealth distribution that increases the income of the poor or reduces that of
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the middle class will lower this cost inducing her to propose the necessary
tax rate that enables the poor to do so.
In Fernandez and Rogerson, the middle class does not obtain any gain
from the low-income types’ educational investment. But the education of the
poor neither imply any cost to a yM individual. Quite the opposite, since
there is no deadweight losses of raising taxation, in rich economies the latter
always get a positive transfer with a complete redistribution of resources,
which on the other hand would help the poor to be educated. Yet as this
model allow for the possibility that certain groups can be excluded from
obtaining the publicly allocated subsidy, middle-income individuals find it
profitable as well a limited tax rate that would impede a yP agent to invest
in education. They will choose the policy that gives them the highest post-
tax income. As seen in the previous section 3.3, if the distance between
low and middle income agents (or between the rich and the middle class)
is sufficiently small (or large), they will prefer τ = 1 and thereby form a
coalition with the poor in support of this policy. Otherwise, excluding the
latter from education may become the majority voting equilibrium sustained
by the two most aﬄuent classes of the economy -recall however that when
∆PM |R is low there may not exist any equilibrium.
Having determined the predicted policy outcomes in each type of regime,
we see in Table 3.8 that the educational differences among institutions turn
out to be similar in the two analytical frameworks when equality conditions
are defined by ∆MR|P . In relatively unequal societies, while democracies and
left-wing dictatorships allow the poor to invest, in “wealth-biased” regimes
only the members of high and middle income groups get educated. In equal
societies, democratic systems approach the pattern of right autocracies, and
both types of authoritarian regimes are expected to perform as in unequal
economies.
If we focus on ∆PM |R instead, both models predict that in those economies
characterized by a more imbalance income distribution, only in left-wing dic-
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tatorships the poor will afford education. Yet when the gap between the lat-
ter and the middle class diminishes, we find divergent predictions. Whereas
according to Perotti’s model, one should observe that all political systems
enable low-income individuals to become educated, in line with Fernandez
and Rogerson the lower class get educated just under democratic and left
autocratic institutions.
Finally taking ∆PR|M as the relevant equality measure, the relative per-
formance of regimes in Perotti is exactly the same as in the previous case.
However, following the logic of Fernandez and Rogerson, we do not know
what to expect given that equilibrium outcomes are unpredictable under
democracy.
3.4.2 Poor economy
In a poor economy, average income is below the cost of education, so there
are no sufficient resources in the economy for everyone to invest in human
capital. The rich are the only group that can afford education by their own.
Yet while in Fernandez and Rogerson’ model, income redistribution may
enhance the middle class to do so as well, in Perotti’s one taxes endanger the
investment ability of high-income individuals.
In the latter model, increased taxation always implies larger income trans-
fers from the rich to relatively poorer agents. Therefore, and given that per
capita income is lower than the price of education, the size of redistribution
may prevent the rich from investing rather than enabling individuals below
the mean to afford education. By contrast, in Fernandez and Rogerson, there
is a range of tax values at which redistributive policy produces a higher con-
centration of resources in the more aﬄuent groups of the society. So at that
range, not only the rich will still get educated, but also the middle class may
now be able to invest in human capital.
Let us start by examining wealth-biased regimes. As it can be seen in
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Tables 3.9 and 3.10, governments in these political systems always pursue a
zero tax rate, according to Perotti’s model, since it enhances both the short-
run welfare and the investment ability of their supporters. Income inequality
has no bearing on policies, but yet it may hinder investment by reducing
the income of individuals in the upper tale of the wealth distribution. In
Fernandez and Rogerson’ framework, however, right-wing dictators are ex-
pected to carry out a moderate redistributive program so that at least one of
the other two classes contributes to cover partially the costs of the education
of the rich. As postulated earlier, the higher the degree of equality between
the middle class and the rich (or between high and low income agents), the
larger the incentives wealth-biased rulers have to increase taxation in order
to extract as many resources as possible out of the poor.
Table 3.9: The Effect of Inequality on Taxes and Human Capital. Poor
Economy
Model Regime Income Equality
∂τ
∂∆PM|R
∂HC
∂∆PM|R
∂τ
∂∆MR|P
∂HC
∂∆MR|P
∂τ
∂∆PR|M
∂HC
∂∆PR|M
Perotti
Democracy + − ≶ 0 ≶ 0 + −
Left Dic − + + − ≶ 0 ≶ 0
Right Dic 0 0 0 − 0 −
F-R
Democracy ≶ 0 ≶ 0 + + + +
Left Dic 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right Dic ≶ 0 ≶ 0 + + + +
Note: F-R refers to the model of Fernandez and Rogerson.
Regarding “populists” autocracies, the equilibrium policy under the frame-
work of Fernandez and Rogerson will be always τ = 0, so that only high in-
come types can acquire education. This is so because the poor will never get
educated despite government redistribution, but yet they will have to finance
the education of other agents if any positive tax rate is enacted. However,
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following the premises of Perotti’s model, left-wing dictators try to reallocate
certain amount of resources toward their own constituencies through fiscal
policy. Nevertheless, as taxation may reduce the welfare of the poor in the
long run (due to the presence of an educational externality), it is possible that
in some circumstances the latter may prefer to restrict the degree of redistri-
bution so as the rich can undertake their investments. As discussed before,
income equality (or inequality) between the poor and the middle class (or
between the latter and the rich) induce “populists” incumbents to promote
human capital accumulation at the cost of their constituencies’ short-term
consumption.21
Finally, consider the political equilibria reached when collective decisions
are made by majority voting. As derived from Perotti’s assumptions, taxes
are expected to increase as ∆PM |R or ∆PR|M get larger, reducing so the
proportion of educated people in the population. The idea is that it becomes
more costly to the median voter to limit taxation so as the wealthy can invest
in human capital when equality increases in this part of the distribution.
Following Fernandez and Rogerson, the middle class always prefer to raise
taxation up to τP because with this fiscal policy middle types not only will
get educated, but also they will maximize their present consumption. Yet
whether this policy is finally enacted will depend on the preferences of high
income individuals. In very equal societies (either if ∆PR|M or ∆MR|P is
considered), an electoral coalition formed by the rich and the middle class
arises in favor of τP , and accordingly one should observe that both income
groups get educated. In very unequal societies, as the rich are now worse
off sharing the policy benefits with the middle class, τ = 0 becomes the
equilibrium tax rate and so only yR individuals can invest in human capital.
21Note however that if high-income individuals do not get educated under democratic
institutions, one should observe the same under left-wing regimes.
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Chapter 4
The Ideology of Dictatorships:
An Empirical Assessment
To test the empirical implications of the models analyzed in the previous
chapter -and thus discriminate between these different formal approaches-, I
now turn to describe the data used in the subsequent econometric analyses.
This chapter is devoted to describe the new database that I have created on
the ideological orientation of dictatorships. The rest of the data used in the
empirical analysis will be described in the next chapter.
Communist regimes, initially seen as the most ideological instances of
dictatorships, eventually lost their ideological fervor. First, these regimes
began to rely more on the use of terror. Then, with the end of the terror
and purges of Stalin, communist regimes instituted “goulash communism,”
relying more on the material basis of consent to maintain support. Commu-
nist absolute systems are not the only dictatorial examples preoccupied with
rents and spoils. Reports of the millions stolen and distributed by dictators
like Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines or Mobutu in Zaire, reinforce the
popular notion that dictators are motivated solely by just money and power.
The academic literature similarly is concerned with the rent-seeking be-
havior of dictatorial leaders. Formal theories of autocracies usually specify
92
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rent-seeking in the objective functions of their rulers (e.g., Grossman and Noh
1990, Wintrobe 1990, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). The literature com-
paring the behavior of democratic and dictatorial governments frequently
focuses on the lack of accountability and kleptocratic nature of the latter
(McGuire and Olson 1996).
Yet dictators may appeal to certain constituencies. Dictatorial regimes
often encapsulate or incorporate groups within society to serve as their bases
of support (O’Donnell 1979, Linz 1973). In exchange for their cooperation,
these groups certainly receive spoils. However they may demand more than
just monetary compensation; they may pressure also for real policy conces-
sions (Gandhi 2004). Which groups are coopted and what type of policy
concessions are made by the regime may hinge on its ideology. And even if
interest groups do require just spoils in exchange for their cooperation, their
demand for rents implies redistribution from someone else. In any case, it is
reasonable to think that the regime’s ideology determines who win and who
loses in resolving distributional conflicts.
Therefore, despite the popular and scholarly focus on rent-seeking as a
motivation and tool of dictators, I believe that the ideology of dictators is just
as important, if not more so. Questions about types of policies and outcomes
that generate distributional tensions such as education-related policies, can
be better answered if we know something about the ideology of these rulers.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the vast literature that uses indicators
of the ideological stance of democratic governments to account for welfare
spending programs or the political management of the economy. Knowing
something about the ideology of dictatorial leaders will allow us to investigate
such questions for dictatorships.
In this chapter, I introduce a measure about the ideology of dictatorships
for all dictatorial regimes that have been existed all over the world from 1960
to 1996. The measure indicates whether dictators are located on the “left,”
“center,” and “right” of the left-right continuum. The organization of this
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chapter is the following: I first discuss conceptually what these terms mean
for the purposes at hand and then provide the details on how I determine
the ideological positions of dictators. From secondary sources, I found several
indicators of 1) the ideological orientation of the dictator and his ruling party,
and 2) policies that are orthogonal to the domestic policy space. In section
4.3, I discuss those problematic cases in which these indicators do not point
to the same conclusion and the decisions regarding them. Finally, I offer
some descriptives of the data.
4.1 Ideology and dictatorships
In light of the theoretical classification of dictatorships proposed in this thesis,
ideally we would want to empirically distinguish dictatorships in terms of
their core constituency’s social class background or in terms of the initial
preferences that their rulers or government parties have on redistribution
and income equality. Yet, to address this question directly may be so hard
that eventually it may become an impossible task. Therefore, as it is nearly
always the case in empirical studies, we have to rely on some good proxies.
I decide to use the ideological location of regimes on the Left-Right spec-
trum as a proxy of their political agenda regarding redistributive policy.
When the ruling party is described as a right-wing group or when it an-
nounces a socialist platform, I believe that these statements imply different
initial preferences over the size of redistribution it desires to pursue in gov-
ernment. In particular, it is assumed that those dictatorships advocating a
leftist or socialist program will wish to increase redistribution; I call them
left-wing or “populists” dictatorships. In contrast, it is assumed that a right-
ist dictator would rather preserve the status quo (i.e. the initial allocation
of resources) than enact any purely income redistributive package.
The existing literature about the ideology of dictatorships is very limited.
There is a few number of studies on this subject and, more importantly, they
do not theoretically and empirically cover the issue in a proper way. As dis-
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cussed in Chapter 2, most theoretical works on the social basis of dictator-
ships make gross simplifications such as the assumption that all dictatorships
promote the interests of the rich, that is that all nondemocratic regimes are
right-wing ones (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Wacziarg 2001; Bourguignon
and Verdier 2000). Empirically, the current literature focuses on a few, se-
lect cases like the work of Rouquie (1984), which studies right-wing military
regimes in Latin America. But it has not been done a systematic and quan-
titative analysis aimed to discriminate between distinct ideological types of
dictatorships.
One reason that may explain why the literature is short of a systematic
coding of the dictatorial governments’ ideology is the existence of conceptual
and operational difficulties. Unlike in democracies where parties issue plat-
forms, many dictators often either 1) do not have parties, or 2) if there are
parties, they may be epiphenomenal vehicles for the dictators. Yet that is
not always the case. There are a number of dictators who rule with a stable
party that has an apparatus and militants who demand that platforms and
statements be issued and followed. Even if this is not the case, I find some
indicators of the ideology of dictators.
4.2 Operationalization
The measure of the ideology introduced in this chapter indicates whether
dictators are located on the “left,” “center,” and “right” of the Left-Right
continuum. For the purposes of operationalization, the sample of dictators
is based on the dichotomous classification of regime developed by Przeworski
et al. (2000) and includes all country-year dictatorships in the world from
1960 to 1996. According to Przeworski et al., for a political regime to be
democratic, it must meet the following rules: (1) “the executive must be
directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and must be responsible
only directly to voters or to a legislature elected by them,” (2) “the legislature
must be also elected” and “there must be more than one party.” (pp. 19-20).
All cases that do not satisfy these rules are defined as dictatorships. Using
CHAPTER 4. THE IDEOLOGY OF DICTATORSHIPS 96
the information available about when each dictator came to power and for
how long they remained in power, I define a spell of dictatorship by the
length of the tenure of each dictator.1 The same ideology is coded for the
length of each dictatorial spell.2
Before proceeding to the description of the indicators used to classify non-
democratic regimes in terms of their ideology, two points are worth noting.
The first one deals with the secondary sources employed in the coding. His-
tory is often subject to interpretation. To insure consistency of judgments, I
adhere to the predominant source used for this database, namely, the various
versions of the Political Handbook of the World edited by Banks et al. (var-
ious years). Second, our ultimate goal is to know what the effect of regime
ideology is on domestic policies, such as educational programs or redistribu-
tion. For that reason, we should avoid tautological classification which would
entail looking at domestic policies to classify ideology which would then be
used in a test of its impact on domestic policies.
Therefore, the indicators used to capture the ideological orientation of
regimes fall into two categories: 1) direct indicators of ideology and 2) poli-
cies -that orthogonal to the domestic policy space. From the sources, I have
gathered information about each of these indicators. I collect as much infor-
mation as I can on each category. What is remarkable is that the indicators
are fairly consistent in pointing to the same conclusion. Each is discussed in
turn.
A. Direct ideological indicators
1Note that I do not define a dictator’s tenure as a dictatorial “regime.” Following this
rule would lead to nonsensical labels, such as Brezhnev regime, an Andropov regime, a
Chernenko regime, etc. . .
2I attempted to track shifts in ideology within the tenure of a single dictator since
our sources occasionally indicated changes, for example, from “Marxist-Leninism” to the
“center-left” (e.g., in Africa after the end of the Cold War). Yet, I decided not to track
these shifts via a finer-grained classification because I could not be certain that such a
subtle shift in one country would be equivalent to the same type of shift as described in
another country.
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Direct ideology indicators are available for both the dictator and the ruling
party. These indicators can be one of three kinds: statements (issued by
either the subject or our sources), genealogy, and actions.
Statements
For each dictatorial spell, I look at the statements and actions of the effective
head of government and the ruling party (if there is one). In the vein of efforts
to code the ideological orientation of democratic governments, such as the
Party Manifestos Project (Budge 1992; Budge et al. 1987), I look for official
statements made by either the head or the ruling party. For the latter, I
examine the names and any platforms that are issued. I adhere mostly to
statements made by the heads or parties themselves, but occasionally I must
resort to judgments made by the main sources. This is why I prefer to stick
to my primary source.
Therefore, in determining the ideology of dictators, I first consider any
description, statement, or announcement of the ruler’s ideological position
issued by Banks et al. (various years). From these statements, I classify the
ideology of the head as Left, Right, and Center, using the following rules:
• Left: for dictators announcing a Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, or Social-
ist platform, Soviet or Chinese-style program. I also include in this
category all heads of state that are described (or whose regimes are de-
scribed) as left-wing, left-of-center, socialist, linked ideologically with
the Communist bloc or advocating a model of “revolutionary populism”
(e.g., Jerry Rawlings in Ghana).
• Right: if the dictator or his rule is described as conservative3, right-
3I noted that Banks et al. use the statement “conservative” not only to describe an
ideological position in the Left-Right dimension, but also to identify those leaders or ruling
parties that seek to maintain a traditional structure of power, certain types of customs or
a religious-oriented government. When that is the case, I do not consider these statements
as an indication of the ideological orientation of dictators.
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wing, right-of-center, or anti-communist (e.g., Leabua Jonathan in Lesotho
or Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast).
• Center: for dictators who are defined as centrist.
I use similar criteria to determine the ideological position of the ruling
party:
• Left: for parties defined as socialist, communist, Marxist-Leninist, left-
ist, or left-of-center. I also include in this category those parties ded-
icated to the “socialist revolution” or committed to “scientific social-
ism.”
• Right: for parties described as conservative,4 rightist, or right-of-center.
I also code as rightist those parties that are defined as anti-communist
or anti-socialist (e.g., Liberia during the True Whig Party’s rule).
• Center: for parties defined as centrist.5
Genealogy
If no official statements or platforms are indicated in the main sources, I
examine the “genealogy” of either the dictator or the ruling party. Regarding
the head of the regime, if I can attribute no official statements to a given
dictator, but know that he is the hand-picked successor of a dictator who
declared, for instance, a Marxist-Leninist state, I assume the present dictator
is a leftist.6
4see the previous footnote.
5There are parties, such as the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, that are committed to the
principle of “democratic centralism” but regarding to the structure of the decision-making
process or the power structure within the party. These cases are not considered as taking
a centrist position in the Left-Right scale.
6This assumption would be more problematic if we were trying to develop a finer-
grained classification. Then, for example, the degree to which a successor is extreme
left, left, center-left, etc. . . when his predecessor is an extreme leftist, would be difficult
to assess. But since I am interested in placing dictators within fewer and more sharply
defined categories, I find this assumption less problematic.
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I follow a similar process with ruling parties. However, in this case there
is greater genealogical variation. One possibility is whether the ruling party
was formed by the merger of other parties whose ideologies are identified
(from an earlier democratic or dictatorial period). Then I take the latter’s
ideology as a proxy for the ideological orientation of the ruling party.7
Another possibility arises when the government party is a coalition or
a front of parties. In these cases, I take into account the ideology of the
leading or dominant party within the coalition. For instance, during the
tenure of Nicholas Grunitzky in Togo, there was a government coalition of
four parties but the main party of such coalition (the Democratic Union of
Togolese People) is, according to Banks et al., a conservative party. When
there is no information on that, then I look at the ideological orientation
of minor political groups and code it as long as all of them share the same
ideology.
Alternatively, if the ruling party or what was the ruling party forms a
coalition or merges with other parties, I code the ideology of the resulting
group or coalition as a proxy for that of the ruling one. South Korea’s
Democratic Justice Party (DJP), for example, was the government party
while Chun Doo Hwan was in power. After Chun’s rule ended, the DJP
merged in 1990 with two other groups to form a new party, the Democratic
Liberal Party (DLP), that belonged to the International Democratic Union
(an international organization of center-right parties, see below). Hence, I
consider the DJP a rightist group.
Actions
Finally, both dictators and ruling parties take some actions that I consider
as equivalent to “ideological statements.” For the dictators, themselves, I
consider actions of two kinds.
7Unless, of course, the original members parties sustained different ideological positions.
CHAPTER 4. THE IDEOLOGY OF DICTATORSHIPS 100
First, sometimes a dictator, before or after his rule, organizes a political
party to compete in elections or to oppose a new autocratic regime. His
party is obviously not the ruling party because the dictator is out of power.
But if we know the ideological orientation of his party from its statements or
platforms, I consider it an indicator of the dictator’s own ideology. Ian Smith
in Zimbabwe, for example, led the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ)
to oppose the Mugabe regime. Although I could not identify Ian Smith’s
ideology directly from statements or platforms issued during his rule, I define
him a rightist dictator based on the ideological orientation of the party he
headed later on.
Second, the predominant sources used provide little direct information
about the ideology of most monarchs and some military dictators. For these
rulers, however, I have some information on their prime ministers or other
cabinet members who manage the daily affairs of state. If a dictator consis-
tently appoints prime ministers or other cabinet members with known and
similar ideological affiliations (based on their parties), then I take ideological
persuasion of the ministers to be an indicator of the dictator’s own views on
the grounds that a dictator would not entrust the running of the country to
ministers with views so different from his own.
Ruling parties can also make “ideological statements” by taking certain
actions. In particular, they may join international party organizations, which
tend to be associated with a particular position on the Left-Right continuum.
I take into account any type of membership whether the party is a full,
consultative or observer member. Parties are classified then according to the
following rule:
• Left: for parties that belong to the Socialist International (SI) or the
Communist International.
• Right: for parties that belong to the International Democrat Union,
IDU (or any of its regional associations) and the Liberal International,
LI (or any of its associated organizations).
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In sum, the direct ideological indicators pertain to the dictator and the
ruling party and are of three types. Table 4.1 summarizes them.
Table 4.1: Direct Ideological Indicators
Heads Ruling Party
Statements
• Proclamations issued by the
dictator (e.g., declares a
“Marxist-Leninist state”)
• Labels regarding dictator
or his supporters (e.g.,
“right-wing,” “centrist,” or
“Maoist”)
• Statements and platforms of
the ruling party or its leaders
• Labels regarding the ruling
party or its leader and sup-
porters
Genealogy
• Ideology of successor or pre-
decessor if direct, intended
succession can be established
• Ideology of parties that
merged to make up the ruling
party
• Ideology of parties that form
a front with the ruling party
Actions
• Ideological orientation of par-
ties formed by the dictator
when out of office
• Ideological orientation of
prime minister appointed by
the dictator
• Membership in international
party organizations (e.g., So-
cialist International, Interna-
tional Democratic Union)
B. Policies
In addition to the direct ideological indicators, I have decided to fill in the
gaps by looking at some “policies.” When I could not find data for any of
the above indicators, then I draw relevant information from certain policies.
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These “policies” should be pure expressions of ideology in that they are not
the product of too much constraint. Austerity measures, for example, do not
fulfill this requirement since leftist regimes may be forced to enact them as
well even if these policies are not in line with their ideological preferences.
On the contrary, for instance, banning certain types of parties can be pretty
much done freely by dictators and thereby provide some indication of their
orientation.
Accordingly, the “policies” considered here include constitutional provi-
sions, proscriptions on political parties and types of media censorship. Each
is discussed in turn.
Constitutional provisions
There are certain constitutional provisions that are clearly ideological state-
ments. In most cases, these statements are particularly useful to identify
leftist regimes. It seems that left-wing regimes are more likely to proclaim
their ideological orientation in Constitutions than right-wing dictatorships.
Yet I consider certain provisions such as if there are wealth requirements for
voting or for being a candidate as an indication of a rightist regime.8 So I
check through Banks et al. to find any constitutional provision relevant for
our purposes and classify regimes according to the following rules:
• Left: for regimes that in their constitutions define the country as a “so-
cialist” or “democratic socialist state,” or if their constitutions provide
for a “socialist” or “communist system of government.”
• Right: for regimes that establish property requirements in order to vote
or qualify as candidate.
Proscription of parties
8I have not found any constitutional statement implying a center ideological orientation.
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The second type of policy is related with those actions aimed to control polit-
ical opposition. If a dictator has banned some, rather than all, parties, which
parties are illegal may be helpful for identifying his regime. In particular,
when the regime proscribes the formation of communist or left-wing groups9
but recognizes other political parties, I take that as an indicator of a rightist
dictatorship. It is true that left-wing regimes sometimes ban leftist parties
because they want to monopolize their side of the ideological spectrum. How-
ever, I have found that in this case, usually leftist dictatorships tend to forbid
the organization of any party and form a one-party state. They follow in the
example of Lenin (1921) who argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat
could not be established without a revolutionary party that monopolized the
political space.10
For operationalization purposes, this indicator takes the form of a di-
chotomy variable with value 1 for all those cases in which there is a ban
on left-wing parties while it is allowed other opposition groups to function.
These cases are seen as examples of rightist regimes. And it takes the value
0 for the remaining cases, including one-party states, dictatorships that pro-
hibit all political activity or regimes that do not establish any legal restriction
on party formation. Observations within the last category are not identified
with any ideological position in the Left-Right dimension. Finally, missing
data represents those regimes for which I have no information on party leg-
islation.
Yet there are special cases that need further consideration. First, some-
times the regime proscribes all political activity but there is some especial
emphasis in banning or persecuting the Communist party. For example,
in Greece after the 1967 military coup, all political activity was proscribed
9I do not consider armed or terrorist groups as political parties. So this variable applies
only to communist or other left-wing parties, but not to armed revolutionary groups.
10In addition, by doing a cross-check with the overlap of this policy measure and the
direct ideological indicators, it turns out that 79 percent of the cases that ban left-wing
parties while allowing other opposition groups to function are right-wing regimes. In-
terestingly enough, I did not find any dictatorship that proscribes only rightist political
groups.
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but the Communist-front party was officially disbanded (Banks et al. 1970:
131). It seems that the military was particularly concerned with repressing
the communist and other radical left-wingers. In fact, the communist lead-
ers fled the country and were strongly persecuted, whereas members of more
center or right-wing parties stayed in the country even involved in politics.
I believe that this is still an indication that the regime has taken a rightist
ideological position -and thus I code these cases as 1 in the “proscription of
parties” indicator-.
Second, it is possible that political parties are not officially banned but
certain regulations at work get to disqualify some of them. For instance,
before the 1985 elections in Liberia, the main opposition parties with broad
popular support were disqualified to present candidates. In particular, the
reason for disqualifying the UPP (United People’s Party) was its leader’s
“socialist leanings” (Banks et al. 1998: 547). I decide to codify as rightist
(code 1 in the variable “proscription of parties”) all dictatorships that enact
any type of restriction on left-wing groups (while allowing other parties to
operate) on the grounds of its socialist or leftist orientation.
Media censorship
Another useful indicator could be censorship of the media. In Banks et al.,
sometimes we found information about the political affiliation of the news-
papers the regime has suppressed or allowed to function. If the dictatorship
suppresses newspapers with left-wing political affiliation, while tolerating
more conservative media (for example, Greece after the 1967 military coup),
then I consider this policy as coming from a right-wing non-democracy. And
the other way around, if conservative media are censored while leftist one are
still in function, then the dictatorship is coded as a leftist regime.
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4.3 Problematic cases
The procedure used to establish the ideology of dictatorships is first to look
at the direct ideological indicators and codify dictatorial regimes according
to the information they provide (and as explained above). Second, if it is
not possible to discern the ideological orientation of these regimes via such
indicators, then I turn to the aforementioned policies to fill in the gaps. As
shown in the next section, in most cases in which regimes could be classified
in terms of their ideology, the information employed came from the direct
ideological indicators.
In applying this procedure, it is very remarkable that the indicators are
fairly consistent in pointing to the same conclusion. However, there are some
cases where the evidence is mixed, and thus a decision is required. Particu-
larly, I found only two cases in which there is a contradiction regarding the
information offered by the direct ideological indicators. In the first place, we
find the case of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in the Arab Republic
of Egypt that, on the one hand, belongs to the Socialist International but,
on the other hand, was established by Anwar el-Sadat as a centrist political
group (Banks et al. 1993: 243; Banks et al. 1998: 281-282). The origins of
this party can be traced back to the rule of Gamal Nasser. Nasser become
president of the Republic on June 23, 1956. One of his main goal was the
creation of a single mass organization to support the government and its poli-
cies. Following unsuccessful experiments with two organizations, the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU) was established as the country’s sole political party in
December 1962. Its statutes described the organization as the “socialist van-
guard” charged with safeguarding and furthering the “socialist revolution”
(Banks et al. 1970: 370).
With the death of President Nasser on September 28, 1970, power was
subsequently transferred to Vice President Anwar el-Sadat. “Prior to the
legislative election of October 1976, President Sadat authorized the estab-
lishment of three ‘groups’ within ASU [the leftist NPUA, the centrist EASO,
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and the rightist FSO] which presented separate lists of Assembly candidates.”
In 1978, “President Sadat announced the formal abolition of the ASU... and
the establishment of a new centrist group which, on August 15, was named
the National Democratic Party (NDP)” (Banks et al. 1997: 246). Yet this
party is a full member of the Socialist International. Drawing additional in-
formation on other criteria can help us to resolve this mixed evidence. Indeed
there are constitutional provisions that point to a leftist orientation of the
regime. The 1971 Constitution defines Egypt as “an Arab Republic with a
democratic, socialist system.” Moreover, the 1980 constitutional amendment
under the tenure of Sadat designated the country as “socialist democratic.”
Based on the affiliation of the ruling party to the Socialist International and
these constitutional provisions, the dictatorial years under the Sadat’s rule
has been classified as left-wing.
In the second place, we find the case of the United National Party (UNP)
which was the ruling party of Sri Lanka during the tenure of Junius Richard
Jayawardene. According to Banks et al. (1993: 784), this organization is
a democratic-socialist party. But yet it is a member of the International
Democrat Union, an international organization of center-right parties. This
contradiction has been resolved by assuming that joining to this international
organization is a more direct indicator of the regime’s ideology than a schol-
arly judgment since it is based on the actions undertaken by the ruling party
itself. Therefore, the UNP was considered a right-wing party.
4.4 The data
After describing the process of collecting information and construction of the
database on the dictatorships’ ideology, I show in this section some descrip-
tive statistics to have a sense of the data. The sample of dictatorships is
based on the dichotomous classification of regime developed by Przeworski
et al. (2000). The data cover the period from 1960 to 1996 and a worldwide
sample of countries. As explained in Section 4.2, the ideological orientation
of dictatorships are captured through two types of indicators: direct ideo-
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logical indicators, which refer to statements or descriptions issued by Banks
et al. regarding the ideology of the dictator or the ruling party and to the
“actions” undertaken by them. These are the primary indicators consid-
ered. And policies indicators, which provide ideological information based
on certain measures related with “constitutional provisions,” “proscription
of parties” and “media censorship.” Then a procedure was defined to clas-
sify regimes in terms of their ideological position in the Left-Right dimension.
Table 4.2 shows the ideological distribution of these regimes.11
Table 4.2: Distribution of Dictatorships by Ideology
Undecided Leftist Rightist Centrist Total
Cases 629 1590 1280 11 3510
Percentage 17.92 45.3 36.47 0.31 100
According to Przeworski et al. (2000), the total number of country-year
dictatorships in the world from 1960 to 1996 is 3513.12 Looking at Table 4.2,
we see that more than 80% of cases can be actually classified in terms of their
ideology. Most of them are located on the left, in particular, 45.3 percent,
while 36.47% of dictatorships maintain a right-wing orientation according
to the data. “Centrist” regimes represent, however, a very small percent,
0.3. Finally, the “undecided” category is a residual group containing those
cases for which the information collected is not indicative of any ideological
orientation of their regimes.
The data displayed in Table 4.2 are based on both direct ideological state-
ments (either of dictators or their ruling parties) and certain types of “po-
lices.” Considering only those regimes whose ideology is identified directly
11This table is based on both types of indicators. See Appendix A, for a complete
presentation of these data.
12I have used the updated version of the ACPL database (Przeworski et al. 2000) that
goes to the year 2000. The three missing observations in Table 4.2 are El Salvador 1960-
61 and Argentina 1962. The sources used did not provide any information about what
happened in these countries during that years.
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from the dictators’ political announcements or the government party’s plat-
forms -or from other direct ideological indicators-, the ideological distribution
of regimes reveals some changes (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Distribution of Dictatorships by Ideology (Direct Ideological
Indicators)
Undecided Leftist Rightist Centrist Total
Cases 783 1579 1137 11 3510
Percentage 22.31 44.99 32.39 0.31 100
In this table, observations classified only by the policies they enact enter
into the “undecided” category. As Table 4.3 indicates, if we focus on regimes
for which it is easy and straightforward to determine their ideology, still a
77% of all dictatorships take a position in the ideological dimension. The pro-
portion of left-wing autocracies remains roughly the same but that of rightist
diminishes. In 143 observations earlier classified as rightist dictatorships, de-
cisions were made upon the policy indicators, whereas the corresponding
number of leftist cases is only 11. The conclusion that immediately comes
to the fore is that it is much easier to detect dictators who sustain a leftist
orientation than those advocating a right-wing political program. This is
so because left-wing authoritarian leaders are more willing to openly declare
their ideological leanings than their rightist counterparts.
To see how the ideological distribution of non-democracies changes over
time, Table 4.4 shows the raw numbers and the proportion of each ideological
type by decade. The first thing to be noted is the steady decrease of the
percentage of rightist regimes over time: while they represent a 43% of all
autocracies in the world at the beginning of the period, at the mid-90s they
represent less than 30%. This trend is also confirmed in Figure 4.1, which
disaggregates by year the same proportions.13 To be sure, the proportion of
right-wing dictatorships starts at first increasing until 1966, and from then
13in Figure 4.1, the “undecided” and “center” types have been collapsed into one group.
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on it experiences a almost constant decline up to the end of the series. Yet,
as Figure 4.1 indicates, right-wing regimes is the type of dictatorship most
frequently observed in the period from 1966 to 1974.
Table 4.4: Ideological Distribution of Dictatorships by Decade
Undecided Leftist Rightist Centrist Total
1960s 120 (14.9%) 337(41.9%) 347(43.1%) 804
1970s 178(16.8%) 454(42.9%) 420(39.7%) 6(0.5%) 1058
1980s 169(16.1%) 535(51.1%) 342(32.7%) 1046
1990-96 162(26.9%) 264(43.8%) 171(28.4%) 5(0.8%) 602
N 629 1590 1280 11 3510
Note: numbers in parenthesis are row proportions.
The percentage of leftist dictators, on the other hand, remains over 40%
throughout the period covered by this study and, taking the whole decade of
the 80s, more than half of country-year dictatorships were leftist (see Table
4.4). A graphical inspection of the more detailed evolution portrayed in Fig-
ure 4.1 reveals that up to 1974, the proportion of left-wing autocracies stays
around 40% with some variations in either way. Thereafter, it continually
grows reaching a level over 50 percent during the 80’s. However, from 1990
on, we observe substantial declines in the number of leftist regimes, which
can be attributed to the end of the Soviet Union and its patronage.
Regarding the chronological evolution of the proportion of the “unde-
cided” category and the few center autocracies, we see in Figure 4.1 that
it usually moves in a range from 12% to 19% until 1989. The increasing
tendency during the mid-90s rightly implies a further difficulty to determine
the ideological orientation of dictators during these years.
In order to examine whether the post-1960 emergence of more ideological
types (i.e., left and right wing dictatorships) has followed a temporal pattern,
Figure 4.2 presents the annual frequency of transitions to leftist and rightist
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Figure 4.1: Type of Non-democratic Regimes as a Percentage of All Dicta-
torships in the World
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autocracies.14
Figure 4.2: Transitions to Left and to Right Dictatorship by Year
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The overall picture shows that regime changes have taken place for the
most part before 1980. From this year, we observe that the number of tran-
sitions to both types of dictatorships drops significantly.15 Between 1961 to
1969, there were more countries making transitions to right-wing autocracies
than to leftist regimes.16 In particular, there were fifteen autocratic transi-
tions to the right and ten to the left. Rightist dictatorial changes occurred
mainly in Latin America (e.g., Guatemala, Ecuador, Dominican Republic
and Honduras all make a transition to right-wing regimes in 1963. Brazil in
1964, and Argentina in 1966), and in South East Asia (Philippines in 1965,
14Note that the transitions of some left and right-wing regimes occur before 1960 (e.g.,
all Eastern European communist countries), and thus they are not counted in Figure 4.2.
15The total number of transitions during the entire period studied is 69: 51 took place
before 1980 and 18 thereafter.
16This may explain in part the increasing trend of the proportion of right-wing regimes
in the mid-60s observed in Figure 4.1.
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Indonesia in 1966 and Cambodia in 1969). Leftist dictatorial transitions were
largely experienced in Africa (e.g., Congo in 1963, Sierra Leone in 1968, and
Sudan, Somalia and Libya in 1969), and in other regions although not as
often (for instance, Myanmar in 1962, Syrian Arab Republic in 1963, Bolivia
in 1964, and Peru and Panama in 1968).
Between 1970 to 1979, there were the same number of transitions (13) to
the left and to the right. However, a regional pattern can be seen. Of the
seven regime changes that came about in Latin America, five were rightist
(Bolivia in 1971, Honduras in 1972, Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and Ar-
gentina in 1976) and two leftist (Nicaragua and Grenada in 1979). Most of
the African transitions were to the left, like Benin in 1972, Ethiopia in 1974
or Seychelles in 1977, and only one to the right (Niger in 1974). In contrast,
the new autocracies that came in Asia do not seem to concentrate on one
side of the ideological spectrum: there were seven right-wing transitions (for
instance, Sri Lanka, Thailand or Pakistan in 1977) and four leftist (Cambo-
dia and Laos in 1975, or Bangladesh in 1972). Finally, between 1980 to 1996
there were nine regime changes to the right, but also nine to the left. And
figures are less clear-cut in the differences across regions.
A key conclusion is derived from the facts displayed in previous graphs.
As indicated in Figure 4.1, although both ideological types represent similar
proportions in the entire sample of autocracies at the beginning of the period,
during the 1980s the percentage of “populist” regimes increases considerably
while that of their rightist counterparts do not stop decreasing until the
end of the series. Yet, we have just observed in Figure 4.2 that, during
the whole period under study, there were more transitions to right than
to left-wing dictatorships. To make sense of this apparent contradiction,
one is lead to conclude that the stability of regimes should diverge across
their ideological orientation. In other words, right-wing autocracies should
have been experienced more breakdowns than leftist ones. Indeed, Table 4.5
indicates that this in fact the case.
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Table 4.5: Transition between Political Regimes
Transition to:
Transition
from:
Dem Left Right Undecided
& Center
Total Number
of cases
Probability
Dem - 9 18 13 40 1995 0.02
Left 20 - 7 16 43 1550 0.0277
Right 27 8 - 16 51 1256 0.0406
Undecided &
Center
22 15 12 - 49 616 0.0795
Total 69 32 37 45 183 5417 0.0337
Table 4.5 is a transition matrix presenting the number of transitions from
each type of regime (including democracy and “undecided & center” autoc-
racies) to each of the others.17 As this table indicates, democracy is the
most stable regime in the sample -it has a 2 percent chance of experienc-
ing a change to a different regime. Interestingly enough, rightist autocracies
emerge more often, actually twice as much, than leftist ones when democracy
is overthrown. Confirming the intuition explained in the previous paragraph,
a right-wing dictatorship has a 4 percent chance of transforming into a dif-
ferent regime, which compares with 2.7 percent for “populist” autocracies.
Yet, both ideological types show similar transition patterns regarding the
political institutions that tend to succeeded them.
Finally, looking at the ideological distribution of regimes by region (see
Table 4.6), systematic regional differences can be seen. Eastern Europe and
East Asia are the regions with the highest percentages of leftist autocracies.
Sub-Saharan and North African, and South East Asian countries display
similar patterns: left-wing dictators have controlled political power more
often than their rightist counterparts. That seems to be true especially in the
Sub-Saharan and North African regions. In contrast, right-wing dictatorships
have prevailed in almost all Industrial nations (i.e., Spain, Portugal and
17The numbers in the “Probability” column refer to the probability of facing a transition,
which is the result of dividing the “Total” number of transitions by the “Number of cases”
observed for each regime in t− 1.
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Table 4.6: Ideological Distribution of Dictatorships by Region
Region Undecided Leftist Rightist Centrist Total
Sub-Saharan Africa 355 (25.6%) 624(45.1%) 405(29.2%) 1(0.07%) 1385
South Asia 67(47.2%) 3(2.1%) 72(50.7%) 142
East Asia 106(62.7%) 63(37.3%) 169
South East Asia 4(1.4%) 147(50.1%) 142(48.5%) 293
Pacific Isl. & Oceania 62(69.7%) 27(30.3%) 89
Middle East & NA 27(7.2%) 198(53.1%) 148(39.7%) 373
Latin America 23(7.1%) 117(36.1%) 179(55.3%) 5(1.5%) 324
Caribbean 6(8.1%) 39(52.7%) 29(39.2%) 74
Eastern Europe & SU 29(7.8%) 326(87.2%) 14(3.7%) 5(1.3%) 374
Industrial countries 2(3.2%) 60(96.8%) 62
Oil countries 56(24.9%) 28(12.4%) 141(62.7%) 225
N 629 1590 1280 11 3510
Note: numbers in parenthesis are row proportions. NA and SU refer to North Africa
and Soviet Union respectively.
Greece) and in most Oil countries. In addition, the proportion of rightist non-
democratic governments in Latin America and South Asia has been higher
than that of leftist ones. A final comment is that it is harder to identify the
ideological orientation of regimes in South Asian countries and, especially, in
the Pacific Islands.
Chapter 5
A Statistical Analysis on the
Role of Political Regimes
5.1 Introduction
The empirical literature assessing the effect of political regimes on educa-
tion typically reports an advantageous position of democratic institutions
in the formation of human capital. Starting with the undoubtedly-realistic
assumption that some degree of government involvement is required for a
broad popular participation in the educational system, quantitative as well
as historical case analyses usually find empirical support for the idea that
democratic politics induces governments to implement more comprehensive
educational policies reaching a larger segment of the population. Although
they stress unlike theoretical mechanisms and study different dimensions of
aggregate educational investment, there seem to be a growing consensus on
the positive impact of democracy.
From a historical perspective, an arguable piece of evidence is the concur-
rence of expansions in education and reforms that enhanced the political voice
of previously excluded groups across the Americas (Mariscal and Sokoloff
2000). The extraordinary literacy and schooling progress that took place
in North America (Canada and the United States) during the first decades
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of the nineteenth century coincided in time with major political changes to
do away with voting privileges. Moreover, the early development of tax-
supported free schools in these two countries contrasts very much with the
experience of the rest of American nations, where important breakthroughs
in the expansion of schooling were not carried out until the late 1800s. This
backward educational position of Latin America has been grounded also on
the extent of political inequality that prevailed in these nations at that time
(Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000). Voting rights were restricted to a elite of
wealthy and propertied men so that they were powerful enough to block
public initiatives of investment in primary schools, which would particularly
benefit the poor while allocating the costs disproportionally on the shoul-
ders of the rich. Thus, the extension of the suffrage has been related to the
evolution of schooling institutions within nations and to the variation in ed-
ucational standards across countries.1 Yet, a simple correlation over time or
among countries does not necessarily mean a causal association. It may be
the case that these political and educational secular developments were both
parts of a broader process driven by other economic or political forces.
Turning to the more contemporary quantitative findings, in an attempt to
explain the substantial differences of primary school enrollment among devel-
oping countries from 1960 to 1987, Brown (1999) detects a statistically signif-
icant relationship between democracy and primary education which subsides
as per capita income levels increases. Lake and Baum (2001) and Wacziarg
(2001), exploiting a broader sample that mixes developed and developing
countries, find that democratic institutions appear to outperform their au-
thoritarian counterparts in the provision of public secondary schooling.
Similar conclusions are reached by many studies on the determinants
1Lindert (2004, Chapter 5) also proposes this line of reasoning, along with other expla-
nations, to make sense of the secular growth in education within European countries. He
points out that significant government efforts in this policy area before 1914 often followed
key democratic changes in the electoral process. See Galor and Moav (2006) for an op-
posing interpretation of the timing of educational and political reforms in some European
nations.
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of public expenditure on education. They use government spending figures
instead of educational outcomes as a proxy of the degree of public commit-
ment to human capital investment and distribution. In the Latin American
context, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) undertake a time-series cross-
sectional analysis of the changes in several categories of social spending over
the period from 1973 to 1997. Despite the reported downward pressures of
globalization on social budget, transitions to democracy are associated with
notable and quick increases in the amount of tax-based resources commit-
ted to human capital formation. In addition, democratic regimes tend to
generate in the long run an expansion of the educational budget.2 For the
African region, Stasavage (2005) has found that those executives elected in
multiparty competition are more responsive to social groups’demands that
entail an upsurge in total government spending on education.
Scholars have also paid attention to how the education budget is allocated
between different levels of formal schooling in different institutional settings.
The motivation underlying this research rests on the implied distributional
consequences of particular allocations. It has been argued, for example,
that funding priorities towards higher education relative to primary benefit
disproportionally middle and upper class students since they are much more
likely to receive the former than lower-income individuals. On the other
hand, dedicating a larger share of the total schooling resources to primary
is deemed as a more effective policy to enhance educational equality: it is a
direct instrument of economic redistribution from the rich to the poor.
The prediction usually asserted in the literature is that democratically
elected politicians, by being more responsive to the less aﬄuent groups of
the society than autocrats, are expected to prioritize basic formal schooling
in the distribution of the education budget. Brown and Hunter (2004) cor-
roborate this hypothesis with a sample of seventeen Latin American countries
between 1980 and 1997. There is also supporting evidence when data from
other regions are used instead. For instance, Stasavage (2005) found a pos-
2Brown and Hunter (2004) reports analogous results for the Latin American region.
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itive relationship between multiparty competition and spending in primary
education in a sample of African countries.3
This small but growing body of empirical research suffers, nevertheless,
several methodological problems that may question its own findings. The
main problematic issue refers to the democracy counterfactuals used in the
comparative analysis. In their attempt to reveal the policy consequences of
regimes, scholars typically compare democracies with an undefined category
which includes, depending on the particular database employed, all countries
whose process of selecting rulers does not satisfy some criteria such as con-
tested elections or alternation in government, or whose institutional settings
do not place much constraints on chief executives. Others use continuous
measures based on the degree of civil and political rights protection. Au-
tocracy becomes thereby a negative indeterminate category embracing many
different institutional frameworks and types of authoritarian regimes. By
being so, it is almost impossible to come out with an unique explanation of
what occur in all autocratic experiences. In contrast, since all democracies
share as a minimum some regulated institutions like contested elections, their
actions or policies are more predictable in comparison with the apparently
more erratic behavior of dictatorships.4 This in turn may bias statistical
results in the former’s favor. My point is that while the electoral dimension
constitutes a first step in classifying political systems, it is not enough to
make undemocratic types equivalent. And this lack of specification is hardly
inconsequential, at the very least it blurs theoretical inferences making causal
mechanisms unclear.
3His argument, however, is based on a redistributive conflict between urban groups
-who are more concerned about funding in secondary schools and universities- and rural
communities -that can benefit the most from primary public provision. Now political insti-
tutions affect the relative influence of these groups in politics. While urban interests have a
larger capacity to challenge rulers in autocratic African regimes, democratic governments
are more inclined to accommodate the demands of rural groups since they constitute the
majority of the society in most African countries.
4Indeed, the standard deviation in many country-level distributions of policy outcomes,
including of course education, is usually higher for the group of dictatorships than among
democracies.
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This question is particularly important if there are some relevant fea-
tures for predicting policy that cluster autocracies in different types. I claim
that the ideological orientation of dictators, by serving as a proxy of their
policy preferences, is a key feature that influences policy-making and thus
has to be taken into account. To see this, let us review one of the most
recurrent theories that points out a positive impact of democracy on human
capital. Its argument emphasizes a power-distribution mechanism of institu-
tions: whereas democratic systems enhance the political strength of the poor
to enforce their redistributive demands for an universal public system of edu-
cation, dictatorial governments mostly accommodate the interests of the rich
who prefer a low state involvement in educational provision. In this account,
whenever there is some sort of restricted access to the political process, it is
always assumed that the people being excluded are the less aﬄuent groups
of society. This conjecture, although may accurately describe some historical
experiences like the European nineteenth-century limited democracies, is not
necessarily true.5
A dictatorial regime may, a priori, appeal to different social groups to
build its basis of support. If those groups have conflicting preferences, then
separating autocracies along the lines of which preferences they represent is
crucial. Otherwise, we are mixing cases of very different nature whose effects
may cancel each other out, making almost no sense to compare the aggregate
outcomes of this combined autocratic category with those of democracies.
Accordingly, the statistical analysis undertaken in this chapter is based upon
an ideological classification of non-democratic regimes. In view of the diver-
gent patterns that appeared in each ideological type, empirical findings come
eventually to justify the convenience of using this classification.
There is another notable difference between the empirical approach used
in the existing literature and the one employed in this thesis. The majority
5Actually, if we accept the ideological position of governments as a proxy of their
social class constituencies, right-wing or wealth-biased autocracies are less frequent than
left-wing or populist ones during the postwar period as shown in the previous chapter.
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of the preceding studies empirically test a direct effect of democracy and do
not explore interactions with other causal factors. Given their theoretical ar-
guments regarding the impact of political regimes,6 the empirical implication
is that the type of political system exerts a direct influence on educational
indicators so that the institutional variable should enter into the regression
independently of other conditions. On the contrary, my argument proposes
that the causal channel of political institutions run through how they process
economic conditions. As conflicting groups adjust their policy preferences to
changes in per capita income and wealth inequality and institutions trans-
late such preferences into public policies, then the responses of governments
to increases in these two factors differ across political regimes. This means
then that the impact of political regimes is conditional on economic devel-
opment and inequality. Accordingly, the empirical implication of this line of
reasoning is that the institutional variable interacts with these factors in the
explanation of the divergent educational patterns of countries.7
In the remainder of the chapter, I test with quantitative data the hy-
potheses developed in this thesis. More particularly, the subsequent empiri-
cal analysis try to discriminate between the last two formal models studied in
Chapter 3. Using different econometric models and an ideological classifica-
tion of dictatorships, I evaluate the conditional impact of political institutions
and check the causal links whereby regimes shape human capital investment.
A special emphasis is placed on the question of whether governments in differ-
ent institutional settings respond in different ways to increases in conditions
like income inequality and economic development. Next section discusses the
dependent variable and introduces the set of indicators employed to measure
it. Section 5.3 examines the impact of political regimes conditional on per
capita income through an over-time analysis. It will be shown that the effect
of per capita income on education is mediated by the institutional framework
6For a review of these theories, see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
7In Chapter 3, where a set of formal models were examined, I mainly focused on the
interaction between institutions and wealth inequality. In this chapter, as shown below,
I establish more precisely the theoretical grounds of the interaction between regimes and
economic development.
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at place. Then Section 5.4 studies the hypotheses regarding the differential
impact of income equality given per capita income and political regimes.
5.2 The dependent variable
The purpose of this research is to explain the substantial variation across-
countries and over time in the accumulation rates of human capital. Besides
aspects of the economic structure, my interest is to prove that politics and, in
particular, the type of institutions that shape decision-making process have
an important role to play in understanding why some nations invest more
in human capital than others. So this study operates at an aggregate level
of analysis and thus the operationalization of the dependent variable must
provide a indicator based on national figures.
The acquisition of skills or human capital can be secured mostly via on-
the-job training or through formal education. The choice of concentrating on
education has been taken for two reasons. For one, it is much easier to collect
and measure the amount of human capital accumulated through education
at a national level than to aggregate all individuals’ skills attained at work.
Two, because government policies are directly and strongly related with the
educational performance of countries,8 making the link from political insti-
tutions to human capital clearer. Therefore, once the focus is on formal
schooling and after considering the direct effects of economic conditions, the
empirical task of this chapter is to provide evidence on the arguments devel-
oped before about why some governments launch more ambitious investment
programs on education than others.
Among the possible indicators that evaluate the educational investment
of countries, our dependent variable, I decide to use data on enrollment rates.
Before discussing more on this variable, let me argue why I disregard other
indicators used in the literature. One possibility would be to consider the
8After all, formal education and in particular primary and secondary schooling is pub-
licly financed in most countries.
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stock of human capital in the economy by examining the average number
of years of schooling in the population from certain age (typically 25) and
older. This option, however, has been abandoned because government actions
and political regimes affect this stock measure precisely through enrollment
rates, a flow variable. Moreover, the causal impact of institutions on the
educational aggregate stock is, at best, very difficult to infer since the latter
is the combined result of political initiatives taken through decades during
which transitions from one regime to another may have occurred.9
Another indicator widely employed in the empirical research is public
expenditure on education. The problem is that this variable is hardly a direct
proxy of actual investment. Although a priori they may capture government
support to human capital, expenditures figures are distorted by patterns of
corruption and punish more efficient institutions in the provision of public
education (Baum & Lake 2003). Those countries able to devote a smaller
amount of funds in order to reach a certain level of schooling attendance
would be deemed as less committed to human capital accumulation when in
fact they are using resources more efficiently. Besides, a genuine goal of this
study is to account for the observed patterns of educational performance of
countries.
The use of schooling enrollment rates mitigates such causal and mea-
surement problems. As these rates constitute a flow variable referring to
educational policy outcomes, they better appraise the actual size of human
capital investment. In addition, current government policies can consider-
ably alter them and even revert the direction of past proposals so that the
alleged institutional effect can be assigned to the political regime at work
9Suppose that in 1972 country A is a democracy whose population has an average
number of schooling years equal to X. Assume also that this country is a democracy since
1970. What we want to know is the extent to which X depends upon the political regime
operating in A. The amount of human capital accumulated up to 1972 (X) captures the
influence of policies adopted not only during the last two years but in a longer time back
during which a different political regime was at work in country A. Therefore, it does not
make any sense to causally relate X in 1972 with a political institutional setting that has
been established, in this case, two years before.
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instead of being a joint contribution of previous institutional systems.
The enrollment figures employed in the over-time analysis, carried out in
the next section, correspond to the combined primary and secondary rate,
which comes from a database that I have assembled from two different in-
formation sources: one on how many people go to school and the other on
population by age. The definition of this variable is the number of students
in primary and secondary divided by the total population between 5 and 19
years old -an age bracket that, in most educational systems, approximates
the official school age in these two levels of education.10
Population data are taken from the Demographic Yearbook-Historical Sup-
plement 1948-1997published by the United Nations (2000). This collection
of international demographic statistics presents population data by age in
5-year groups. To construct enrollment rates in primary and secondary, I use
the figures for the 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 age groups. Data on the number of
students are based on the International Historical Statistics series compiled
by Brian Mitchell. Although these historical series report students figures
separately for each level of education, here I decide to combine the data for
primary and secondary.
The main purpose of this decision is to remove artificial changes in sin-
gle time series produced by reforms in the educational system affecting the
official school age in these levels. Since the available population data are
not adjusted by such reforms but they refer always to the aforementioned
age groups, then any school reorganization that alter the grades comprised
in primary and secondary will be reflected in the separate enrollment rate
series. Suppose that we decide to examine secondary schooling and thus
10Although almost all empirical studies on enrollment rates use the World Development
Indicators (World Bank), which is the most comprehensive international database based
on Unesco, I decide not to use it as the central data set of the over-time analysis because its
time coverage is more limited. It provides national observations on an annual basis from
1980 and onward. But before this year, data points cover only the years 1960, 1965, 1970
and 1975. The new database that I have constructed covers annually the whole period
from 1960 to 1996.
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we only consider the 15-19 age group as the most approximate school-age
group in secondary. Now imagine that a reform changing the number of
years in high school is implemented. This will obviously affect the number
of students, but also the enrollment rate since the reference school-age group
has not been adjusted -it continues to be the population between 15 and
19 years old. If we were to focus on one level of education over time, then
such reform–induced changes in enrollment rates would be wrongly consid-
ered in the statistical analysis as real variation to be accounted for by other
explanatory factors. Combining both schooling levels, however, eliminates
this problem.
After merging the data sets on population and number of students, the
resulting variable (ENROLL) provides information on enrollment rates for
153 countries from 1960 to 1996. It is an unbalanced panel of countries with
a total of country-year observations equal to 3577. On average, a country is
observed 23 years.
Before undertaking a formal statistical analysis of the theoretical propo-
sitions on investment in human capital, it is convenient to know the scope
of the variation in this dependent variable. To see the time variation, Figure
5.1 shows how the world average enrollment rate (in both secondary and
primary) has changed since 1960. Taking the whole set of countries, while in
1960 around 48 children out 100 with school-age were acquiring on average
some pre-university formal education, by the mid 1990s this number elevates
to 67 resulting in an increase of 40 percent.
This large and growing tendency of human capital investment is apparent
across countries with different positions in the world income distribution. As
seen in Figure 5.2, both OECD countries and the rest of the world seem to
be subject to the same time forces promoting education. The two groups
of nations exhibit substantial improvements in schooling provision, despise
their different levels of income. Another fact worth noting is that the upward
trend of the less developed countries appears to be steeper, which suggests
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Figure 5.1: Average Enrollment in Primary and Secondary (All Countries)
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that a catching up process and, therefore, a reduction of the existing gap
have taken place throughout the period covered by this study.
Figure 5.2: Average Enrollment in Primary and Secondary (OECD Coun-
tries and the Rest of the World)
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In spite of such common increasing tendency, much variation across coun-
tries remains. To see this, Figure 5.3 displays the international distribution of
school enrollment for the entire 1960-1996 panel. For each year, data points
representing country figures are drawn around the mean value (indicated by
the thick line). As shown in the graph, the differences among nations are
quite large. For instance, in the 1985 cross section, the mean value of the
enrollment rate is 58.7 with a standard deviation of 17.7 and a range from
12.3 (in Mali) to 90.7 (in New Zealand). Overall, the range of the variable is
considerably wide going typically from less than 20 to above 80.
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Figure 5.3: Cross-Country Variation of Enrollment Rates by Year
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5.3 The economic-development conditional ef-
fect of political institutions: An over-time
analysis.
This section concentrates on the time variation of educational outcomes and
explains it by exploiting information on a set of covariates from a cross-
sectional time-series dataset. To expand the series as much as possible, I
use the combined rate of enrollment in pre-university education (ENROLL)
as the dependent variable of the statistical analysis. As explained above,
this variable contains yearly information on enrollment rates in primary and
secondary from 1960 to 1996 for around 153 countries. Although the amount
of annual data actually available varies per country (since it is an unbalanced
panel), the series of the typical nation has a time-span, on average, of 23 years
in most model estimations.
The theoretical hypotheses regarding the differential impact of income
inequality across political regimes are not tested in this section because of the
time limitations in inequality data. As will be shown, there are usually few
year-observations within most countries, which would shorten considerably
the overall time length under study. And second, but more importantly,
income inequality tend to be very persistent in the short run. Therefore, the
empirical exam of the theoretical priors on income inequality and political
institutions is left to the next section where estimation strategies exploit
mainly variation across countries.
Apart from understanding the dynamics of education outcomes and iden-
tifying other explanatory forces, the subsequent over time analysis based on
this panel dataset does allow us to test other crucial empirical implication of
the analytical models. This is the causal effect of political institutions condi-
tional on economic development. So I focus here on the interaction between
regime type and per capita income (as a measure of development) and try
to find out whether institutions show different patterns in the relationship
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between economic progress and school enrollment. But before that let us see
how this hypothesis works.
5.3.1 The question
Economic development is hypothesized to have a positive impact on educa-
tion. Yet, according to the models examined in Chapter 3,11 the implicit
function relating income per capita and education is not continuous since it
is assumed that, once a member of a particular class gets educated, the other
individuals from the same class also invest in education. A reasonable theo-
retical reinterpretation of the relationship between these two variables for a
typical country that both maintains the main insights of models and guar-
antees continuity (something needed for the statistical analysis) is portrayed
in Figure 5.4 panel (a). The value “a” is defined as the threshold income
separating “poor” from “rich” economies. Sticking to the definitions given in
the theoretical models, at early stages of development (income values below
“a”), there are no enough resources in the economy for everyone to acquire
education and only the rich can invest in human capital by their own. If the
potential investors in the economy are mainly the upper class, then increases
in income per capita should have a relative small impact on education up to
the point “a”, as can be seen in the graph.12
To make this proposition clearer, consider what happen when economies
have cross the income threshold “a”. Now, the members of the middle class
are able to pay their own investment so that they start to receive education.
Whenever the proportion of middle-income individuals in the population is
higher than that of high-income agents (which is not very unrealistic at this
level of per capita income), then we should observe a relatively abrupt in-
crease of enrollment once the economy has passed such income threshold.
11From now on, when I refer to the analytical models or models of Chapter 3, I am
referring only to the ones of Perotti (1993) and Fernandez & Rogerson (1995).
12Except for certain political economy conditions under the logic of Fernandez and
Rogerson’ model in which the middle class becomes also skilled thanks to educational
subsidies financed by the poor.
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Figure 5.4: The Working Hypothesis
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Moreover, economic redistribution would determine how much the expected
enrollment rate gets expanded at this point. Remember that when per capita
income is above “a” (i.e. in rich economies), the poor may also obtain formal
schooling as long as a certain degree of redistribution is imposed. Therefore,
if governments endorse a redistribution package that allocates sufficient rev-
enues for the poor to get educated, then such increase in schooling should be
very large.
Thereafter, the positive effect of income wanes as enrollment is getting
closer to its natural limit of 100 per cent. The enrollment rate may reach
eventually this limit under very wealthy conditions in which, regardless of the
redistribution size, all groups may be able to afford education. In sum, the
relationship between income per capita and the expected enrollment rate can
be plausibly approximated as a logistic function (as described in Figure 5.4
panel (a)), where the influence of income per capita is comparatively lower
at very low and at very high levels of economic development.
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Could we expect this association be the same across different political
institutions? Or is it reasonable to expect interaction effects between in-
stitutions and the wealth of nations? According to the theory outlined in
several parts of this thesis, the type of regime exerts an indirect influence
on human capital investment. Instead of claiming a fixed direct impact, this
thesis has been argued that the effect of institutions works via how they pro-
cess or respond to other economic determinants of policy, which implies that
the differences in educational outcomes among political systems (namely, the
effect of regimes) vary with economic conditions. In Chapter 3, it has been
broadly discussed the interaction between institutions and income inequality.
In this section, however, I try to elucidate, drawing on the extensions of the
analytical models made above, if governments’ reactions to an increase in per
capita income depend on the institutional context.
Although using distinct modeling setups, the extensions of both formal
accounts (i.e Perotti 1993; Fernandez & Rogerson 1995) predict that, on
average, left-wing autocracies should accumulate less human capital than
any of the other two regimes in poor countries, whereas they should have
better educational outcomes than democracies and right-wing dictatorships
in high-income countries. The effect of per capita income, in other words, is
predicted to be larger in populist regimes than in the other political systems
(see Figure 5.4 panel (b)).
The idea common to both explanations is that, in low-income nations,
any policy promoting education is comparatively more costly to the poor. In
Perotti, a human capital-enhancing policy implies a reduction in the level of
pure-income redistribution, which is obviously more costly to the poor than
to the middle class. As a result, the inequality conditions under which the
externality from the investment of the rich may compensate the short-run sac-
rifices of regimes’ constituencies are more stringent in left-wing dictatorships
than in democracies. Of course, wealth-biased regimes do not redistribute at
all in any circumstances and thus constitute the institutional scenario that is
expected to promote the most human capital. In Fernandez and Rogerson,
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as it is not possible that the least aﬄuent groups of the society can invest
in education, they are worse off if a publicly provided program of subsidies
that would enhance aggregate schooling is endorsed: in this case they are
simply financing the education of other classes.13 Hence we should observe
that populist dictatorial governments have not a real interest in encouraging
education. On the contrary, as seen in Table 3.10, there exist some inequality
conditions under which democracies and right-wing dictatorships tend to ap-
prove a certain level of public financing in the form of educational subsidies
so that not only the rich but also the middle class can acquire education.
Summarizing, if the income shares of social classes are randomly assigned
to political institutions, then the latter two regimes will have higher average
rates of enrollment than left-wing autocracies.
However, at later stages of development -more particularly, when per
capita income is equal to or greater than “a” in Figure 5.4-, government
redistribution may help the “uneducated” poor to overcome their liquidity
constrains in their investment in education. Leftist autocrats, by pursuing
low-income individuals’ interests, are inclined to implement at least the nec-
essary level of redistribution so that all members of society become skilled.
Regardless of inequality, in this institutional context a spectacular immediate
increase in enrollment should occur right after income per capita has reached
the wealth threshold “a”. Yet the poor may not get educated in the other
types of regimes. From Perotti’s model, democratic politicians or rightist dic-
tators are willing to increase the tax and transfer system in order to foster hu-
man capital but only under certain configurations of the income distribution
that make the cost of educating the poor small enough from the viewpoint
of the median voter or the upper class respectively. Considering the model
of Fernandez and Rogerson, first it is possible the formation of democratic
government coalitions in favor of a restricted redistribution policy leading to
the exclusion of the poor from education and, second, right-wing autocrats
do not have any incentive in facilitating school access to the least well-off.
13Remember that this model assumes that there is no educational externality and that
transfers are received only by those who actually go to school.
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 133
Both theoretical models therefore predict that left-wing regimes experience,
on average, a steeper increase of enrollment as the economy develops than
their institutional counterfactuals.
The expected differences in outcomes between democracies and rightist
dictatorships are less clear-cut. Focusing on the Perotti’s setup, we can see in
Table 3.10 that in poor countries wealth-biased regimes are expected to have
higher enrollment rates than democracies, whereas the differences in enroll-
ment are very small but in favor of democratic governments in rich countries
(see Table 3.8), which suggests that economic progress has a greater effect
under democracies. In regard to Fernandez and Rogerson’ model, in low-
income countries, both types of regimes are hypothesized to produce the
same outcomes in education but as the economy keeps growing democracies
on average tend to raise enrollment at a higher rate than rightist autocra-
cies.14
5.3.2 Data
To empirically address these theoretical hypotheses, I use a cross-sectional
time-series database. It is a global sample that includes all countries for which
annual information on the relevant variables is available from 1960 (or from
the year of independence) to 1996. Data on the dependent variable comes
from the indicator previously discussed about the enrollment rates in primary
and secondary education (ENROLL). This dataset is an unbalanced panel of
countries, that is, the time coverage of the period under studied varies from
one country to the other. For instance, while some nations have data on
education for all 37 years of the period, others may have no more than four
observations. Note also that the particular structure of the panel (how many
countries and years have information) depends upon the set of variables under
analysis. Statistical results are robust, however, to this unbalanced nature
of the data. The sample includes both developed and developing countries
14Once again, these hypotheses rely on the assumption that inequality characteristics
are randomly assigned to political institutions.
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and it has a broad representation of nations for each region of the world.
Regarding political institutions, I use the dichotomous classification of
democratic regimes (REGH) developed by Przeworski et al. (2000).15 But
the country-year dictatorships are further distinguished by their ideological
orientation exploiting the data described in Chapter 4. In particular, I use
the data on the ideology of dictatorships that are based on the complete
procedure explained in this chapter, that is, the data based on the two types
of proposed indicators: the direct ideological indicators and the policy indi-
cators. Considering the overlap of these two variables, the number of nations
examined is around 153 yielding a total of country-years observations equal to
3577. This number drops to 3328 when the analysis is restricted to democra-
cies, right and left-wing dictatorships.16 As we shall see, the sample reduces
a lot as other variables enter into the analysis.
Finally with regards to economic development, I exploit data on real
GDP per capita as a proxy. The source of the data is the Penn World Table
(Heston et al. 2002). Among the alternative income levels, I use RGDPCH
(Chain series), and the starting version used is PWT6.1. To enlarge the size
of the sample as much as possible, I fill some missing data calculated from
the same variable RGDPCH of the version PWT5.6. To be more precise, for
the missing data in the real GDP per capita (Chain series) from PWT6.1, I
use the predictions on this variable based on a regression (with fixed-country
effects) on the real GPD per capita (Chain series) from PWT5.6.
Before proceeding to the estimation process, some descriptive data about
the relationships of interest are presented in the next section.
15Concretely, I employ an updated version of this dataset that goes to the year 2000.
16That is, when those dictatorships that could not be classified in terms of their ideology
or are considered centrists are excluded from the analysis.
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5.3.3 A preliminary exploration of the data
To have a sense of the data, I present in this section some descriptives pre-
liminaries on the effect of political institutions on educational outcomes from
the raw data. Focusing first on the variation over time, Table 5.1 shows the
mean values of the combined enrollment in primary and secondary levels and
its cumulative growth (“achange”), for 5-year subperiods and for different
types of political regimes.17 As can be seen in the table, average enrollment
rates have increased (during the entire period) less in democratic countries
than in both types of dictatorships. While the cumulative growth of educa-
tion over the whole period is 9.5 percentage points under democracies, the
corresponding figures for left and right-wing dictatorships are 10.6 and 14.9
respectively. In populist regimes, schooling average enrollment has expanded
particularly in 1960s and 1970s (see column 7 in Table 5.1), whereas in right-
ist dictatorships enrollment grows steadily during the entire period except
in the 1990s as indicated in the last column of the table. Looking at the
institutional differences associated to the mean values of enrollment, we see
that in all subperiods democratic countries tend to have, in average, greater
enrollment rates than their dictatorial counterparts. In turn, left-wing dic-
tatorships seem to outperform right-wing ones in most of the subperiods.
One is tempted to interpret these institutional differences as the effect of
political institutions on education. However, this is an unconditional esti-
mation of the impact of institutions, which can be misleading if other causal
factors varies also with political regimes. In that case, institutions may be
picking up the effects of other variables correlated with both political regimes
and enrollment.
17Instead of using the difference between the simple year averages as a measure of the
over-time change in enrollment, I follow the suggestion of Persson and Tabellini (2003:
47) that consists in estimating the cumulative growth of enrollment over a certain period
by “finding the difference between the estimated coefficients on the last and the first year
dummy of the period” in a regression of enrollment with year dummies and country fixed
effects. According to these authors, “the country fixed effects take care of the potential
problem of countries with different [enrollment] average..entering and exiting the panel at
different times” (p. 47).
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Table 5.1: Political Regimes and enrollment (ENROLL) Over Time
All regimes Democracy Left Dic Right Dic
mean achange mean achange mean achange mean achange
1960-1964 48.4 1.6 55.7 1.1 45.3 3.3 38.1 1.3
1965-1969 49.5 1.6 58.9 2.5 46.8 -1.1 40.6 2.4
1970-1974 53.6 2.2 63.2 0.9 50.9 2.2 45.2 3.4
1975-1979 55.1 1.5 65.8 1.1 51 2.6 47.8 1.6
1980-1984 58.4 1.2 67.1 0.8 52.3 0.9 54 1.4
1985-1989 60.5 0.7 67.9 0.7 53.3 0.8 55.4 1.8
1990-1996 64.1 1.2 67.7 2.1 54.1 1.3 62.8 0.04
All years 56.5 11.1 64.7 9.5 51 10.6 48.8 14.9
Cases 3328 1473 1005 850
Countries 147 86 60 54
Note: “achange” refers to the average cumulative change of ENROLL for dif-
ferent subperiods, and for the whole period in the row “All years.”
An obvious factor that may be driving these educational disparities across
regimes is per capita income. On the one hand, we have seen in the Intro-
duction to this thesis that GDP per capita is indeed positively related with
enrollment rates. On the other hand, as Figure 5.5 indicates, institutions
seem also to be related with per capita income. This figure shows the dis-
tribution of GDP per capita of country-year observations within each type
of political institution. As portrayed in the graph, dictatorships (of both
types) tend to have a lower average income than democratic countries. Most
of the dictatorial cases concentrate on relatively poor intervals of income,
while democratic institutions appear to spread over relative richer intervals.
Table 5.2 offers a clearer description of the incidence of political regimes
by per capita income. For several GDP per capita ranges, this table displays
the observed proportion of each type of institution -taking only the sample
of democracies, left and right wing dictatorships. Among very poor country-
year observations (with average income less than 1000$), almost 90 percent
of the cases are dictatorial systems. The proportion of democratic regimes
is nearly 10 percent. This proportion increases gradually with economic
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Figure 5.5: The Distribution of per capita Income in Different Political
Regimes
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development, representing more than half of the cases among observations
with per capita income greater than 6000$. In very rich countries (with
values of GDP per capita over seven thousands dollars), the proportion of
dictatorial regimes is less than 30 percent. Therefore, this data confirms
the well-known fact that the incidence of democratic institutions seem to be
positively associated with per capita income. A final point that is worth
noting is that both types of dictatorships seem to have a similar distribution
of GDP per capita.
Table 5.2: The Incidence of Political Regimes by GDP/cap
GDP/cap Democracy Left Dic Right Dic
0-1000 9.50 (46) 52.69 (255) 37.81 (183)
1001-2000 20.5 (151) 50.5 (373) 29 (214)
2001-3000 27.9 (154) 34.4 (190) 37.8 (209)
3001-4000 47.3 (187) 20 (79) 32.7 (129)
4001-5000 45.9 (142) 21.4 (66) 32.7 (101)
5001-6000 40.9 (105) 32.3 (83) 26.8 (69)
6001-7000 53.2 (99) 24.7 (46) 22 (41)
7001- 76.5 (1066) 10.5 (146) 13.1 (182)
Cases 1950 1238 1128
Note: Main figures are row proportions. Number of cases
in parenthesis.
Given this relationship between political institutions and economic de-
velopment, it follows that the higher educational performance of democratic
regimes shown above is due in part to the effect of per capita income. So the
next step is to control for this factor.
As provisional evidence for the interaction effect of per capita income and
political regimes, we can take a look at Table 5.3 where the mean of enroll-
ment is shown in several income intervals grouped by political institutions.
The table reveals that, in poor countries with values of GDP per capita lower
than 2000$, democracies seem to outperform the similar outcomes of the two
dictatorial types. As we move to middle-income countries, we see nevertheless
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how the mean of enrollment under dictatorships approaches and, in the case
of left-wing autocracies, even surpasses democratic standards. For instance,
in those countries with GDP per capita between 2000 and 3000 dollars, the
observed average proportion of students attending school is 50, 57 and 48
for democracy, left and right wing dictatorships respectively. Moreover, this
highest performance of populist regimes appears to be a persistent pattern in
countries with income levels lower than 6000$. By comparing the evolution
of education across institutions, the figures suggest, in line with theoretical
expectations, a stronger positive relationship between income and enrollment
in populist regimes -up to the point of 6000$ from which democratic countries
apparently take the lead again.
Table 5.3: Political Regimes and enrollment (ENROLL) by GDP/cap
GPD/cap All regimes Democracy Left Dic Right Dic
0-1000 28.5 (296) 42.2 (23) 27.9 (149) 26.5 (124)
1001-2000 41.1 (447) 46.4 (95) 41.2 (224) 37.1 (128)
2001-3000 51.7 (357) 50.6 (90) 56.9 (118) 48.2 (149)
3001-4000 55.6 (305) 55.9 (127) 59.8 (66) 52.7 (112)
4001-5000 59.9 (252) 60.6 (103) 62.5 (60) 57.5 (89)
5001-6000 61.9 (207) 62.8 (74) 62.9 (73) 59.7 (60)
6001-7000 61.4 (151) 64 (76) 57.6 (39) 60 (36)
7001- 70 (1104) 71 (860) 66.8 (124) 65.6 (120)
Cases 3119 1448 853 818
Note: Main figures are mean values of ENROLL. Number of cases in
parenthesis.
Yet such data need to be read with prudence. One major source of sus-
picion is the existence of a strong regime selection on economic development
causing a nonrandom distribution of regimes across levels of wealth. Since
democratic systems are positively associated with income, we observe relative
few cases of poor democracies and rich dictatorships (see Table 5.2). Thus
a comparative assessment of performance at the two extremes of the world
income distribution can be very misleading. Not only that, as will be shown
later, this selection process may distort statistical inferences regarding the
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different effect of economic development across regimes. In any case, these
preliminary findings need further formal empirical tests that, among other
things, controls for a set of alternative explanatory variables. This more
careful empirical analysis is undertaken in the next section.
5.3.4 Estimation and results
To test more rigorously the working hypotheses outlined before, the general
strategy of estimation adopted here is as follows. Suppose that in each polit-
ical regime I, policy performance (i. e. school enrollment) in country i and
year t are determined by the following stochastic process:
Y Iit = F
I(αi + θXit) + ²
I
it, I = D,L,R (5.1)
where Y represents the rate of primary and secondary school enrollment,
X the vector of independent variables, F (.) is a function relating expected
enrollment to a combination of covariates and ² is a random variable captur-
ing the influence of all unobserved factors of education. Finally, the is and
ts index countries and years respectively, and I denotes the three types of
institutions, that is, democracy (D) left-wing (L) and right-wing (R) dicta-
torships.
One advantage of working with time-series cross-section data is the possi-
bility of using methods to control for unobserved country-specific traits that
may influence the dependent variable. Although these time-invariant char-
acteristics of countries cannot be directly included in the set of regressors,
it is possible to incorporate their effects via the introduction of a dummy
variable for each country in the regression. This is the fixed-effect formu-
lation in which group heterogeneity can be captured by differences in the
constant term or, put differently, each unit has its own intercept. A very
important implication of this model is that the estimation of the other pa-
rameters of interest is based on the time variation within groups. Differences
among countries are totally ignored as a source of variation to identify the
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impact of explanatory factors. Actually, this method is equivalent to a regres-
sion replacing original data with observations measured as deviations from
their country means, that is, a regression of [Yit − Yi] on [Xit − X i] where
Yi = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 Yit, the mean over the T observations of group i and similar
for X i (Greene 2000: 561).
The general performance model of equation 5.1 uses this technique. By
estimating a different intercept to each group (αi), all country-specific de-
terminants of education that are invariant through time are hold constant
in the estimation process. In this way, we eliminate the potential bias that
may emerge when such determinants are also correlated with other covari-
ates. For instance, suppose that there are certain features of countries, say
their colonial history or geographical location, that prompt them to be stable
democracies. If these traits also affect educational outcomes, then omitting
them from the regression will produce biased estimates regarding the im-
pact of political regimes. In order to avoid this type of potential bias due
to different unobserved group-specific factors, the model in (5.1) includes
country-dummy variables into the right-hand side of the equation. So the
question we ask to the data becomes whether changes in enrollment are as-
sociated with changes in Xit for a given country. Instead of comparing, for
example, democratic nations with countries under leftist regimes (holding
constant other covariates) to estimate differences in education, the fixed-
effect specification looks only at nations that have gone through political
transitions and compares performance during the democratic period to the
one during left-wing dictatorial years.
Expanding the argument within the function in (5.1) to test the hypothe-
ses of the interaction effect between per capita income and political regimes
on human capital, we can rewrite (5.1) as
Yit = F (αi+δ1Lit+δ2Rit+β1Wit+β2Wit∗Lit+β3Wit∗Rit+γZit)+²it, (5.2)
where L and R are binary indicators, one for each type of dictatorship tak-
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ing value 1 if an observation is a left or a right-wing autocracy respectively
and 0 otherwise. W represents per capita income and Z a vector of control
variables. Disturbances are assumed to be identical in all regimes so that
²Dit = ²
L
it = ²
R
it = ²it. As in standard applications of interactive models (Brau-
moeller 2004; Brambor et. al. 2006), δ1 (or δ2) measures the differences in
education between leftist (or rightist) regimes and democracies (the reference
category) when W = 0. The coefficients showing whether the relationship
between economic development and human capital varies across institutions
are β2 and β3. Noting first that β1 tells us how income is associated with ed-
ucation under democracy, β2 evaluates if the responses of populist dictators
to economic development are different from those of democratic politicians
while β3 evaluates the same thing but with respect to rightist dictators. If
β2 = β3 = 0, then contrary to our hypotheses GDP per capita has a similar
influence regardless of the institutional settings at work.
Before discussing the empirical evidence, two econometric issues concern-
ing reverse causation that could invalidate the statistical results need to be
examined. The first one consists of the potential endogeneity of economic
development. One may think that school enrollment could simultaneously
promote per capita income, which implies a reversal of causality from the
dependent variable to this predictor that if not considered in the regression
analysis then its coefficient will be inflated. However, there are reasons to
argue against the strength of such reversal. While it is reasonable to expect
that the stock of human capital in the workforce will determine in part eco-
nomic growth18, it is harder to sustain the same expectation for enrollment
rates, which informs about the percentage of young people (who are out of
the workforce) that receive some kind of pre-university education. Moreover,
as our concern is whether enrollment rate fosters per capita income and not
economic growth, then the fact that education could expand the future total
18See Barro (1997) for supporting evidence. The question on whether human capital
promotes economic growth is, however, a controversial issue as shown by Pritchett (2001)
and Easterly (2002), who provide evidence to the contrary. For a recent and quite complete
review of the empirical literature on the macro-level relationship between (different mea-
sures of) human capital and economic performance, see Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003).
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output do not guarantee that per capita income will increase too since it
depends also on population. In any case, the level of enrollment in a given
year is unlikely to induce greater prosperity in that year.
The second issue deals with reverse causation running from schooling to
political regimes. It has been argued that a better-educated population tend
to support democracy over other dictatorial alternatives. The conventional
explanation, pioneered by Lipset (1960), emphasizes a culture link within
the broader modernization theory: education is claimed to cause a change of
individual values more consistent with standard democratic practices. The
empirical evidence sustaining this idea has been based, however, on sim-
ple cross-country correlations between the educational stock in the society
and the democratic nature of institutions; an evidence not robust to the
application of more rigorous techniques (Acemoglu et. al. 2005). Using
within-country variation, these authors do not find supporting evidence for
this relationship, which leads them to conclude that such inferences based on
cross-country variation were likely biased as a consequence of the omission of
fixed characteristics of countries in the statistical analysis. The cultural ex-
planation have also been theoretically contested. In an attempt to determine
the factors inducing governments to control citizens’ information, Lott (1999)
proposes that public education may serve the interests of totalitarian rulers
as a mean of indoctrination in their strategies to contain opposition. Instead
of fostering democratic values, dictators may use state-managed schools to
diffuse a regime-supporting ideology. Moreover, Lott finds through differ-
ent statistical tests that, at higher levels of totalitarianism, indoctrination
becomes a cheaper way to deter opposition compared to pure force. Apart
from these theoretical and empirical reasons against a causal link from our
dependent variable to institutions, some of our hypotheses would be more dif-
ficult to confirm if the culture view were true, making the potential reversal
a minor problem in our case.19
19Note that this view always predicts a positive association between democracy and
education, whereas for example one of our interaction hypotheses predicts a higher levels
of education in relatively richer left-wing dictatorships.
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Turning to the estimation process, we need to assume a functional form
of the model described in equation 5.2 as well as a particular behaviour of
the disturbances process ²it in order to come out with a estimable equation.
Different assumptions concerning both elements (F and ²it) will thus result
in different estimation models.
Linear regression models
In the first set of models that I run, the function F in (5.2) is assumed to be
linear so that the estimated equation would be:
Yit = αi+δ1Lit+δ2Rit+β1Wit+β2Wit ∗Lit+β3Wit ∗Rit+γZit+ ²it. (5.3)
According to the hypotheses developed in Section 5.3.1, the expectations
are that under poor economic conditions left-wing dictators face less incen-
tives to promote education than their institutional counterparts while right-
wing autocracies either have a higher level of education than democracies -in
the Perotti‘s setup- or show a educational pattern similar to that of the latter
-in the Fernandez&Rogerson’ setup. Thus δ1-which measures the difference in
expected enrollment between democracies and left-wing dictatorships when
per capita income W is zero- should be negative and δ2 -which evaluates the
same difference but between democracies and right-wing regimes- should be
positive or zero.20
Under rich economic conditions, however, we should observe leftist dic-
tatorships at the top of the performance institutional ranking followed by
democracies and rightist autocracies at the bottom, which implies differ-
ent political responses to economic prosperity depending on the institutional
framework. Taking into account that the impact of per capita income is al-
ways positive, the hypotheses are that economic development has the greatest
20As the Undecided&Center category of dictatorship is removed from the analysis,
democracy constitutes the reference group in (5.3).
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effect in populist regimes and the lowest in right-wing ones. In democratic
institutions, it will increase enrollment at a rate in between those of dicta-
torships. Such hypotheses suggests that the interaction term W ∗ L in (5.3)
should enter the regression with a positive sign while W ∗R with a negative
one -note that the reference category in (5.3) is democracy.
To test those theoretical propositions, I first estimate equation 5.3 by
ordinary least squares (OLS) with country fixed-effects (FE)21 assuming the
disturbances to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across
panels. To correct this problem, standard errors are computed using the
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) method proposed by Beck and Katz
(1995; 1996). Table 5.4 presents the results.22
Column 1 reports the coefficients (and the panel-corrected standard er-
21The F -tests against the fixed-effect specification (the null) are widely rejected and
very significant. To save space, country dummies are not reported in the output tables.
22In the regression analyses that follows including those of the next section, six Middle
Eastern oil countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates) are excluded. The reason behind this decision is that their economies rely to
a large extent on fuel exports, which distorts their pattern of economic development and
government incentives to expand the access of public education (Gylfason 2001; Ross 2006).
Indeed, these nations are typically very rich while their educational performance are too
low for what one may expect by looking at their per capita income. Note that the fixed-
effect approach does not allow to control for indicators measuring the economic weight
of natural resources since this feature is for the most part a time-invariant characteristic
of nations. Because these countries were classified (when the procedure described in the
previous chapter pointed to some ideological orientation) as rightist absolute regimes,
excluding them from regressions works if somehow against our hypotheses. In addition,
several other influential outliers are not included in the usable sample: Malawi from 1994 to
1996 and South Africa from 1990 to 1996. Both countries increase spectacularly but quite
unrealistically the number of students in one year. In Malawi, the schooling enrollment
rate jumps from 56% in 1993 to more than 80% in 1994. Such huge increase coincides
with a political transition to democracy from a right-wing dictatorship. According to
several sources, the first democratic Malawian government made a strong emphasis on
education in its electoral campaign. Although it actually imposed compulsory primary
education, government’s educational output has been widely criticized because of the lack
of resources, the overcrowding in schools or the high rate of dropout (one of the largest
among African countries). In the case of South Africa, enrollment expands from 73% in
1988 to 96% in 1990 and over 100% in later years. Actually, South Africa is the only
country in the sample that reaches that level of education. In the discussion of results, I
will report how they change when these observations are included.
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rors in parentheses) of the most parsimonious specification which contains the
key factors that proves whether the effect of per capita income (INCOME)23
changes with institutions in the expected direction. School enrollment (EN-
ROLL) is thus stipulated to be a function of INCOME, the two binary in-
dicators of dictatorships (LEFT and RIGHT) and the interaction terms be-
tween these variables (LEFT*INCOME and RIGHT*INCOME). In addition,
I introduces two dummies variables indicating if private (PRIVATE) or sec-
ondary vocational (VOCATIONAL) schooling are counted in the enrollment
figures in order to abstract from artificial jumps in the dependent variable
owing to changes in coverage.
The coefficient on the INCOME variable is positive and statistically signif-
icant, corroborating the existence of a positive relationship between economic
prosperity and education within democratic countries. However, looking at
the value of the coefficient (1.20), economic development seems not to be
very strongly associated with education. If we consider the time variation of
enrollment, it takes two and half standard deviations in per capita income (a
change of 5000$) to generate a increase in education of almost one standard
deviation (that is, 6 percentage points). This result is very surprising in view
of the much stronger impact of income usually reported in the cross-section
empirical literature (see for instance Dasgupta 1993; Perotti 1996; Mingat
and Tan 1998; Brown 1999). Regardless of the model specification and esti-
mation method, most estimates in the present analysis do not show a great
influence of GDP per capita in any regime, which suggests that economic
development is not as an important predictor in accounting for educational
changes in a given country as it is in explanations of the educational differ-
ences among nations.24
Turning to the institutional variables, they are all statistically significant
but while the dummy indicator of left-wing regimes and its interaction with
23This variable enters to the regression divided by 1000, so INCOME refers to GDP per
capita expressed in thousands of dollars.
24Easterly (1999) finds as well this shifting pattern of economic development in primary
enrollment regressions.
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income have the expected signs, the covariates related with right-wing dic-
tatorships do not. In line with theoretical predictions, left-wing regimes are
associated with lower rates of enrollment in comparison to democracies in rel-
atively poor countries but as the economy grows populist dictators response
by increasing schooling at a higher rate than democratic politicians. Yet, and
contrary to expectations, right-wing autocracies seem to have lower levels of
education than democracies under relative poor conditions. As indicated by
the coefficient of RIGHT, its magnitude is even lower than that of the binary
indicator for leftist absolute regimes. Also, the positive association between
per capita income and education is stronger in rightist dictatorships than in
democratic nations. The two basic controls, PRIVATE and VOCATIONAL,
are related with significantly higher rates of enrollment.
These empirical regularities could be driven however by omitted variables.
One potential candidate is the percentage of rural population in the society.
Without holding this determinant of education constant, there are reasons
to think that the regimes-related covariates are capturing its effect.
On the one hand, it has been widely established the existence of a ru-
ral/urban gap in education even in developed countries. As stated before,
both supply and demand side factors may account for this gap. On the sup-
ply side, the cost of public education can be argued to be greater in rural
areas. The provision of educational services is subjected to higher economies
of scale in urban locations than in more dispersedly populated rural areas.
To the extent that the supply of educational services requires some invest-
ment fixed-costs, like the building of schools or teacher salaries, increasing
the number of students reduces the educational cost per student up to certain
point. Rural communities may spread these initial costs of education over a
lower number of students as a consequence of their less concentrated popula-
tion. On the demand side, city residents face stronger incentives to acquire
education as urban labor markets, dominated by the industrial and service
sectors, compensate skilled employees better than agricultural labor markets
where the demand of highly educated workers is lower. These two arguments
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Table 5.4: Education and the interaction effect of income and institutions.
Simple linear regression
(1) (2) (3)
Method PCSE,FE PCSE,FE PCSE,FE
Dependent variable ENROLL ENROLL ENROLL
LEFT -2.80 0.58 0.10
(1.03)*** (0.71) (0.70)
RIGHT -6.94 0.35 0.46
(1.30)*** (0.62) (0.66)
INCOME 1.20 0.32 0.41
(0.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***
LEFT*INCOME 0.57 0.76 0.82
(0.15)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)***
RIGHT*INCOME 0.69 -0.24 -0.29
(0.17)*** (0.11)** (0.11)**
PRIVATE 9.72 9.51 9.48
(1.51)*** (1.49)*** (1.50)***
VOCATIONAL 7.06 6.15 5.89
(0.46)*** (0.46)*** (0.45)***
RURAL -0.85 -0.83
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
TRADE -0.01
(0.01)
POP14 0.02
(0.06)
Average effect 37.84 86.62 85.16
No. Observations 3030 2881 2646
No. Countries 136 129 123
Prob>Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. INCOME refers to GDP
per capita divided by 1000. Average effect is the average value of country-
specific effects (intercepts). *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***signif-
icant at 1%.
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points, therefore, to a negative relationship between the percentage of rural
population and enrollment figures.
On the other hand, dictatorial regimes tend to have a larger proportion of
rural population than democracies in all per capita income intervals.25 Thus
it could be the case that the poorer performance of dictatorships at low in-
come levels reflects partially the fact that dictatorial cases have a larger size
of rural population. Moreover, as economic development shrinks that size
and non-democratic regimes start the development process with a greater
proportion, then it could be possible that an increase in per capita income
causes a greater decline in the proportion of rural population under dic-
tatorships than under democracies, which may explain in part the greater
influence of economic prosperity in the former.
Column 2 in Table 5.4 shows that this is in fact the case. Once the per-
centage of rural population (RURAL) is introduced in the estimated equa-
tion, the educational differences between regimes vanish completely at low
levels of per capita income. Economic development still have a positive, al-
though smaller, significant impact within democratic political institutions:
an increase of 5000 dollars in average income rises primary and secondary
enrollment by only 1.6 percentage points. The two interaction terms have the
expected signs and are statistically significant. Consistent with hypotheses,
the coefficient of RIGHT*INCOME turns out negative indicating a weaker
relationship between education and economic resources in right-wing dicta-
torships than in democracies. Yet the sum of the two parameters of INCOME
and RIGHT*INCOME, which informs about the effect of per capita income
in rightist autocracies, is not significantly different from zero. Wealth-biased
dictators seem not to open up formal schooling to lower social classes as the
economy grows.
25Summary descriptives show that in countries with for example a GDP per capita lower
than 1000$, the average share of rural population in democratic countries is 77% while in
left and right wing dictatorships is 83% and 86% respectively.
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A crucial result for our theory is that populist dictatorships is the type of
regime in which economic prosperity induces the largest increments in enroll-
ment rates. Even after the proportion of rural population is controlled for,
the coefficient of LEFT*INCOME is still positive and significant: leftist dic-
tators tend to foster education, as a consequence of economic development,
at a higher rate than democratic politicians. Looking at the sum of the corre-
sponding parameters of INCOME and LEFT*INCOME -again this measures
the impact of per capita income in left-wing dictatorships-, we see that an
increase of 5000 dollars in the GDP per capita causes a significant upsurge of
5.4 points in the enrollment ratio. The coefficient of RURAL is negative and
statistically significant as expected: the larger the size of rural population in
society, the lower the number of children who are enrolled in pre-university
schooling. The other two controls, PRIVATE and VOCATIONAL, retain its
significance levels and keep the same sign and magnitude.
In column 3 of Table 5.4, I check whether these empirical findings are
robust to the inclusion of additional standard controls in the literature. The
first one is the degree of trade openness in the economy (TRADE), defined as
imports plus exports over GDP, and the second one is the proportion of the
population aged under 14 (POP14). The regression results indicate that these
two covariates do not actually help to explain educational variation within
countries. Although they do not have any explanatory power, their inclusion
in the estimation model does not change other coefficients. If anything, the
earlier pattern of the development consequences on education in different
regimes reveals clearer since the interaction terms and the additive parameter
of per capita income increases in magnitude.
To see more clearly the substantive implications of the interactive coeffi-
cients, I use the estimates of the last model to obtain the predicted values of
the dependent variable as a function of average income in different regimes.
Figure 5.6 depicts the relationship between education and GDP per capita
in the three institutional categories. The constant term is normalized to be
60 per cent, which corresponds to the fixed effect of Venezuela. Note that
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choosing a different fixed-country effect does not change the portrayed rela-
tionship. According to this simulation, when the economy is very poor, the
institutional setting is an insignificant predictor of enrollment rate: all insti-
tutions seem to have similar educational levels. But as the economy develops
the educational differences among regimes become more patent and increase
with GPD per capita. Leftist dictators respond to prosperity by expand-
ing education at a higher rate than democratic politicians, while right-wing
rulers do not seem to react in any systematic way.
Figure 5.6: The predicted impact of GDP/cap on enrollment by political
regime
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In sum, the empirical evidence confirms the existence of indirect insti-
tutional effects. Although the type of regime does not appear to make any
difference in educational outcomes at very poor levels of income, the relative
performance of institutions diverges however as the economy grows in the
expected way. Another central finding in accordance with theoretical priors
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is that the ideological orientation of dictators seems to constitute a relevant
feature in explaining educational policy responses of governments. Dicta-
torships appear to take very different educational paths, so the proposed
classification of dictatorships proves to be a relevant institutional distinc-
tion for the research question at hand. Moreover, the fact that their relative
performances in comparison to that of democracy run in opposite directions
provides empirical grounds against the strategy of grouping all dictatorial
cases in one category to compare their combined educational outcomes with
the democratic governments ones.
Dynamic regression In time-series cross-section data, observations for a
particular country are not usually independent. Data could be generated by
a dynamic process in that the value of the regressand in a particular year
depends on its past quantities. Certainly this is the case in our sample: edu-
cation figures exhibit a strong correlation between observations in sequential
periods. For instance, in a simple regression of ENROLL on its lagged value
plus a constant, the interval estimate of the autoregressive coefficient goes
from 0.94 to 0.96. It is well known that the time structure of the data, if not
explicitly modeled, will be buried in the errors producing serial correlation.
This in turn will make OLS standard errors incorrect. Since earlier statisti-
cal models did not take into account this dynamics in the dependent variable
and did not correct for a possible autocorrelation in the errors, we need to
rerun previous regressions with estimation strategies that rightly incorporate
these dynamic issues.26
The most simple strategy is to assume that the errors are serially corre-
lated and include this information in the estimation process. I do this in the
first column of Table 5.5. This model reproduces the last specification of the
previous table but estimates it by Prais-Winsten regression (which employs
the generalized least-squares method) assuming that residuals follow a com-
26A graphical inspection of residuals from the last specification in Table 5.4 clearly
shows a pattern of serial correlation. More formally, the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge
2002: 282-283) on these residuals cannot reject the null of no first-order autocorrelation
(in Stata the implementation of this test is done with the command “xtserial”).
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mon AR(1) process in all panels.27 As before, standard errors of coefficients
are calculated using PCSE and country fixed-effects are introduced in the
regression.28
The first thing to be noted is that residuals are in fact highly correlated
as suggested by the value of the estimated autocorrelation parameter Rho
(0.74).29 Considering the variables of interest, the main change in statistical
results is that the coefficient for the interaction term RIGHT*INCOME loses
its significance level meaning, contrary to expectations, that the positive im-
pact of GDP per capita on education is basically the same in both democratic
and right-wing regimes. Notice that such impact is statistically significant as
indicated by the coefficient of INCOME. The hypothesis according to which
the effect of economic development should be stronger in leftist dictatorships
than in the rest of regimes is again confirmed by the data, although the real
difference turns out smaller. As displayed in the output table, the remaining
coefficients are unaffected by this time adjustment of data.
A more appropriate strategy, proposed by Beck and Katz (1996; 2004), is
to explicitly model the dynamics via the introduction of a lagged dependent
variable in the right-hand side of the regression. This method can only be
applied on stationary time series.30 In the present analysis, however, several
formal tests points to a non-stationary process in our school enrollment mea-
sure. As already stated, the coefficient on the lagged ENROLL variable in
a simple autoregression is very near one (its point estimate is 0.95). Also,
the Fisher test for panel unit roots cannot reject the null that all series of
27In practice, this method consists in transforming the data, with an estimate of the
autocorrelation parameter, to eliminate serial correlation of the errors and then applying
OLS to the transformed data.
28See Beck and Katz (1995) for a description of this entire statistical procedure.
29This estimate has been calculated using the option “tscorr” in Stata which corresponds
to the time series autocorrelation calculation.
30That is, when the stochastic process generating the time observations for each panel
has constant mean and variance. A value near one on the lagged dependent variable
coefficient indicates that the regressand is non-stationary or, in other words, the presence
of unit roots in the data.
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Table 5.5: Education and the interaction effect of income and institutions.
Dynamic linear regression
(1) (2) (3)
Method FE FD FD
AR(1) AR(1) Country-specific AR(1)
Dependent variable ENROLL D-ENROLL D-ENROLL
LEFT 0.61 -0.07 -0.22
(0.64) (0.47) (0.45)
RIGHT 0.38 -0.26 -0.22
(0.65) (0.38) (0.36)
INCOME 0.36 -0.06 0.01
(0.07)*** (0.11) (0.10)
LEFT*INCOME 0.35 0.20 0.21
(0.12)*** (0.11)* (0.09)**
RIGHT*INCOME -0.13 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
PRIVATE 3.95 2.24 2.31
(1.13)*** (0.95)** (0.87)***
VOCATIONAL 4.71 3.84 3.41
(0.55)*** (0.50)*** (0.48)***
RURAL -0.84 -0.30 -0.29
(0.03)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)**
TRADE -0.01 -0.001 -0.002
(0.01) (0.004) (0.004)
POP14 0.01 0.48 0.55
(0.07) (0.16)*** (0.17)***
Constant 0.51 0.53
(0.07)*** (0.07)***
Rho 0.74 0.23 0.33
No. Observations 2646 2423 2423
No. Countries 123 122 122
Prob>Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. INCOME refers to GDP per capita divided
by 1000. Rho indicates the estimate of the residual autocorrelation parameter. *significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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ENROLL are non-stationary (Prob>Chi2 =0.1021).31
In the presence of unit roots, we could alternatively treat the dynamics of
the model using an error correction regression that separates short from long
run impacts of the independent variables on Yit. Yet I cannot implement
this method since our data do not satisfy the assumption of cointegration
on which the error correction model is based. A proof of the absence of
cointegration is that the residuals from a regression of the dependent variable
on all covariates exhibit a non-stationary pattern, as the Fisher test indicates
(Prob>chi2 = 0.2002). To have an idea of the magnitude of this pattern, the
autoregressive coefficient of residuals is 0.92 with a standard error of 0.007.
In the case of no-cointegrated data, the optimal dynamic model that we
can fit to the data is a first-difference (FD) regression, which only accounts
for short-run relationships (Beck and Katz 2004). This is a model in first-
differences where the dependent variable, transformed as ∆Yit = Yit− Yi,t−1,
is regressed on a first-differencing transformation of all explanatory factors,
∆Xit = Xit − Xi,t−1. Such transformation has the immediate consequence
of eliminating the country effects. In addition, coefficients now measure to
what extent changes in the covariates are associated with changes in the
regressand.32 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.5 present the results of applying
this model to our last specification where all covariates are introduced. The
results are corrected for any remaining autocorrelation left in the residuals
assuming a common AR(1) process in all panels (column 2) or a different
AR(1) pattern across countries (column 3).
Except for the proportion of the population aged under 14, the whole set
of controls keeps their previous significance levels and their signs, although
the magnitude of coefficients get reduced. POP14 is still positively related
with education but now its coefficient in the two models turns out significant.
31For a description of this test, see Maddala and Wu (1999).
32For a full description of the first-difference estimator in the context of panel data, see
Wooldridge (2002).
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Acccording to the coefficiens of the two binary indicators of dictatorships,
when there is no variation in per capita income regimes do not make any
difference. Per capita income loses explanatory power in democratic institu-
tions. It seems that, in the short-run, GDP per capita does not induce any
change in enrollment rate in both democracies and right-wing dictatorships.
Once again, and in line with theoretical expectations, the interaction term
LEFT*INCOME is positive and significant. But the impact of economic
development in left-wing dictatorships (which is equal to the sum of coeffi-
cients INCOME and LEFT*INCOME), is statistically significant (at 10%)
only when the autocorrelation is assumed to be different across panels.33
Fractional logit regression models
In this section, I re-examine empirically the theoretical arguments through
a model that assumes a logistic-type functional form (F ) in equation (5.2).
In earlier regressions, it was assumed that the relevant relationships between
variables could be approximated by a linear function. One substantive im-
plication of this assumption is that the determinants of education exert a
constant effect throughout the domain of the function. However, as put for-
ward in section 5.3.1, the working hypothesis points to a nonlinear association
between economic development and human capital. Additionally, fitting a
linear regression will not assure that predicted values satisfy the bounded
nature of our dependent variable whose values are delimited between zero
and 100%. Indeed, looking at the average effect in columns 2 and 3 of Table
5.4, it is pretty clear that with such a high constant term predicted values
will likely exceed the upper limit of this interval.
A valid estimation strategy that takes care of these functional form-
related issues is the fractional logit regression proposed by Papke andWooldridge
(1996). Briefly, this regression is a generalized linear model in which the
expected value of any fractional response variable, rescaled to the interval
33A similar result is obtained if the same model is estimated but without taking into
account the serial correlation in the residuals.
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[0,1],34 could be modeled as
E(Yit|X) = G(Xβ), (5.4)
where G(.), called the link function, is chosen to be the cumulative distribu-
tion of the logistic function and the dependent variable Yit is assumed to be
distributed Bernoulli. Thus
E(Yit|X) = exp(Xβ)
[1 + exp(Xβ)]
. (5.5)
This model always yields predicted values between 0 and 1 and ensures,
in line with theoretical priors, that the effect of any covariate on E(Yit|X)
decreases as Xβ →∞. Equation 5.5 is estimated by quasi-likelihood meth-
ods.35
Table 5.6 displays the statistical results of fitting this model to our data
considering two different specifications.36 The first one reproduces the last
estimated specification (see column 1). Before testing the main hypothe-
ses, let us look at the effect of the control variables. As before, a higher
proportion of rural population (RURAL) reduces the rate of school enroll-
ment. Trade openness (TRADE) and the size of the population aged under
14 are (POP14), once again, irrelevant factors to understand the educational
changes over time. Finally, the impact of PRIVATE and VOCATIONAL
34In our case, we divide the enrollment rate, which is a fractional response variable, by
100 to normalize it to the unit interval.
35See Wooldridge (2002: 661-663) for a concise description of this method, and Papke
and Wooldridge (1996) for a deeper analytical explanation and an application.
36Both specifications incorporate, however, country-fixed effects. As Greene has been
argued (2000: 839), the introduction of country heterogeneity in a logistic regression does
not entail major econometric problems. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust standard
errors, corresponding to the valid estimates of the asymptotic variance of parameters
discussed in Papke and Wooldridge (1996). These standard errors are estimated assuming
that observations within groups (clusters) are non-independent. This adjusts the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimators for the existing correlation between residuals of the
same unit.
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remain stable.
Regarding the more substantive hypotheses, the empirical findings seem
to confirm the absence of significant educational disparities between democ-
racies and right-wing dictatorships at any income level. Note that the es-
timated parameters on the additive term RIGHT and its interaction with
GDP per capita are both statistically insignificant. The overall conclusion
drawn from all interactive coefficients and the one on INCOME is that per
capita income is positively associated with education in all regimes, but its
effect is higher in left-wing dictatorships as expected.
To clarify the size of these interaction effects, Figure 5.7 simulates the
predicted enrollment rate as a function of per capita income in the three
types of regimes, holding the rest of the variables at their means (PRIVATE
and VOCATIONAL are set to 1, and the constant term to the average ef-
fect). In poor countries, political institutions do not differ in their educa-
tional records; all tend to have the same schooling levels. But as per capita
income increases, left-wing dictatorial governments invest in human capital
more than democratic or rightist dictatorial ones making their educational
differences wider. Such differences, portrayed in Figure 5.7, become statisti-
cally significant when countries reach a per capita income level around 3000$
and stay significant thereafter. The divergent educational pattern of democ-
racies and right-wing dictatorships graphed in the figure is not significant as
already mentioned.
The differential impact of per capita income in democratic and leftist
absolute regimes may be driven by the selection of regimes with respect
to economic development. As stated before, the incidence of democracy
varies positively with the wealth of nations. Since the effect of GPD per
capita on enrollment is expected to wane as the economy grows, then the
lower estimated effect in democratic institutions could be driven by the fact
that they are usually observed in high-income levels whereas dictatorships
in relatively poorer nations. This explanation does not invalidate, however,
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 159
Table 5.6: Education and the interaction effect of income and institutions.
Fractional logit regression
(1) (2)
All regimes Only Dictatorships
Dependent variable ENROLL ENROLL
LEFT 0.04
(0.08)
RIGHT 0.03 0.11
(0.09) (0.17)
INCOME 0.03 0.11
(0.01)*** (0.05)**
LEFT*INCOME 0.03
(0.01)**
RIGHT*INCOME -0.02 -0.09
(0.02) (0.05)*
PRIVATE 0.42 0.36
(0.21)** (0.17)**
VOCATIONAL 0.27 0.11
(0.11)** (0.18)
RURAL -0.04 -0.04
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
TRADE -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
POP14 0.003 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Average effect 1.39 1.13
No. Observations 2646 1296
No. Countries 123 81
Note: robust cluster standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable, ENROLL, is rescaled to the interval [0,1] and IN-
COME refers to GDP per capita divided by 1000. Average effect is the
average value of country-specific effects (intercepts). The reference group
in model (2) is left-wing dictatorship. *significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Figure 5.7: Predicted values as a function of GDP/cap by political regime
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the empirical findings regarding the differences between left and right wing
autocracies because the distribution of per capita income is similar in both
types of dictatorship.
A more systematic comparison among dictatorial governments is made in
column 2 of Table 5.6. This model replicates the previous one but excluding
democratic political regimes.37 Now the reference category corresponds to
left-wing regimes, so the INCOME variable measures the impact of GDP
per capita within these institutions. As seen in the table, the coefficients
of this variable and the interaction term RIGHT* INCOME are statistically
significant, which confirms the existence of different response patterns to
economic development depending on the ideological orientation of dictators.
In Figure 5.8, we can see more clearly the substantive implications of these
coefficients. This figure graphs the predicted values of enrollment as GDP per
capita increases in the two type of dictatorships.38 Rightist regimes seem to
perform better when the economy is poor, yet this difference is not significant.
Consistent with hypotheses, the performance of leftist autocracies tend to
be higher as the economy develops but this higher educational performance
starts to be statistically significant from an income level around 5000$.
To quantify the effect of per capita income in the two dictatorial cate-
gories, I use the coefficients in model (2) to compute the predicted change in
enrollment when GDP per capita increases by 5000 dollars at different values
of income. Table 5.7 shows these changes and their significance levels.39 The
first thing to be noted is that while populist dictators do respond to economic
prosperity by increasing human capital, rightist ones do not expand educa-
37To make the distribution of economic development more similar within each dictatorial
group, I drop all observations from Singapore, a very rich left-wing dictatorship without
a close enough rightist counterfactual to be compared with. Including this country to the
analysis produces similar results.
38As in the previous simulation, the other continuous variables are hold at their means.
PRIVATE and VOCATIONAL are set to 1, and the constant term to the average effect.
39The other covariates are held constant at the same values as in the previous simula-
tions.
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Figure 5.8: Predicted values as a function of GDP/cap by the type of
dictatorship
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 e
nr
ol
lm
en
t r
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
GDP/cap (in thousands $)
Left−Dic Right−Dic
Model (2)
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 163
tion as consequence of this prosperity. For instance, a change from 5000$ to
10000$ in the amount of resources per habitant of the economy induces an
significant expansion in school enrollment rate of 12 percentage points in left-
ist autocracies, yet this same rise does not generate any significant change in
education under right-wing dictatorships. In fact, all predicted educational
increments are not significant in this type of dictatorship. Secondly, under
left-wing autocracies, the effect of per capita income reduces in size at higher
levels of income turning insignificant when the economy reaches an income
value of around 20000$. This second finding therefore comes to prove the
hypothesis that such effect wanes as the economy develops.
Table 5.7: The size of the per capita income’s effect on education
∆Income=5000$ ∆E[ENROLL/Left] ∆E[ENROLL/Right]
at 0 13 2.6
(5.7)** (4.5)
5000 12 2.6
(3.9)*** (4.4)
10000 9.9 2.6
(2.9)*** (4.3)
15000 7.2 2.6
(3.4)** (4.2)
20000 4.8 2.5
(3.6) (3.9)
Note: Other continuous variables are fixed at their mean values. PRIVATE and
VOCATIONAL are set to 1, and the constant term to the average effect. Standard
errors in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Summary
The empirical evidence offered in this section can be summarized as follows.
The effect of economic development on enrollment rates changes with the
estimation method under democratic and right-wing dictatorships. Yet, con-
sistent with the hypotheses, such effect is always positive and stronger under
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left-wing autocracies. This result is robust to the use of distinct econometric
and specification models. In democracies, economic development increases
educational outcomes except when applying first-difference statistical meth-
ods. With regard to rightist regimes, results are more volatile across the
different estimation models. Either per capita income is not a relevant causal
factor of education or, when it is, the relationship between these two vari-
ables resembles the pattern in democracies. In other words, when GDP per
capita positively change enrollment rates under right-wing dictatorships, this
association does not differ from the one predicted under democracies.
In line with the theoretical priors, the educational differences across po-
litical institutions vary as a function of economic development. This result
questions the theory usually proposed in the literature that the democratic
nature of institutions shapes directly the policies determining human capi-
tal. On the contrary, such finding tends to corroborate a theory like the one
provided in this thesis according to which institutions exert an indirect effect
that changes with economic conditions.
In particular, the evidence shows that political regimes do not seem to
have any impact in very poor countries. Although the hypothesis was that
“wealth-biased” dictatorships should raise human capital accumulation more
than their institutional counterparts, we can rationalize this finding with the
idea that governments can do very little when there are few economic re-
sources. At low levels of per capita income, governments may have orga-
nizational constraints to establish the basis of a comprehensive educational
system. As the economy develops, however, regimes make a difference. Con-
sistent with the hypotheses, left-wing dictatorships appear to increase school-
ing enrollment at a greater rate than the other two types of political systems.
Finally, if we include the outlier observations dropped from the previous
analyses, that is, Malawi from 1994 to 1996 and South Africa from 1990 to
1996, the results concerning right-wing dictatorships tend to vary. The main
changes are: first, due to the Malawian cases, the binary indicator of these
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regimes (RIGHT) becomes negative and significant. Note that in Malawi, a
very poor country, enrollment rates have reportedly increased from 56% to
80% in one year that coincides with a transition from a right-wing dictator-
ship to a democracy. Second, due to the observations of South Africa, the
positive effect of per capita income becomes more stable in rightist autocra-
cies and sometimes it is stronger than in democracies.
5.4 The differential impact of inequality across
institutions
The aim of this section is to test empirically the hypotheses developed in
Chapter 3 that relate wealth inequality with educational outcomes of coun-
tries at different levels of economic development.40 The relationship between
these two variables, given average income, is argued to change with the type
of political regime and the particular income groups affected by increases in
inequality. The theoretical argument behind is based on two main points.
The first one pursues the idea that the effect of inequality depends on the
part of the distribution in which the wealth dispersion occurs. It is not the
overall configuration of income distribution what determines government’s
reactions to increased inequality but which social classes are impoverished or
enriched as a consequence of an income spread.
To simplify the analysis, the formal models examined in Chapter 3 con-
sider only three relevant income groups: the poor, the middle class and the
rich. Given this division and to come out with clear predictions that can
be compared across institutions, the comparative statics is restricted to in-
equality in three different locations of the distribution: an income spread
between the middle class and the poor, a dispersion affecting the tails of the
distribution (i.e. between the poor and the rich), and finally an increase in
40This analysis is confined to an empirical examination of the predictions obtained from
the extensions of the last two models in Chapter 3. These predictions are summarized
in Tables 3.7 and 3.9. Unless otherwise noted, these are the models that I refer to when
talking about the formal models of Chapter 3.
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inequality between the middle and high-income individuals.
The second point states that political institutions will condition the ul-
timate impact of a dispersion within such income intervals, given a level
of per capita income. The political decisions affecting education have re-
distributive consequences: either if policy consists of a broad redistribution
program of income (as in Perotti 1993) or if the economic benefits of poli-
cies can be targeted to certain groups (as in Fernandez and Rogerson 1995),
a collective decision over them implies a redistribution of resources among
individuals with different economic positions. Consequently, individuals will
sustain different policy preferences and it is precisely the existence of this
conflict what makes political institutions a relevant factor. They serve as a
resolution mechanism of conflict through which these divergent preferences
are aggregated into public policies.
As it was argued in the theoretical chapters of this thesis, the democratic
method of majority voting brings, as the winning proposal, the ideal point
of the median voter -who belongs to the middle class. This occurs even in
the case that political parties represent social groups and care about policy
choices.41 In the absence of electoral constraints, parties are more prone
to follow their own ideological agenda in the sense of responding to their
constituencies’ preferred redistributive programs. In dictatorial governments,
leftist political parties observe mainly the interests of low-income individuals
while right-wing ones tend to support the optimal policies of the rich.
Now income inequality may affect the degree of redistribution favored by
economic classes. Since it may change optimal policies of income groups in
opposite directions, and given the previous discussion, political institutions
are expected to condition the impact of inequality on redistributive policy
41When parties are ideological, the result of policy convergence is obtained under two
conditions (Roemer 2001): the dimension of the policy space must be unidimensional (as
in our formal models) and parties must have certainty about the behavior of voters (this
is also satisfied in our case since the unique feature that determines voting is the economic
positions of groups, which is known).
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and educational outcomes. Let’s consider, for instance, an increase in the
economic distance between the rich and the middle class. Suppose that the
collective decision to be taken is a proportional income tax to finance equal
transfers to all individuals and that education generates positive externalities
from educated to non-educated individuals -as in Perotti’s model. Focusing
on rich countries, redistribution will promote education as the poor (the only
social class that does not have enough income to pay the cost of education)
would be able then to overcome the fixed costs of human capital investment.
Such increase in inequality will make the middle class more willing to rise
the level of taxation since they become poorer, and viceversa in the case of
the rich. Thus we should observe that increased inequality in this part of the
distribution is positively associated with education in democratic institutions
and negatively related in right-wing dictatorships (see Section 3.2 of Chapter
3 for a more detailed argument behind this hypothesis).
The empirical analysis of this section focused on the predictions obtained
from the extensions of the last two models of the formal theoretical chapter.
Although they have a similar setup, they differ in two important questions:
the type of policy over which individuals have to make a collective decision
and whether aggregate schooling have a positive side-effect on all individual
incomes. Under some political and economic conditions (defined by the po-
litical regime and average income), these models derive opposite predictions
concerning the association between inequality and education. Thus the em-
pirical examination that follows will shed some light on which of these two
models get to capture the political economy mechanisms relating redistribu-
tive politics and educational outcomes.
5.4.1 Data
Turning to the data used in the ensuing analysis, I first discuss inequality
measures. The relevant indicator of the economic positions of classes is their
wealth but since there are few countries with data on the distribution of
wealth, I use that of income as a proxy. Income inequality can be assessed
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 168
by different measures. The most popular one is the Gini coefficient, a com-
pact index that provides information on the overall degree of inequality. Yet,
as hypotheses refer to variations in the income received by groups, this in-
dicator is of little use for the purposes at hand. The same change in the
Gini coefficient could hide different movements between the income shares
of groups. Deininger & Squire (1996: 4) put it very clear, for instance, “a
redistribution from the top to the middle class may be associated with the
same change in the Gini index as an increase in the share of the income re-
ceived by the bottom quintile at the expense of the middle class.” Therefore,
this measure does not serve us to answer our research question on whether
inequality in different locations of the income distribution has a differential
impact on education.
To gauge income spreads between several groups, I employ ratios of quin-
tiles representing the poor, the middle class and the rich. More concretely,
from data on income-shares by quintiles, I first obtain the share of these
classes -denoted by P, M and R respectively. For the poor, I combine the
shares of the first and second quintiles (P) -which corresponds to poorest
40% of the population. For the middle class, I use the combined share of the
third and fourth quintiles (M), and the richest one (5th quintile) proxies for
the share of the rich (R). Once these shares has been created, then I use the
ratio of P to M as a measure of the income equality between the middle class
and the poor, the ratio of the two poorest quintiles (P) to the top quintile
as an index of equality between the poor and the rich, and likewise for the
allocation of income between middle and high-income individuals.
Data on quintile shares are drawn from Deininger and Squire’ dataset
(D&S 1996), updated in theWorld Income Inequality Database (WIID V2.0a,
June 2005) by the United Nations University-World Institute for Develop-
ment Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). It is the most comprehensive in-
ternational dataset covering developed and developing countries. Yet it has
some limitations. Its main problem, actually common to most global inequal-
ity data, is the variation in the definition of inequality-related measurement
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concepts that hinders comparability between countries and over time (Atkin-
son and Brandolini 2001). Country-year figures can vary in several dimen-
sions like data coverage -whether they have a nationwide or an urban/rural
coverage-, the unit of analysis -households or individuals-, the measure of in-
dividual economic positions -whether income or expenditure- or, if based on
income, whether it is measured gross or net of taxes. To ensure comparability
among observations and thus reduce potential measurement errors, I select
only those observations based on similar concepts. Concretely, I pick only
data that refer to gross income (because our theoretical hypotheses are con-
cerned with the pre-tax income distribution) and have national coverage.42
Regarding the unit of analysis, both household and individual based cases
are included in the estimation process in view of the fact that this dimen-
sion does not seem to generate significant differences in inequality data as
to introduce a systematic bias in statistical results (D&S 1996: 11; Easterly
2006).
After making this adjustment on data, the total number of cases available
to the analysis is reduced to 440. They covers 94 countries with an mean of 5
time observations per unit within the period 1960-1996. It is an unbalanced
panel and there are several countries with only one observation. Given the
time limitation of the data, and the fact that inequality is very persistent
over time (D&S 1996; Moene and Wallerstein 2003), the empirical work
of this section will also exploit variation across countries to estimate the
relevant relationships. To have a sense of this data, Table 5.8 shows the
mean and the standard deviation of each ratio of groups’ income shares
previously discussed. As seen in the table, the share of the poorest 40%
of the population represents, on average, 43 percent of the income share of
the middle class (2nd and 3rd quintiles) and 39 percent of that of the richest
quintile. The average degree of equality between the middle class and the
rich is much higher: middle-income groups tend to hold 86 percent of the
42The exception to national coverage is Israel which is based upon urban coverage.
However, this is a minor measurement problem since much of Israel is urban and thus this
data could be used as a good approximation to national coverage.
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income share received by the richest group in the economy.
Table 5.8: Summary Statistics on Income Inequality
Mean Standard Cases
Deviation
P/M 43.25 12.03 440
M/R 86.13 29.28 440
P/R 39.45 20.35 440
As for the dependent variable, I use data on gross school enrollment
in secondary (ENROLSEC)43 from the World Development Indicators 2000
(World Bank 2000). It is an unbalanced panel covering 169 countries from
1960 to 1996. For each country, there are 21 possible observations drawn
from the years 1960, ’65, ’70, ’75, ’80-96, but the average time length of
panels is about 16 years.
The advantage of using this new variable, despite the fact that it has fewer
observations than the one of the previous analysis (ENROLL), is that we can
make reliable comparisons between countries. The variable ENROLL that I
have constructed combining primary and secondary educational levels suffers
a problem of consistency across nations since the population data collected to
create enrollment rates are based on definitions that varies among countries.44
It cannot be used therefore in the subsequent estimation models that draw on
both cross-sectional and over time variation. On the contrary, the secondary
enrollment data from the World Bank are adjusted to ensure comparability
and the fact that it has a shorter time span constitutes a minor problem
43The definition of this variable is total enrollment at secondary educational level, re-
gardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to
that level of education. As this variable is a gross ratio, it may exceed 100% if individuals
outside the age cohort corresponding to secondary are enrolled in that educational level.
44The most important definition affecting data consistency is whether figures refer to
de jure or de facto population. National differences with respect to this definitional issue
affect cross-sectional variation and thus they may introduce a source of potential bias in
regressions exploiting cross-country changes.
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 171
now since, in any case, the inequality variables shrinks drastically the data
overlap.
The reasons for studying secondary education instead of primary are, first,
the greater existing variation of the former: primary education is compulsory
in almost all countries and easier to enforce. In fact, from the beginning
of the period educational outcomes of countries have been relatively high
and similar. The educational performance regarding secondary level shows
much larger national differences. For instance, in 1990 the mean value of the
secondary enrollment rate is 52 with a standard deviation of 31.5 ranging
from a minimum of 4.9 (Tanzania) to a maximum of 119.5 (Netherlands).
Looking at all cross sections, the range of the variable usually goes from less
than 6 percent to more than 80 percent. The second reason is that the cost
of education, either as a direct or as an opportunity cost (foregone income),
is likely higher in the case of secondary education. Remember that a crucial
assumption of theoretical models is that this cost must be a binding economic
constraint on educational choices of individuals.
Regarding independent variables other than inequality, most of them like
average income, trade openness or some measures on the demographic com-
position of the population has already been described. Some new control
variables, included in the subsequent regressions, are time-invariant and try
to grasp some systematic influences in education from specific characteristics
of countries. Unlike the empirical analyses of the earlier section, the follow-
ing regressions use country differences to identify the impact of causes owing
to the time limits of inequality data series. Thus we need to hold constant
those national traits that could be simultaneously affecting education and
other covariates.
As shown below, the most influential one turns out to be the dominant
religion in the society and, in particular, the percentage of Moslems in the
population. The intuition is that the prevalence of this religion may be as-
sociated with the degree of social discrimination against women. In turn, it
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is reasonable to think that those societies where women have less social op-
portunities tend to under-educate them. As the dependent variable refers to
total enrollment (including both male and female data), controlling for fac-
tors that determine the intensity of the gender gap in a society will be crucial
so that to produce net estimates on the redistributive dynamics associated
with social classes.
5.4.2 Estimation and results
The estimation process, aimed to test the hypotheses summarized in Tables
3.7 and 3.9 of the formal chapter, is divided in three parts. Each of them
deals with the effect of inequality within each of the three proposed locations
of the distribution. I first focus on the inequality between the middle class
and the poor, then on the economic gap between middle and high income
individuals, and finally I examine the educational consequences of an increase
in the ratio of the poor’ share to that of the wealthy. The strategy employed
to test how the impact of inequality changes with average income and political
institutions is the same for the three cases.
This strategy consists of estimating the interaction between inequality
and GDP per capita for each political regime at a time. Given a particular in-
stitutional framework, I examine how governments’ educational responses to
increased inequality vary with economic development. It has been abandoned
the alternative of a higher-order interaction model -where binary indicators
for institutions are interacted with income and inequality simultaneously-,
for several reasons. Apart from the greater complexity in the interpretation
of coefficients, this model would produce less reliable estimates as the mul-
ticollinearity problem often present in interactive equations becomes more
severe with the number of the interaction terms. Note that the estimated
equation must contain the entire set of lower-order terms (Braumoeller 2004;
Brambor et. al. 2006), the cardinality of which increases more than exponen-
tially with the number of variables that we want to interact. Thus a model
in which the two dummy indicators for left and right-wing dictatorships are
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interacted with GDP per capita and income inequality will contain at least 11
terms. When inequality refers to the distance between the income shares of
the poor and the middle class, for instance, the high degree of multicollinear-
ity (there are five simple correlations between independent variables above
0.90) makes almost impossible the task of separating net effects.
In more formal terms, it is assumed that for each political regime I,
secondary school enrollment Y in country i and year t is determined by
Y Iit = F
I(θXit) + ²
I
it, I = D,L,R (5.6)
where X represents the vector of covariates, θ the set of parameters to be
estimated, and F (.) is a function determining the shape of the relationship
between secondary education and independent variables. The stochastic part
of the equation is captured by the error term ². Finally, I denotes the three
types of institutions, that is, democracy (D) left-wing (L) and right-wing
(R) dictatorships. Expanding the argument of F so that to account for the
interactive effect between per capita income and economic equality, we have
Y Iit = F
I(α+β1Eit+β2Wit+β3Eit∗Wit+γZit)+²Iit. I = D,L,R, (5.7)
E indicates the equality ratio: P/M, M/R or P/R. W represents per capita
income and Z a vector of control variables. Disturbances are assumed to be
identical in all regimes so that ²Dit = ²
L
it = ²
R
it = ²it.
The interpretation of the β’s coefficients is not straightforward. β1 mea-
sures the impact of an increase in the equality ratio in question whenW = 0,
while β2 tells us how economic prosperity influences education when E = 0.
As there are no cases with a zero value in either of these two factors, β1
and β2 have no substantive interest whatsoever by their own. In order to
come out with sound inferences, these coefficients have to be considered in
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conjunction with β3 -the parameter on the interaction term E ∗W -, which
evaluates the effect of the combination of E and W . If our aim is to un-
derstand the relationship between equality and education, then β3 tell us
how this relationship changes with economic development. For a given value
of per capita income, the overall impact of an increase in equality will be
β1 + β3W .
Equation 5.7 is estimated by a fractional logit regression, which was de-
scribed in section 5.3.4. This statistical model assumes that F is the cumula-
tive distribution of the logistic function, ensuring that predicted values lay in
the interval [0,1]. Although our dependent variable (ENROLSEC) could take
values above 100% since it is gross enrollment, it is still bounded: it certainly
has a lower limit of zero but it also has an inherent upper limit as enrollment
cannot take infinite positive values. Such delimited nature of the response
variable casts doubt on working with linear regression models in which noth-
ing prevents from obtaining negative predicted values or unrealistic positive
ones. Therefore, in order to take care of these functional-related issues, I use
a fractional logit regression. The estimated equation for expected enrollment
becomes then
E(Yit|X) = exp(α+ β1Eit + β2Wit + β3Eit ∗Wit + γZit)
[1 + exp(α + β1Eit + β2Wit + β3Eit ∗Wit + γZit)] . (5.8)
This equation is estimated for each political regime at time. A theo-
retical appealing feature of this econometric model is that the influence of
covariates on the expected enrollment rate decreases as the argument of the
function tends to infinity. For our relationship of interest, this means that
the degree of inequality could be an irrelevant cause of education in very rich
economies. Even if economic equality exerts different pressures on human
capital depending on the level of prosperity in the economy, eventually it
may become an inconsequential factor as per capita income approaches rela-
tively extreme positive values. One possible reason for this result is that all
income groups will be able to afford education by their own.
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As a methodological note, in all the following regression analyses, the
variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is estimated assuming that ob-
servations within countries are non-independent. This adjustment does not
affect the estimated coefficients. It only corrects standard errors for a possi-
ble correlation among residuals of the same country. A final comment deals
with the dependent variable. As stated before, gross school enrollment may
be greater than 100%. In our case, there are in fact few observations with
education data well above 100. But as the fractional logit regression requires
a dependent variable within the unit interval, I assign a value of 100 to all
observations with enrollment above this limit.45
Inequality between the middle class and the poor
Before proceeding to the discussion of the statistical results, we must know
first the distribution of covariates within political regimes. This is important
to know since the fact that some factors may distribute differently within
institutions could impair institutional comparisons. In addition, this infor-
mation helps us to determine the extent to which the statistical inferences
depend on the chosen specefication model fitting to the data. Table 5.9
provides some basic summary statistics by political regime for the variables
included in the subsequent regression analysis, taking only the data overlap
into account.46 In the first two rows, the mean and standard deviation of
the more substantive variables are displayed. The distribution on the level of
equality between the middle class and the poor, measured by the ratio of their
income shares (P/M), appears to be more or less the same across political
regimes. Its average value is between 40 and 48 percent in the three types of
institutions, although right-wing dictatorships show a higher degree of dis-
persion (17.13 as opposed to 10.43 and 13.24 for democracy and left-wing
autocracies respectively). In contrast, the distribution of per capita income
45These observations are Canada (1987-88, 1990-91), Austria 1987, Belgium (1985, ’88
and ’92), Bulgaria (1985-86), Denmark (1981, ’87 and ’92), Finland (1987 and ’91), Nether-
lands (1983, ’87 and ’91), Norway 1991, Sweden 1992 and Estonia 1995. Except Bulgaria,
the rest are democratic countries.
46For a definition of the variables, see Appendix B
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(INCOME) varies quite a lot between democratic and non-democratic insti-
tutions: while in the former the mean of GDP per capita is almost 12000$
(with a standard deviation of 7.17 thousands dollars), it is 4528$ and 3828$
in leftist and rightist autocracies respectively. Their corresponding standard
deviations are 3.38 and 2.14 thousands dollars. Since it is crucial the sort of
discrete separation between rich and poor economies for our empirical ques-
tion concerning the income-conditional effect of inequality, we must keep in
mind that those estimations based on democratic countries may refer for the
most part to wealthy economies. Note that these numbers comprise only the
cases that have information for all variables under study.
Table 5.9: Summary Statistics (P/M)
Mean Std. Deviation
D L R D L R
INCOME 11.95 4.53 3.83 7.17 3.38 2.14
P/M 42.09 47.87 44.19 10.43 13.24 17.13
SRICH 45.89 43.92 52.68 10.25 13.54 11.29
MOSLEM 0.03 0.12 0.38 0.14 0.25 0.41
CATH 0.39 0.30 0.19 0.36 0.41 0.36
TRADE 59.63 65.54 70.34 32.97 81.12 40.65
Cases 152 47 36
Note: INCOME is GDP per capita in thousands dollars.
The time-invariant controls seem to have a more similar distribution
within democracies and populist regimes compared to that in right-wing
dictatorships. An interesting pattern emerges from the table: whereas in
the latter the Moslem religion is more prevalent than the Catholic one, the
opposite occurs in the former political regimes. The mean proportion of
Moslems in the population (MOSLEM) is much higher in rightist autocra-
cies (0.38), but also is its standard deviation (0.41). The average percentage
of Catholics is, however, lower in this type of regime (19%) than in democra-
cies (39%) and left-wing dictatorships (30%). Regarding the income share of
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the rich (SRICH),47 we see that while its variance is similar across regimes,
“wealth-biased” regimes show on average a higher share. The top quintile of
the income distribution tends to hold almost 53% of the total income when
dictatorial governments are ideologically to the right, 44% when they have a
leftist ideological orientation and 46% under democratically elected govern-
ments. Political regimes seem to differ also in the degree of trade openness
(TRADE). The higher mean level of openness in leftist autocracies in compar-
ison to democracies is driven by one single country, Singapore (observed only
in 1980 and 1988). If this country is removed from the sample, the mean and
the standard deviation of TRADE decline to 49.84 and 30.66 respectively.48
Then populist dictatorships become on average the least opened economies to
international trade. Their rightist counterparts, in contrast, have the highest
mean value of the sample but also more variation.
Table 5.10 presents the regression results for two different specifications.
In the baseline specification, model (1), GDP per capita, the ratio of the
poor’ income share to the one of the middle class, and their interaction are
included to grasp the changing effect of inequality as a function of economic
development. Additional controls are introduced. A key one is the share
of the rich. The rationale for including this variable is that we need to
keep the income share of the rich constant so that changes in P/M reflect
actually movements between low and middle income individuals. Otherwise a
variation in P/M could be as well the result of a transfer of resources between
the upper class and any of the other groups. As a consequence, we could not
ultimately identify which class gets richer and at the expense of what group.
This is crucial since the theoretical mechanisms behind the predictions of the
models involve income movements among certain groups.
The other controls are the proportion of Moslems and Catholics in the
population, and decade dummies. The time-invariant religion variables are
47The reason for including this as a control will be given below.
48Yet the summary information for the rest of variables, including per capita income, is
practically the same.
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included to grasp possible influences of cultural factors on education. They
could also affect the rate of female enrollment in formal schooling. For in-
stance, one recurrent fact in the Arab countries is that gender differences in
the access to education are quite large compared to other regions of the world
(UNESCO 2005). On the other hand, decade dummies are introduced to ac-
count for the temporal changes in enrollment. Since the estimated regressions
exploit both cross-sectional and over-time variation, and as the mean of sec-
ondary school enrollment exhibits an upward trend, it is necessary to add
some time controls for these secular increases. Hence the inclusion of decade
dummies, which basically control for the possibility that observations from
more recent decades may have higher values in the dependent variable.49
As we can see in Columns 2-4 of Table 5.10, the coefficients on the religion-
related factors are all negative, but only for the case of MOSLEM they reach
the thresholds of statistical significance in all political regimes. The results
suggest therefore that the proportion of Moslems in the population has a
negative impact on education. The percentage of Catholics is also negatively
associated with enrollment but its coefficient is only significant (at 10%) in
rightist dictatorships. The income share of the top quintile decreases sec-
ondary education in democratic countries and it has a insignificant influence
under non-democratic institutions. Turning to the key variables of interest,
the interaction term (P/M)*INCOME is associated with a higher level of ed-
ucation when its coefficient is significant -that is, in dictatorial institutions.
The lower-order coefficient on per capita income is significant in democracies
and left-wing dictatorships: but while it is positive in the former, the sign
of the coefficient is negative in the latter. Yet these quantities do not have
any substantive interest by their own since, as stated before, they refer to
unrealistic scenarios where income equality is equal to zero.
In the next specification of the model (Columns 5-7), I add trade open-
ness as an additional regressor. In the regression for rightist dictatorships,
the results are similar but trade integration itself is not significant. The
49To save space, these decade dummies are not reported in the output tables.
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inclusion of this variable in the regression of leftist autocracies makes the
coefficient on average income lose its significance level. The rest of covariates
do not practically change and trade openness seems to significantly reduce
enrollment rates. Regarding the regression results for democracies, several of
them vary with this new specification: income equality becomes positive and
significant, whereas the control variables MOSLEM and SRICH turn out not
to be statistically different from zero. Looking at the coefficient on TRADE,
more opened economies appear to have a positive impact on education.
From the estimated parameters in the output table, we cannot know
whether our more substantive hypotheses are confirmed. To test them and
as this is an interactive model, it is necessary to calculate some quantities of
interest and their standard errors -considering both the lower-order and the
interaction terms (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor et. al. 2006). In order to see
whether the effect of a more equal distribution of income between the middle
class and the poor is conditional on economic development, Figures 5.9-
5.11 clarify the substantive implications of the last specification estimates.50
They illustrate graphically how the impact of equality varies across the range
of average income and whether it is significant. In each figure, the solid
line indicates the change in predicted values when the ratio P/M is at its
mean and increases by one standard deviation, keeping the other covariates
constant at their mean values and setting the decade dummy for the 80’s
at 1.51 In addition, a 90% confidence interval -denoted by the dash lines-
has been drawn to grasp the degree of uncertainty around the estimated
difference. When the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval are
both above or below the zero line in the vertical axis, then the shown impact
of equality on secondary enrollment rates is statistically significant.
50The figures have been constructed following the procedure explained in Bram-
bor et. al. (2006). For a more detailed explanation, see the web site
http://homepages.nyu.edu/˜mrg217/interaction.html
51The average value of P/M and its standard deviation are the ones of the pooling
sample of all political regimes, that is, 43.40 and 12.38 respectively. Likewise, the means
of the other variables correspond to this pooling sample.
CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 181
Figure 5.9 shows this simulation for the case of democracy. A smaller
dispersion of income between the middle class and the poor seems to have a
positive influence on education in relative low-income countries. At 5000$,
for instance, raising the ratio P/M by 12.4 percentage points would produce
an increase in enrollment of almost ten percentage points, which implies a
13.5% increase relative to the average enrollment of the sample used in the
last regression for the democratic cases (73). Yet such effect is slightly above
the significance threshold for a 90% confidence interval. The magnitude
of this increase reduces, however, with per capita income. When countries
reach a economic level near 10 thousands dollars, income equality becomes
an insignificant factor of education.
Figure 5.9: The effect of P/M at different values of average income (demo-
cratic institutions)
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In leftist dictatorships (see Figure 5.10), increased equality between low
and middle income groups does not have any impact in early stages of de-
velopment. As GDP per capita rises, equality begins to be positively associ-
ated with enrollment but the strength of this relationship diminishes steadily
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with the wealth of the economy. The figure suggests therefore that it is from
middle intervals of average income when the degree of equality may affect
significantly the proportion of young people receiving secondary education.
Figure 5.10: The effect of P/M at different values of average income (leftist
dictatorships)
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Left Dictatorship
Figure 5.11 reproduces the same simulation for right-wing dictatorships.
At low levels of GDP per capita, changes in the configuration of the income
distribution between the middle class and the poor do not seem to have any
consequence in the dependent variable. But, as in the case of leftist dic-
tatorships, an increase in the share of the income received by the bottom
two quintiles -at the expense of the middle class- starts to have a significant
effect on enrollment when the economy approaches a per capita income close
to 3000$. According to these estimates, its greatest effect occurs at a level of
economic development near 7 thousands dollars: here a change in the ratio
of P/M from 43.4 to 55.78 percentage points expands secondary schooling
by more than 9 percentage points. In relation to the mean enrollment in
the sample of right-wing dictatorship used for estimation (46), this implies
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a nearly 20% increase -which is statistically significant even for a 95% con-
fidence interval. Once again, as the economy grows, the impact of equality
reduces steadily.
Figure 5.11: The effect of P/M at different values of average income (right-
ist dictatorships)
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Right Dictatorship
Before interpreting these results in light of theoretical models, two central
caveats need to be made. The first one deals with the estimates instability
in the regression for the sample of left-wing autocracies owing to outlier ob-
servations. Dropping the two observations of Singapore (1980 and 1988),
mentioned before, makes all variables of interest insignificant. The empirical
relationship portrayed in Figure 5.10 is driven thus by these two outliers.
Income equality, therefore, does not appear to be systematically related with
education at any level of per capita income. The only two covariates that
retain their significance levels are MOSLEM and TRADE but the coefficient
on the latter shifts its sign, suggesting a positive impact of trade openness
on school enrollment. There is also another limitation of the data that ques-
tions our inferences from the democracies-based regressions. The strong cor-
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relation between the incidence of democracy and economic development, as
documented in Table 5.9, may imply that the estimates concerning this type
of regime refer mostly to wealthy economies. The lack of sufficient demo-
cratic cases with low values of per capita income hampers the reliability of
inferences we could make for such income intervals. At the very least, this
calls for some prudence when it comes to making any causal claim on the
relationship between equality and education in poor democratic countries.
On the other hand, we could interpret these findings as an account of what
actually happens in relative wealthier economies. Although the above sim-
ulations have been done for the entire range of GDP per capita, the fact
that the sample of democracies comprises mainly developed countries, any
significant association found in the data could solely apply to observations
at such stages of economic development.
How does the evidence presented so far fit to the empirical implications
of theoretical models? To what extent do previous findings discriminate be-
tween the two models? Taking the above qualifications into consideration,
the regression results regarding democratic institutions could be read as sup-
portive evidence of both models. If the significantly positive association
between education and equality, portrayed in Figure 5.9, is actually describ-
ing what occurs in relative high-income countries, then this is consistent with
the predictions of both models (see Table 3.7). Basically, the common idea
that leads them to the same prediction is that a less dispersion in this part of
the distribution increases the middle class’s demands for redistribution since
they are poorer.52 In turn, redistribution will enhance enrollment by helping
the least aﬄuent groups to pay the fixed cost of education.
The insignificant effect of inequality in left-wing dictatorships -when Sin-
gapore is removed from the analysis- seems to go more in line with the setup
of Fernandez and Rogerson (F&R). In wealthy countries, both models predict
that populist dictators will enact at least the required redistributive policy
for low-income agents to invest in human capital. So inequality is not ex-
52See Section 3.4.1 for a more elaborate description of the mechanisms involved.
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pected to shape the proportion of people obtaining formal schooling, which
seems to be confirmed by our data. In developing countries, according to
Perotti’s model, the cost to the poor of limiting the size of redistribution so
that the well-off individuals can undertake their investments decreases with
the economic position of the poor. Due to the existence of educational exter-
nalities, they should be more willing to restrict the degree of redistribution
as their income share rises, suggesting a positive impact of an increase in
P/M on education (see Table 3.9). However, it could be the case that in
our sample there are no a sufficient number of leftist dictatorships with ini-
tial conditions above the equality threshold from which the poor find it in
fact profitable to promote human capital (and thus future growth) at the
expense of present consumption. If that is actually the case, then the finding
that equality (P/M) is an irrelevant factor to explain human capital across
average income could not be interpreted as against the setup of Perotti.
The results with respect to right-wing dictatorships are broadly support-
ive of Perotti’s model and contradict some implications that arise from the
framework of F&R. In line with the former, note that rightist dictatorial
governments do not have any education-related reason for raising the bur-
den of taxation in a poor economy. In turn, since P/M does not entail the
share of the rich, any variation in this ratio should not influence enrollment
as corroborated by the data. But as the economy develops, increased equal-
ity in this part of the distribution should foster human capital investment,
which is assumed to create positive externalities. On the one hand, as long
as there are enough resources in the economy to permit all groups acquire
education, public redistribution will lessen the economic constraints the poor
face in their investment in human capital. On the other hand, the incentives
of the rich to subsidize the education of the poor are higher when the in-
come gap between the lower and the middle class is reduced because the size
of the transfer the poor need to afford education diminishes. In contrast,
considering the setup of F&R, the prediction is that inequality should not
affect enrollment in wealthy rightist dictatorships given that the proportion
of educated people in the population is assumed to generate no social return.
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Therefore, the empirical pattern shown in Figure 5.11 is apparently more
consistent with Perotti’s setup. In addition it corroborates the existence of a
positive externality from education or, at least, that politicians believe in its
existence when taking their decisions over educational-redistributive policy.
This claim, however, is subject to the usual caution about the few number
of dictatorial cases used in the regression analysis.
Inequality between the middle class and the rich
In this section, I examine whether inequality between the middle class and
the rich has any bearing on secondary school enrollment, given political in-
stitutions and average income, and whether this relationship differ from the
earlier empirical patterns observed for the case of inequality between the
two poorest groups in the society. The estimation strategy used to test the
hypotheses is similar to the one pursued in the previous section. Based on
a fractional logit regression, two different specifications are estimated: our
baseline model (1) and the specification (2) containing trade openness as an
additional regressor. The relevant equality ratio now is M/R and, in order
for this measure to grasp real movements between high and middle income
groups, I control for the share of the poor (SPOOR). The rest of covariates
are the same.
The summary information about the set of controls is as before (see Table
5.9). Regarding the new covariates M/R and SPOOR, some interesting dif-
ferences emerge across political regimes. As indicated in Table 5.11, both the
average portion of income held by the bottom 40% of the population and the
mean share of the middle class relative to that of the top quintile are lower
in “wealth-biased” dictatorships than in the other institutional frameworks.
Under those absolute regimes ideologically oriented more to the right, the
middle 40% of the distribution retains, in average, almost 67% of the wealth-
iest group’s income. This mean ratio goes up to 86% and 96% in democratic
and leftist institutions respectively. The institutional differences concerning
the economic position of the poor are smaller but note that in populist dic-
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tatorships, as one may expect, the poor are better off holding a mean share
of almost 19%.
Table 5.11: Summary Statistics (M/R)
Mean Std. Deviation
D L R D L R
M/R 86.13 95.84 66.69 29.28 35.84 24.25
SPOOR 16.35 18.63 14.75 5.67 7.01 6.39
Cases 152 47 36
Table 5.12 presents the regression results for the two specifications. Look-
ing first at the coefficient on the control variables, we see that the negative
impact of MOSLEM is robust only in rightist autocracies. After introduc-
ing trade openness, the proportion of Moslems in the population reduces
significantly enrollment rates in this type of regime but not in the others.
The coefficient on CATH is insignificant across specifications and political
regimes. It seems then that the percentage of Catholics in the society is a
factor that does not contribute to understand the observed national differ-
ences in human capital. Trade liberalization is positively associated with
education in democracies. And, as before, its apparently negative impact
in leftist regimes is driven by the two outlier observations corresponding to
Singapore. In fact, if this country is taken away from the analysis, the co-
efficient on TRADE becomes significantly positive. Finally, the share of the
poor appears to foster secondary enrollment in democracies. If, as stated
before, the estimates for these regimes refer for the most part to wealthy
countries, then this finding is more consistent with the predictions derived
from Perotti’s model. Given the existence of positive externalities derived
from human capital, the decisive median voter in democratic nations is more
prone to subsidize the education of the poor as they are better off. The
reason is that they will need a smaller transfer in order to undertake their
investments. Note that in the framework of F&R, the economic position
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of low-income groups does not shape the redistributive policy preferences of
the middle class. Whether middle-income individuals may want to impose a
greater redistribution package -that would help the poor to pay the fixed cost
of schooling- depends only on their relative position to the mean income.53
Regarding the more substantive hypotheses, income equality does not
seem to affect secondary education in the samples of democracies and left-
wing dictatorships. In contrast, the coefficients on M/R and its interaction
with GDP per capita are significant in the regression of right-wing dicta-
torships. To grasp better the implications of this interaction, Figure 5.12
simulates the differences in predicted values when the ratio M/R is at its
mean and increases by one standard deviation for different values of per
capita income.54
The figure indicates that when the economy is very poor, increasing the
share of the middle class at the expense of the richest 20% of the population
significantly decreases the fraction of people enrolled in secondary educational
level. At 1000$ of average income, a one standard deviation rise in M/R
shrinks the rate of enrollment by 10 percentage points. Or, in other words,
it produces an almost 22% decline relative to the right-wing dictatorships’
mean. However, this negative effect reduces as the economy develops and
it turns even positive, although not significant, when the economy reaches a
per capita income near 8000$.
Taking the predictions from the theoretical models into consideration (see
Tables 3.9 and 3.7), the empirical evidence shown in the figure is more in
line with Perotti’s model. In less aﬄuent countries, the models have opposite
expectations: while income equality among the middle class and the rich is
expected to hinder human capital in the setup of Perotti, it is hypothesized
53See Section 3.3.2 for a formal proof of this statement.
54The procedure used in this simulation is the same as in earlier simulations. The other
continuous variables are hold at their means and the decade dummy for the 80’s is equal to
one. The average value of M/R is 85.94 and its standard deviation 30.62. These numbers
belong to the pooling sample of all political regimes.
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Figure 5.12: The effect of M/R at different values of average income (right-
ist dictatorships)
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to expand education in the model of F&R. In the former, by reducing the
resources of the only potential investors in the economy (the rich), increasing
M/R could have negative consequences for investment. However, the fact
that the redistributive policy associated with educational subsidies can be
targeted to relatively wealthier groups in the model of F&R, such negative
effect can be tempered by enacting a certain degree of redistribution towards
better-off individuals. Actually, a smaller dispersion of income between the
middle class and the rich induces rightist dictators to raise taxation in order
to extract as many resources as possible out of the poor.55 If it is the case
that average income is high enough to send the middle-income agents to
school, this increased taxation will enable them to invest in human capital.
Hence the positive relationship between M/R and education.
The finding of a negative impact of equality under poor right-wing dicta-
torships somewhat refutes the type of educational policy proposed in F&R. It
55See Section 3.3.1, for an explanation of the mechanisms behind this proposition.
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is not so clear that governments has the possibility to launch a publicly allo-
cated program of educational subsidies, at least for secondary education, that
redistributes the benefits mainly in favor of high-income groups. Otherwise,
there are no reasons that might explain this empirical pattern.
In more developed economies, that is, when the relevant question for in-
creasing human capital depends on the education of the poor, the hypothe-
ses of the models are also different. According to the Perotti’s framework,
since a smaller share of the rich reduces their contribution in financing low-
income agents’ investments, then an increase in M/R will induce right-wing
dictators to promote the education of the latter -given the existence of pos-
itive externalities. Yet as human capital does not generate any social re-
turn in the model of F&R, rightist dictators are not expected to open up
secondary schooling to the least well-off at any initial equality-related condi-
tions. Therefore, the evidence that the effect of equality has a tendency to
be positive, although insignificant, at higher levels of per capita income may
be in line also with the hypothesis derived from the Perotti’s setup.
Figure 5.13 shows the same simulation but using the coefficients of the
regression for democracies. A lower income gap between the middle class and
the wealthiest group of the society is negatively associated with secondary
enrollment across all stages of economic development. Although this relation-
ship is overall insignificant, note that the degree of uncertainty diminishes
as per capita income increases. For instance, at 3000$, the 90% confidence
interval around the predicted change in enrollment -when M/R rises by one
standard deviation- has a range going from -16 to 8 percentage points. Yet
at higher values of GDP per capita, say 15000$, this range goes from -10 to
less than 1 percentage points, suggesting a more significant negative impact
of M/R in more developed countries. These results are somewhat consistent
with the predictions of both models. Under both formal frameworks, the
bigger the share of the middle-income individuals, the lower their demands
for redistribution which, in turn, may hinder the investment by the poor.
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Figure 5.13: The effect of M/R at different values of average income (demo-
cratic institutions)
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The dispersion in this part of the distribution does not contribute in
explaining educational differences among leftist dictatorships. In fact, the
point estimate of the change in predicted values -given an increase of 30.62
percentage points in M/R- is zero nearly for the entire range of per capita
income. Although subject to the caveat about the few observations available
for the analysis, this seems to confirm the hypothesis (of both models) that
inequality does not have any impact on enrollment when average income
improve. Whenever the economy is rich enough to enhance the education of
all social classes, populist dictators will impose at least the necessary degree
of redistribution for the poor can acquire formal schooling, and they have
incentives to do so regardless of the initial distribution of income.
Inequality between the poor and the rich
This section is aimed to test the final hypotheses concerning equality among
the two groups at the tails of the income distribution. Thus the relevant
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equality measures introduced in the statistical analysis are the ratio of the
two bottom quintiles to the richest one (P/R) and the share of the middle
class (SMIDDLE). As in previous sections, I use a fractional logit regression
to estimate our baseline model and the specification with trade openness
included as an extra control.
Table 5.13 shows the regression results.56 Focusing on the last specifica-
tion, model (2), we see that the empirical pattern arising from the coefficients
on control variables is very similar to those of earlier analyses, specially to
the first one regarding inequality between the middle class and the poor.
MOSLEM is negatively associated with enrollment in dictatorial regimes,
but its coefficient is much more robust in right-wing dictatorships. TRADE
has a positive impact under democratic and leftist institutions -if Singapore
is removed from the sample-, and finally the share of the middle class seems
to be an irrelevant factor in explaining the variation of secondary enrollment.
Turning to the hypotheses of interest, Figure 5.14 clarifies the differential
impact of inequality for democracies.57 Income equality between the poor and
the rich has a positive effect on enrollment that decreases with per capita
income. In light of the theoretical models, this pattern seems to corroborate
the expectations from F&R (see Tables 3.7 and 3.9). But if we take into
account the fact that democracies are mainly observed at relative high values
of GDP per capita, then the shown pattern in the figure tend to confirm the
hypothesis obtained from Perotti’s model according to which the decisive
middle-class voter in democratic governments is more prone to finance the
education of low-income individuals as their economic positions improve.
56The descriptive data for SMIDDLE in the different institutional samples is quite sim-
ilar. Its mean is between 32% (in right-wing dictatorships) and 38% (in democracy); the
average share of the middle class in left-wing dictatorships is 37.4%. The mean value of
P/R shows greater differences across political regimes. As one may expect, left-wing dic-
tatorships have in average the highest ratio, almost a 50%, followed by democracies with
39% and lastly right-wing dictatorships with 31%. The degree of variation is, however,
higher in leftist autocracies.
57As in previous simulations, this figure shows the effect of an one standard deviation
increase in P/R (20.90) from its mean (39.73), keeping the rest of variables at their average
levels and setting the decade dummy for the 80’s at 1.
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Figure 5.14: The effect of P/R at different values of average income (demo-
cratic institutions)
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In Figure 5.15, I do the same simulation for right-wing dictatorships. A
smaller dispersion of income among the poorest and the richest groups of the
society produces a negative, but insignificant, impact on education. Yet at
later stages of development, this effect becomes positive and stays for a while
in the border of statistical significance (at 10%). Once again, this result seems
to match with the Perotti’s setup and contradicts the model of F&R. The
reasons are the same as those exposed in the previous section when discussing
income equality between the middle class and the rich under “wealth-biased”
regimes. An additional reason, derived from the Perotti’s model, that may
explain the positive effect in wealthier countries is that the poor needs a
lower transfer to afford education as their share increases.
Regarding left-wing autocracies, income inequality does not seem to have
a impact on education at any level of economic development. This find-
ings resembles the earlier ones obtained when the other equality ratios were
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considered.
Figure 5.15: The effect of P/R at different values of average income (rightist
dictatorships)
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Summary
The empirical results obtained in this section confirms the general hypothesis
that the relationship between income inequality and human capital is condi-
tional on per capita income. Moreover, they also confirm that the interaction
between inequality and economic development in the explanation of human
capital formation seems to differ depending on political institutions and the
specific part of the income distribution where inequality occurs. An increase
in the income gap between the rich and the middle class generates an effect
that differs from the educational consequences produced by, for example, an
increase in the inequality between the poor and the middle class.
In addition, for a given inequality ratio, the association between this fac-
tor and enrollment rates changes with political institutions. Therefore, the
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type of political regime process economic conditions differently as predicted
by the hypotheses. Political institutions, in other words, condition the gov-
ernment’s educational responses to variations in inequality and per capita
income. Overall, the broad patterns arising from the empirical evidence are
more consistent with the set up of Perotti (1993). The findings tend to con-
firm the hypotheses developed on the basis of this model regarding the effect
of political institutions.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis has been to explain the variation regarding edu-
cational outcomes observed across countries and over time since 1960 to 1996.
In particular, the question was why do countries show different patterns in re-
gards to their schooling enrollment in secondary and primary? This question
seems a priori puzzling in light of the efficiency reasons given in the economic
literature for expanding education to broad sectors of the society. Yet even if
human capital accumulation generates desirable consequences for the econ-
omy as a whole, it has been argued in this thesis that educational-enhancing
policies need to be politically sustainable. The explanation put forward in
this work stressed the role of political institutions. Political regimes influence
the aggregate rates of enrollment as long as social groups sustain opposing
views for the type of policy to adopt. When there is a distributional conflict
around policies, it is reasonable to think that individuals have different policy
preferences. Given this, institutions serve as a mechanism of resolution by
favoring certain interests over others.
The existing literature about the relationship between political regimes
and education has usually ignored the distributional consequences entailed
in the politics of education. The several studies within this literature have
mainly focused on the electoral constraints of democratic institutions that,
unlike dictatorships, induce politicians to respond to the popular demands for
198
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expanding the access to education. The underlying conflict in these studies
brings politicians face to face with citizens where both parts have opposing in-
terests: politicians may want to maximize their personal rents at the expense
of citizens’ welfare. Yet under democracies, thanks to the electoral compe-
tition and the existence of accountability devices, rulers are to some extent
compelled to accommodate the educational demands of social groups. On the
contrary, dictators do not confront such institutional checks that could lead
them to meet popular requests. As a result, given certain social pressures
for increasing human capital accumulation, democracies should outperform
dictatorial regimes.
The theoretical argument of this thesis stresses a different causal mech-
anism through which political institutions may shape educational outcomes.
Starting from the idea that social groups may have distinct preferences for
the education-related policy to enact, institutions function as a instrument
of conflict resolution by distributing decision power among the groups in
confrontation. Based on a class-model of politics, my thesis argues for a
distinction among dictatorial regimes depending upon to which social class
dictators appeal to construct their bases of support. It is presumed that
“populist” autocracies defend the poor’ interests while rightist dictators act
essentially in the benefit of the more aﬄuent groups of society. Democratic
institutions, in turn, tend to carry out the most desired policy of the median
voter -who belongs to the middle class.
Since groups’ policy preferences are not fixed and constant across shifting
economic contexts, it is expected that the effects of institutions or the edu-
cational differences between institutions change with such economic states.
More concretely, the formal models examined in the thesis predict that the
political choices of social classes may vary with economic development and
income inequality. Accordingly, institutions exert a indirect effect on educa-
tion that changes as well with these two economic factors. Put it in another
way, political regimes mediate the government’ educational responses to in-
creases in per capita income and wealth inequality. In addition, this thesis
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puts forward and empirically tests the idea that the policy consequences of an
increase in the degree of inequality may be different depending upon in which
part of the distribution the dispersion occurs. A change in the economic dis-
tance between the middle class and the poor have distinct implications for
policy preferences that a change in the income gap between, for instance, the
middle class and the rich.
The empirical evidence offered in this analysis is generally consistent with
the hypotheses developed. Regarding the interaction between institutions
and per capita income, the effect of economic development on enrollment
rates is always positive and stronger under left-wing autocracies than un-
der the other two types of regimes: democracy and right-wing dictatorship.
This empirical finding is systematically obtained regardless of the estimation
method used or the specification of the econometric model. However, the im-
pact of per capita income under democratic and right-wing political systems
seems to differ according to the estimation method. When the institutional
framework is a democracy, the statistical results are more stable and indicate
a positive relationship between GDP per capita and enrollment rates. But
in rightist dictatorships, the empirical evidence appears to be more volatile:
either per capita income has an insignificant effect on education or has a
significantly positive effect that does not differ from the one predicted under
democracies. In line with the hypotheses, the educational patterns of political
institutions fluctuate as a function of economic development, which corrobo-
rates the theory proposed in this thesis according to which institutions exert
an indirect effect that changes with economic conditions. Particularly, the
evidence shows that the nature of political regime does not seem to have any
impact in very poor countries. As the economy grows, however, the type of
regime makes a difference in educational outcomes: left-wing dictatorships
tend to increase schooling enrollment at a greater rate than the other political
systems.
With regards to the hypotheses that deal with income inequality, the em-
pirical results demonstrate that the relationship between income inequality
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and education is conditional on per capita income. On the other hand, they
also confirm that the interaction between inequality and economic develop-
ment changes with political institutions and the specific part of the income
distribution where inequality occurs. For a given inequality ratio between
the income shares of different social classes, the association between this fac-
tor and enrollment rates is different depending upon the type of political
regime. Overall, the empirical evidence discriminates among the several for-
mal models examined, being more in line with the general set-up of Perotti
(1993). Therefore, the findings obtained in the empirical analysis prove the
hypothesis that political institutions determine the educational responses of
governments to variations in inequality and per capita income.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Ideology Data
Ideology of dictatorhsips. Data
Country Period Ideology
Algeria 1962-1991 LEFT
1992-1996 Undecided
Angola 1975-1996 LEFT
Benin 1960-1971 Undecided
1972-1990 LEFT
Botswana 1966-1996 RIGHT
Burkina Faso 1960-1979 RIGHT
1980-1982 Undecided
1983-1996 LEFT
Burundi 1962-1965 Undecided
1966-1975 RIGHT
1976-1986 LEFT
1987-1992 RIGHT
1996 RIGHT
Cameroon 1960-1996 RIGHT
Cape Verde 1975-1990 LEFT
Central African Republic 1960-1965 LEFT
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Country Period Ideology
1966-1978 Undecided
1979-1980 LEFT
1981-1992 Undecided
Chad 1960-1996 Undecided
Comoros 1975 Undecided
1976-1977 LEFT
1978-1988 Undecided
1995-1996 Undecided
Congo 1960-1962 Undecided
1963-1991 LEFT
Djibouti 1977-1996 LEFT
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1960-1996 LEFT
Ethiopia 1960-1973 Undecided
1974-1992 LEFT
Gabon 1960-1996 RIGHT
Gambia, The 1965-1993 LEFT
1994-1996 Undecided
Ghana 1960-1965 LEFT
1966-1968 Undecided
1972-1978 Undecided
1981-1992 LEFT
Guinea 1960-1983 LEFT
1984-1996 Undecided
Guinea-Bissau 1974-1996 LEFT
Cote d’Ivoire 1960-1996 RIGHT
Kenya 1963-1996 LEFT
Lesotho 1966-1985 RIGHT
1986-1992 Undecided
Liberia 1960-1989 RIGHT
1990-1996 Undecided
Madagascar 1960-1992 LEFT
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Country Period Ideology
Malawi 1964-1993 RIGHT
Mali 1960-1967 LEFT
1968-1991 Undecided
Mauritania 1960-1983 LEFT
1984-1996 RIGHT
Morocco 1960-1996 RIGHT
Mozambique 1975-1996 LEFT
Niger 1960-1973 Undecided
1974-1992 RIGHT
1996 Undecided
Nigeria 1966-1978 Undecided
1983-1996 Undecided
Rwanda 1962-1996 Undecided
Senegal 1960-1996 LEFT
Seychelles 1976 CENTER
1977-1996 LEFT
Sierra Leone 1967 Undecided
1968-1991 LEFT
1992-1995 Undecided
Somalia 1969-1990 LEFT
1991-1996 Undecided
South Africa 1960-1993 RIGHT
Sudan 1960-1964 Undecided
1969-1984 LEFT
1985 RIGHT
1989-1996 Undecided
Swaziland 1968-1996 RIGHT
Tanzania 1961-1996 LEFT
Togo 1960-1962 Undecided
1963-1966 RIGHT
1967-1996 Undecided
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Country Period Ideology
Tunisia 1960-1996 LEFT
Uganda 1962-1970 LEFT
1971-1979 No ideolgy
1985 Undecided
1986-1996 LEFT
Zaire 1960-1964 Undecided
1965-1996 RIGHT
Zambia 1964-1990 LEFT
Zimbabwe 1965-1978 RIGHT
1979 Undecided
1980-1996 LEFT
Dominican Republic 1960-1962 Undecided
1963-1964 RIGHT
1965 Undecided
El Salvador 1962-1978 RIGHT
1979 CENTER
1980-1981 LEFT
1982-1983 Undecided
Grenada 1979-1982 LEFT
1983 Undecided
Guatemala 1963-1965 RIGHT
1982 Undecided
1983-1985 RIGHT
Haiti 1960-1985 RIGHT
1986-1990 Undecided
1991-1993 RIGHT
Honduras 1963-1970 RIGHT
1972-1981 RIGHT
Mexico 1960-1996 LEFT
Nicaragua 1960-1978 RIGHT
1979-1983 LEFT
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Country Period Ideology
Panama 1968-1988 LEFT
Argentina 1966-1972 RIGHT
1976-1982 RIGHT
Bolivia 1960-1963 RIGHT
1964-1970 LEFT
1971-1977 RIGHT
1978 Undecided
1980-1981 RIGHT
Brazil 1964-1978 RIGHT
Chile 1973-1989 RIGHT
Ecuador 1963-1971 RIGHT
1972-1978 Undecided
Guyana 1966-1991 LEFT
Paraguay 1960-1996 RIGHT
Peru 1962 Undecided
1968-1975 LEFT
1976-1979 CENTER
1990-1996 Undecided
Suriname 1980-1987 LEFT
1990 LEFT
Uruguay 1973-1984 RIGHT
Bangladesh 1971 Undecided
1972-1974 LEFT
1975-1981 RIGHT
1982-1989 Undecided
China 1960-1996 LEFT
Indonesia 1960-1965 LEFT
1966-1996 RIGHT
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1960-1996 RIGHT
Iraq 1960-1996 LEFT
Jordan 1960-1996 RIGHT
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Country Period Ideology
Korea, South (Rep.) 1961-1987 RIGHT
Laos PDR 1960-1974 RIGHT
1975-1996 LEFT
Malaysia 1960-1996 RIGHT
Mongolia 1960-1991 LEFT
Myanmar 1962-1996 LEFT
Nepal 1960-1990 RIGHT
Pakistan 1960-1970 RIGHT
1977-1987 RIGHT
Philippines 1965-1985 RIGHT
Singapore 1965-1996 LEFT
Sri Lanka 1977-1988 RIGHT
Syrian Arab Republic 1960-1962 Undecided
1963-1996 LEFT
Taiwan 1960-1995 RIGHT
Thailand 1960-1972 RIGHT
1973-1974 Undecided
1976 Undecided
1977-1982 RIGHT
1991 Undecided
Yemen Arab Rep.(North) 1967-1973 RIGHT
1974-1977 Undecided
1978-1989 RIGHT
Bulgaria 1960-1989 LEFT
Czechoslovakia 1960-1988 LEFT
East Germany 1960-1989 LEFT
Greece 1967-1973 RIGHT
Hungary 1960-1989 LEFT
Poland 1960-1988 LEFT
Portugal 1960-1973 RIGHT
1974-1975 LEFT
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Country Period Ideology
Romania 1960-1989 LEFT
Spain 1960-1975 RIGHT
Turkey 1960 Undecided
1980-1982 RIGHT
U.S.S.R. 1960-1990 LEFT
Yugoslavia 1960-1990 LEFT
Fiji 1970-1996 Undecided
Western Samoa 1962-1996 Undecided
Bahrain 1971-1996 Undecided
Kuwait 1961-1964 Undecided
1965-1996 RIGHT
Oman 1960-1996 RIGHT
Qatar 1971-1996 Undecided
Saudi Arabia 1960-1996 RIGHT
United Arab Emirates 1971-1996 RIGHT
Afghanistan 1960-1962 RIGHT
1963-1972 Undecided
1973-1977 RIGHT
1978-1991 LEFT
1992-1996 Undecided
Albania 1960-1991 LEFT
Azerbaijan 1991 LEFT
1992 Undecided
1993-1996 LEFT
Bhutan 1971-1996 Undecided
Belarus 1991-1996 RIGHT
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1996 Undecided
Brunei 1984-1996 RIGHT
Cambodia 1960-1968 LEFT
1969-1974 RIGHT
1975-1996 LEFT
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Country Period Ideology
Cuba 1960-1996 LEFT
Equatorial Guinea 1968-1996 Undecided
Eritrea 1993-1996 LEFT
Georgia 1991 Undecided
1992-1996 LEFT
Kazakhstan 1991-1996 LEFT
Korea, North (Dem. Rep.) 1960-1996 LEFT
Kyrgyzstan 1991-1996 Undecided
Lebanon 1975 RIGHT
1976-1981 Undecided
1982-1988 RIGHT
1989-1996 Undecided
Maldive Islands 1965-1996 Undecided
Moldova 1991-1995 CENTER
Sao Tome and Principe 1975-1990 LEFT
Somaliland 1991-1996 LEFT
Yemen PDR (South, Aden) 1967-1989 LEFT
Tajikistan 1991-1996 LEFT
Turkmenistan 1991-1996 LEFT
Tonga 1970-1996 RIGHT
Uzbekistan 1991-1996 LEFT
Vietnam 1976-1996 LEFT
Cyprus 1960-1982 RIGHT
Republic of Yemen 1990-1996 RIGHT
Yugoslavia2 1991-1996 LEFT
Libya 1960-1968 RIGHT
1969-1996 LEFT
Ethiopia2 1993-1996 LEFT
Appendix B
Codebook
CATH: Percentage of Catholics in the population. Source: Leksykon Pan’stw
S’wiata (1993) and Encyclopedia Britannica’s on-line Statistical Info for
Countries.
ENROLL: Primary and Secondary enrollment ratio. This ratio is equal to the
number of students in primary and secondary divided by the total population
between 5 and 19 years old. Source: United Nations (2000) and Mitchell
(2003).
ENROLSEC: Secondary school enrollment ratio (% gross). Gross enrollment
ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population
of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown.
Source: World Development Indicators 2000, World Bank.
GINI: Gini coefficient of gross incomes which includes market incomes plus
transfers, but before taxes are taken out. The data is based upon income and
national coverage (as opposed to expenditures and urban/rural coverage).
Source: Deininger and Squire (1996) and UNU-WIDER (2005).
INCOME: : Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (Chain series). Inter-
national prices, base year 1996. Starting source is Penn World Table Version
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6.1 ; then I fill missing data calculated from real GDP per capita in constant
dollars (Chain series, international prices, base year 1985) from (Penn World
Table Version 5.6.
LEFT: Ideological classification of dictatorships. Dummy variable coded
1 for left-wing dictatorships and 0 otherwise. It is constructed from the
regime classification of REGH, so takes into consideration all democratic and
dictatorial regimes. Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges
that year. Source: see REGH, Chapter 4 of this thesis and Banks et al.
(various years).
M/R: Income equality between the middle class and the rich. Ratio of SMID-
DLE to SRICH. Source: see SMIDDLE and SRICH.
MOSLEM: Percentage of Moslems in the population. Source: Leksykon
Pan’stw S’wiata (1993) and Encyclopedia Britannica’s on-line Statistical Info
for Countries.
POP14: Percentage of the population aged under 14 in the total population.
Source: World Development Indicators 2000, World Bank.
PRIVATE: Dummy variable coded 1 if enrollment data (ENROLL) includes
private schooling and 0 otherwise. Source: see ENROLL and Mitchell (2003).
P/M: Income equality between the poor and the middle class. Ratio of
SPOOR to SMIDDLE. Source: see SPOOR and SMIDDLE.
P/R: Income equality between the poor and the rich. Ratio of SPOOR to
SRICH. Source: see SPOOR and SRICH.
REGH: Regime classification as democracies and dictatorships. Dummy vari-
able coded 1 for dictatorship, 0 for democracy. Transition years are coded as
the regime that emerges that year. Source: Przeworski et al. (2000).
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RIGHT: Ideological classification of dictatorships. Dummy variable coded
1 for right-wing dictatorships and 0 otherwise. It is constructed from the
regime classification of REGH, so takes into consideration all democratic and
dictatorial regimes. Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges
that year. Source: see REGH, Chapter 4 of this thesis and Banks et al.
(various years).
RURAL: Rural population as a percentage of total population. Source:
World Development Indicators 2000, World Bank.
SMIDDLE: Gross income share of the middle class (3rd and 4th quintiles).
The data is based upon income and national coverage. Source: Deininger
and Squire (1996) and UNU-WIDER (2005).
SPOOR: Gross income share of the poor (1st and 2nd quintiles). The data
is based upon income and national coverage. Source: Deininger and Squire
(1996) and UNU-WIDER (2005).
SRICH: Gross income share of the rich (5th quintile). The data is based
upon income and national coverage. Source: Deininger and Squire (1996)
and UNU-WIDER (2005).
TRADE: Total trade (imports and exports) as a share of GDP. Source: World
Development Indicators 2000, World Bank.
VOCATIONAL: Dummy variable coded 1 if enrollment data (ENROLL) in-
cludes vocational secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Source: see ENROLL
and Mitchell (2003).
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INTRODUCCIO´N Y CONCLUSIONES
EN CASTELLANO
Introduccio´n
Pregunta de investigacio´n
¿Por que´ algunos gobiernos invierten ma´s en educacio´n que otros? ¿Bajo
que´ condiciones queda garantizado a amplios sectores sociales el acceso a
la educacio´n formal pre-universitaria? ¿Que´ factores pol´ıticos y econo´micos
explican las diferencias nacionales existentes en las tasas de acumulacio´n de
capital humano? Estas son las preguntas que se intentan responder en este
estudio. La motivacio´n que subyace a todas ellas proviene de una perplejidad:
mientras que parecen existir poderosas razones econo´micas para la adopcio´n
de pol´ıticas de inversio´n en capital humano, observamos no obstante una gran
variacio´n en los resultados educativos entre pa´ıses y a lo largo del tiempo.
El capital humano ha sido considerado desde hace tiempo una de las
principales fuentes del crecimiento econo´mico. Distintos enfoques teo´ricos
del crecimiento econo´mico tratan el capital humano bien como un input
productivo adicional o como un factor directamente asociado a la tasa de
innovacio´n (Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003). Por otro lado, los economistas
han venido subrayando la presencia de externalidades derivadas de la esco-
larizacio´n (o inversio´n en capital humano). Adema´s de los retornos privados
a la educacio´n, muchos razonan que los aumentos en la educacio´n generan
algunos beneficios sociales de los que no son perceptores los inversores di-
rectos. Los trabajadores cualificados pueden aumentar la productividad de
sus compan˜eros menos educados. Una mayor proporcio´n de gente educada
en la fuerza de trabajo puede tambie´n aumentar la adopcio´n de nuevas tec-
nolog´ıas. Dado que estos efectos positivos no se incorporan en las decisiones
individuales, este tipo de fallo de mercado puede llevar a los individuos a
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infra-invertir en capital humano de modo que el nivel agregado de educacio´n
en la sociedad puede ser menor que el nivel socialmente eficiente. Este hecho
ha constituido una de las justificaciones econo´micas centrales para la inter-
vencio´n gubernamental en la provisio´n de educacio´n (Poterba 1994; Sianesi
and Van Reenen 2003).
Otra razo´n econo´mica importante para el apoyo pu´blico a la educacio´n
esta´ relacionada con las imperfecciones del mercado de cre´dito (Poterba
1994). Cuando los mercados de capitales son imperfectos y los individuos se
ven constren˜idos en su capacidad de endeudarse para educarse, la escolari-
zacio´n so´lo esta´ al alcance de aquellos con una riqueza suficiente. Incluso si
los individuos incorporan en sus decisiones las ganancias sociales de la edu-
cacio´n, es posible que no inviertan debido a la falta de medios. Por tanto,
el hecho de que los grupos de bajo ingresos no puedan acceder libremente
al cre´dito a cambio de sus rentas futuras hace necesaria una intervencio´n
pu´blica que permita extraer los beneficios econo´micos y el potencial para el
crecimiento econo´mico que se derivan de una mayor acumulacio´n de capital
humano.
La importancia de estas limitaciones de mercado depende obviamente
de la existencia de ciertos costes relacionados con la adquisicio´n de la edu-
cacio´n. Aunque uno pueda pensar que los costes directos de la educacio´n
pre-universitaria sean relativamente pequen˜os- ya que la escolarizacio´n en
primaria y secundaria suele ser gratuita o esta´ fuertemente subvencionada-,
los costes de oportunidad (el ingreso no percibido) son mucho ma´s significa-
tivos, especialmente en el nivel secundario. Es por tanto razonable pensar
que las decisiones de escolarizacio´n esta´n afectadas en parte por la carga
econo´mica que conlleva la obtencio´n de la educacio´n.
Varias organizaciones internacionales de desarrollo se han hecho eco de
estas l´ıneas de razonamiento econo´mico al subrayar el papel beneficioso de
la educacio´n para un potencial alto crecimiento. El Banco Mundial, el
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo o la UNESCO, entre otras, han venido
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apoyando sin fisuras la creencia convencional de que la expansio´n de la es-
colarizacio´n ba´sica es un prerrequisito de la prosperidad que aumenta el de-
sarrollo econo´mico (Easterly 2002: 72). De forma similar, los paquetes de
reformas defendidos por el llamado “Washington Consensus” incluyen una
priorizacio´n del gasto educativo frente a otros tipos de gasto pu´blico ma´s
orientados hacia el consumo cuando los gobiernos necesitan reducir su de´ficit
fiscal (Williamson 1990).
Sin embargo, a pesar de las proclamas de las instituciones internacionales
y de la justificacio´n econo´mica para la expansio´n de la provisio´n de educacio´n,
los resultados educativos var´ıan considerablemente entre pa´ıses. Como ilus-
tracio´n de la gran variacio´n transversal, en 1990, la distribucio´n global de
las tasas de matriculacio´n en secundaria 1 tiene un valor medio del 52.12 por
ciento con una desviacio´n t´ıpica de un 31.49 por ciento. Y el rango de las
variaciones entre pa´ıses es bastante amplio yendo de un 4.9% (Tanzania) a un
119.5% (Holanda). Si la acumulacio´n de capital humano es tan beneficiosa
para el crecimiento, ¿co´mo es que los pa´ıses no han convergido hacia niveles
educativos altos?
Un factor que evidentemente esta´ detra´s de las disparidades educacionales
es la riqueza de la economı´a. La explicacio´n ma´s simple es la de que la can-
tidad de recursos disponibles en la sociedad determina cua´nta gente puede
adquirir educacio´n formal cuando la inversio´n en educacio´n conlleva ciertos
costes econo´micos. O bien define los l´ımites econo´micos a los que se enfrentan
los gobiernos en sus intentos por extender la educacio´n.2 Sin embargo, incluso
cuando se tiene en cuenta el ingreso per ca´pita, existen diferencias sustan-
1Los datos son del Banco Mundial (World Development Indicators 2000 ). Para una
definicio´n ma´s precisa de esta variable (ENROLSEC), ver el Ape´ndice B.
2Puede pensarse tambie´n en te´rminos de una explicacio´n por el lado de la demanda. El
creciente grado de industrializacio´n y el crecimiento del sector servicios asociado al desar-
rollo econo´mico han cambiado las preferencias individuales con respecto a la educacio´n.
Los cambios estructurales del mercado de trabajo resultan en un v´ınculo cada vez ma´s
fuerte entre la educacio´n y las oportunidades de trabajo. Los individuos pueden ser por
tanto ma´s proclives a invertir en capital humano para mejorar su posicio´n en el mercado
de trabajo (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993).
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ciales que necesitan ser explicadas. La figura B.1 presenta la magnitud de
las variaciones entre observaciones pa´ıs-an˜o con niveles similares de ingreso
per ca´pita.3
Tal y como muestra claramente el diagrama, la tasa de matriculacio´n
en secundaria parece estar positivamente relacionada con el ingreso medio:
cuanto ma´s alto el valor de este u´ltimo, mayor es el porcentaje medio de la
gente joven matriculada en educacio´n secundaria. Sin embargo, la historia no
termina aqu´ı. Para un nivel dado de ingreso per capita medio, normalmente
observamos un grado relativamente alto de dispersio´n al rededor de su media
educativa correspondiente. Por ejemplo, cuando el ingreso medio esta´ entre
los 5000 y los 6000 do´lares, la matriculacio´n media es del 57% y su desviacio´n
t´ıpica es del 18%.
¿Cua´les son los factores causales que esta´n detra´s de estas persistentes
diferencias en la acumulacio´n de capital humano? El argumento que esta tesis
presenta sostiene que las pol´ıticas que impulsan la educacio´n, pese a sus con-
secuencias en te´rminos de eficiencia, necesitan ser sostenibles pol´ıticamente.
Deben ser congruentes con el intere´s de los grupos sociales pol´ıticamente
dominantes. El argumento parte del reconocimiento de que cualquier inter-
vencio´n gubernamental dirigida a aumentar el capital humano puede tener
implicaciones redistributivas. Puede beneficiar a ciertos grupos sociales en
detrimento de otros. Incluso si aumentar el nu´mero de personas educadas en
la poblacio´n crea externalidades positivas (beneficios que repercuten en todos
los individuos de la sociedad), la distribucio´n de los costes de esta pol´ıtica
puede generar “perdedores” y “ganadores” netos. Por tanto, pueden surgir
3El gra´fico es un diagrama de caja en el que los puntos se refieren a los valores medios
de cada intervalo de ingreso. Para cada intervalo de mil do´lares de GDP per ca´pita, la caja
se extiende a ma´s menos una desviacio´n t´ıpica desde la media; y las l´ıneas verticales se
extienden a los valores ma´ximos y mı´nimos. La u´ltima caja incluye los casos con un ingreso
per ca´pita mayor de 20000 do´lares. Seis pa´ıses petroleros del Medio Oriente(Bahrein,
Kuwait, Oma´n, Catar, Arabia Saudita y los Emiratos A´rabes Unidos) esta´n excluidos
-su inclusio´n har´ıa bajar significativamente la media de matriculacio´n en los intervalos de
ingreso ma´s altos. Ver Ape´ndice B, la variable INCOME, para una definicio´n de los datos
del PIB per ca´pita.
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Figure B.1: Varianza de la escolarizacio´n en secundaria por el ingreso per
ca´pita
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Nota: Los puntos indican los valores medios. La caja se extiende a ms
menos una desviacio´n t´ıpica desde la media y las l´ıneas se extienden a
los valores ma´ximos y mı´nimos.
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conflictos de intere´s entre distintos actores sociales. Los individuos, en ese
caso, tendera´n a tener distintas visiones acerca de que´ pol´ıtica implementar.
A su vez, si los potenciales “perdedores” de la intervencio´n poseen poder
efectivo para determinar las decisiones pu´blicas, no tenemos por que´ esperar
que la pol´ıtica ma´s eficiente desde el punto de vista educativo se adopte,
aunque sea deseable para el conjunto de la economı´a.
Existen dos cuestiones que han de responderse para poder saber cuando
un programa que promueva la educacio´n va a ser implementado. La primera
concierne a las preferencias que sobre las distintas pol´ıticas tienen los grupos
sociales relevantes. Para responder a esta pregunta, la tesis sigue el enfoque
adoptado por los ana´lisis de economı´a pol´ıtica de la educacio´n ma´s impor-
tantes (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993; Perotti 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson
1995). Los costes y ganancias derivados de las acciones pu´blicas que afectan
a los resultados de educacio´n son fundamentalmente econo´micos. Las prefe-
rencias pol´ıticas dependen de la posicio´n econo´mica de los individuos y, por
tanto, los grupos relevantes potencialmente enfrentados se definen en funcio´n
de sus ingresos. Las pol´ıticas preferidas por los grupos, segu´n el argumento,
no son fijas sino que pueden cambiar cuando algunas condiciones var´ıan, en
particular, la desigualdad de renta y el ingreso per capita. Estos dos factores
econo´micos determinara´n as´ı la estructura subyacente de preferencias y la
naturaleza del conflicto pol´ıtico. Al contrario que ana´lisis previos, esta tesis
defiende que el efecto de la desigualdad de riqueza puede variar dependiendo
en que´ parte de la distribucio´n tiene lugar la dispersio´n de riqueza. No es
por tanto la configuracio´n general de la distribucio´n lo que da forma a las
elecciones individuales sino que´ clases sociales se empobrecen o enriquecen
como consecuencia de la redistribucio´n del ingreso. Simplificando el nu´mero
de los grupos econo´micos a tres (pobres, clases medias, y ricos), se examina
teo´rica y emp´ıricamente el impacto de un aumento de la desigualdad entre
estas tres clases en comparaciones de dos a dos.
La segunda pregunta se refiere al me´todo pol´ıtico utilizado para agre-
gar las preferencias en conflicto y del que surgen las pol´ıticas pu´blicas. A
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falta de un planificador educativo benevolente, las instituciones pol´ıticas de-
sempen˜an un papel crucial en la seleccio´n de propuestas al distribuir el poder
pol´ıtico entre los grupos sociales en oposicio´n. E´stas determinan por tanto si
las demandas de aquellos sectores de la poblacio´n en contra de la expansio´n
educativa acabara´n siendo aceptadas pol´ıticamente. Esta tesis se centra en
la clase ma´s ba´sica de institucio´n de entre las que estructuran los procesos de
toma de decisio´n, esto es, la naturaleza del re´gimen pol´ıtico, y se adhiere a los
modelos pol´ıticos basados en la estructura de clases. Tal y como se discute en
el siguiente cap´ıtulo, la literatura creciente acerca de la relacio´n entre la edu-
cacio´n y el re´gimen pol´ıtico examina el impacto del tipo de re´gimen basado
en una categor´ıa dicoto´mica que distingue entre sistemas democra´ticos y
dictatoriales. En este trabajo, sin embargo, se distingue entre dictaduras
segu´n su orientacio´n ideolo´gica. Estas se dividen en dos tipos: dictaduras de
izquierdas o “populistas” y dictaduras de derechas. Se parte del supuesto de
que las primeras maximizan el bienestar de los pobres, mientras que las de
derechas satisfacen fundamentalmente las preferencias de los ma´s acomoda-
dos. En l´ınea con el enfoque convencional en economı´a pol´ıtica, los conflictos
en torno a las pol´ıticas, en democracias, se resuelven mediante el voto por
mayor´ıa de modo que aquel que dicta las pol´ıticas es bien el votante mediano
-que pertenece a la clase media-, bien la coalicio´n ganadora de la que la clase
media es parte4.
Al determinar el equilibrio de poder entre las clases sociales, el impacto
del re´gimen pol´ıtico sobre los programas y resultados educativos se espera que
cambie con las condiciones econo´micas. Aqu´ı pues se defiende que las institu-
ciones pol´ıticas no ejercen un efecto directo ni constante sino uno condicional.
Dado, en primer lugar, que las preferencias de los grupos sociales dependen
del ingreso per capita y de la desigualdad y, en segundo lugar, las institu-
ciones determinan que´ demandas sociales se convierten en pol´ıticas pu´blicas,
el mecanismo causal propuesto en esta tesis, y mediante el cual los reg´ımenes
influyen en los resultados educativos, es que las instituciones dan forma a
las respuestas educacionales de los gobiernos ante estados econo´micos cam-
4Para una justificacio´n teo´rica de esta clasificacio´n institucional ver el siguiente cap´ıtulo.
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biantes. Por tanto, el impacto del re´gimen pol´ıtico es condicional al ingreso
per ca´pita y a la desigualdad econo´mica.
En resumen, este estudio ofrece una enfoque centrado en torno a la idea
de que la riqueza de la economı´a y su distribucio´n entre las clases sociales
interactu´an con las instituciones pol´ıticas para producir distintos patrones de
educacio´n. Dependiendo de las configuraciones conjuntas de estos factores,
surgen distintas expectativas en materia de pol´ıticas y resultados educativos.
Las diferencias sustanciales entre resultados nacionales de capital humano
que se han mostrado anteriormente pueden ser explicadas por tanto por la
variacio´n en las condiciones econo´micas e institucionales. El supuesto inicial
clave reside en la naturaleza redistributiva de las pol´ıticas que afectan a la
acumulacio´n de capital humano, haciendo que los actores sociales sostengan
distintas visiones acerca de la pol´ıtica adecuada.
Estructura de la tesis
La tesis esta´ organizada de la siguiente manera. El cap´ıtulo 2 presenta una
revisio´n de las principales contribuciones a la cuestio´n ma´s general acerca de
los resultados educativos agregados de los pa´ıses, y en particular, a la relacio´n
ente reg´ımenes pol´ıticos y capital humano. Tambie´n presenta los principales
aspectos del argumento que aqu´ı se propone y enfatiza su relevancia anal´ıtica
vistas las lagunas teo´ricas y emp´ıricas en la literatura relevante. Dos l´ıneas de
investigacio´n esta´n directamente relacionadas con este trabajo. La primera
de ellas comprende varios estudios sobre la economı´a pol´ıtica de la educacio´n
que han examinado el efecto de algunos factores econo´micos en los equi-
librios pol´ıticos alcanzados en los sistemas democra´ticos con respecto a las
pol´ıticas educativas. Aunque se reconoce la existencia de preferencias het-
eroge´neas al rededor de las elecciones educativas colectivas, no se exploran
si los diferentes mecanismos institucionales de resolucio´n de conflictos pro-
ducen equilibrios pol´ıticos que tienen consecuencias divergentes en te´rminos
de los resultados educativos. La segunda l´ınea de investigacio´n esta´ directa-
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mente relacionada con el impacto de los reg´ımenes pol´ıticos sobre el capital
humano. Su principal fallo, sin embargo, reside en que estas explicaciones
ignoran impl´ıcitamente los efectos redistributivos de los programas de acu-
mulacio´n de capital humano.
El cap´ıtulo 3 esta´ dedicado al ana´lisis formal del argumento. Se exa-
minan varios mecanismos de interaccio´n formalmente, generando una serie
de hipo´tesis espec´ıficas para su comprobacio´n emp´ırica subsiguiente. Este
cap´ıtulo toma como punto de partida los principales modelos de la literatura
de economı´a pol´ıtica de la educacio´n (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993; Perotti
1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). Estos modelos intentan desentran˜ar
como la desigualdad en la riqueza y el ingreso per ca´pita influyen la inversio´n
total en capital humano bajo un escenario institucional en el que las pol´ıticas
redistributivas se eligen por mayor´ıas electorales. Mediante el examen de
estos modelos, el propo´sito de este cap´ıtulo es el de analizar sus implicaciones
para otros marcos institucionales. En otras palabras, intenta extender su
lo´gica a instituciones no democra´ticas y derivar algunas predicciones claras
con las que hacer comparaciones entre reg´ımenes. Una extensio´n adicional
de estos modelos, llevada a cabo en este cap´ıtulo, es una evaluacio´n del
impacto diferencial de los aumentos en la desigualdad en distintas partes de
la distribucio´n del ingreso.
Para comprobar emp´ıricamente las predicciones del ana´lisis formal, el
cap´ıtulo 4 introduce una nueva base de datos acerca de la ideolog´ıa de las dic-
taduras para todos los reg´ımenes dictatoriales desde 1960 a 1996. Basa´ndose
en varios indicadores sobre las preferencias ideolo´gicas de los gobiernos au-
tocra´ticos, se construye un procedimiento para clasificarlos consistentemente
segu´n los dictadores se situ´en en la izquierda, centro, o derecha de un con-
tinuo. A partir de fuentes secundarias se construyen varios indicadores rela-
cionados con 1) la orientacio´n ideolo´gica del dictador y su partido y 2), las
pol´ıticas que sean ortogonales al espacio pol´ıtico nacional. Una vez que se
han discutido varios casos problema´ticos en los que estos indicadores no lle-
van a la misma conclusio´n y se han justificado las decisiones en estos casos,
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se ofrecen algunos ana´lisis descriptivos de los datos.
El cap´ıtulo 5 pone a prueba con datos cuantitativos la validez emp´ırica
de la teor´ıa. Utilizando distintos modelos econome´tricos, se comprueban
los v´ınculos causales mediante los que los reg´ımenes configuran la inversio´n
de capital humano e investiga el impacto condicional de las instituciones
pol´ıticas. En este cap´ıtulo se desarrollan dos ana´lisis emp´ıricos separados.
Primero, mediante la explotacio´n de la variacio´n longitudinal de los datos, se
examina el efecto del tipo de re´gimen condicional al ingreso per capita. En se-
gundo lugar, las hipo´tesis interactivas en relacio´n a la desigualdad econo´mica,
el ingreso per capita y las instituciones pol´ıticas se comprueban usando series
temporales y variaciones transversales. Los resultados obtenidos a trave´s de
estos ana´lisis nos sirven para discriminar entre los varios modelos formales,
ya que proponen distintos mecanismos pol´ıtico-econo´micos en relacio´n a la
pol´ıtica redistributiva y los resultados educativos. Por u´ltimo, el cap´ıtulo
6 resume la contribucio´n teo´rica de esta tesis y sus principales resultados
emp´ıricos.
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Conclusio´n
El objetivo principal de esta tesis ha sido explicar las variaciones en cuanto
a los resultados agregados de educacio´n que se observan entre pa´ıses y a lo
largo del tiempo entre 1960 y 1996. En particular, la pregunta de inves-
tigacio´n planteada era ¿por que´ las naciones muestran diferentes patrones
con respecto a sus tasas de matriculacio´n en secundaria y primaria? A prio-
ri, esta cuestio´n parece desconcertante a la luz de las razones de eficiencia
que se han aducido en la literatura econo´mica para justificar pol´ıticas de ex-
pansio´n educativa a amplios sectores de la sociedad. Sin embargo, aunque la
acumulacio´n de capital humano pueda generar consecuencias positivas para
la economı´a en su conjunto, las pol´ıticas que promueven la educacio´n han de
ser pol´ıticamente sostenibles. La explicacio´n propuesta en esta tesis enfatiza
el papel de las instituciones pol´ıticas. Los reg´ımenes pol´ıticos influyen en
las tasas agregadas de matriculacio´n en la medida en que los grupos sociales
relevantes en el ana´lisis sostienen visiones opuestas acerca del tipo de pol´ıtica
que debe de ponerse en pra´ctica. Cuando existe un conflicto distributivo en
torno a las pol´ıticas, es razonable pensar que los individuos tengan diferentes
preferencias por las mismas. Dada dicha heterogeneidad de las preferen-
cias, las instituciones sirven como mecanismo de resolucio´n de conflictos al
favorecer unos intereses sobre otros.
La literatura existente sobre la relacio´n entre reg´ımenes pol´ıticos y edu-
cacio´n ha ignorado por lo general las consecuencias distributivas que implica
la dina´mica pol´ıtica de la educacio´n. Los distintos estudios dentro de esta
literatura se han centrado principalmente en las restricciones electorales de
las instituciones democra´ticas que, a diferencia de las dictaduras, inducen a
los pol´ıticos a responder a las demandas populares de expansio´n del acceso a
la escuela. El conflicto subyacente en estos estudios enfrenta a los hacedores
de pol´ıticas con los ciudadanos comunes donde ambas partes tienen intereses
opuestos: es posible que los pol´ıticos deseen maximizar sus rentas personales
a costa del bienestar de los ciudadanos. No obstante, en las democracias,
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gracias a la competicio´n pol´ıtica y la existencia de instrumentos de control
pol´ıtico, los gobernantes se ven forzados en cierta medida a satisfacer las
demandas educativas de los grupos sociales. Por el contrario, los dictadores
no esta´n sujetos a limitaciones institucionales que les pueda llevar a cumplir
las peticiones populares. En consecuencia, dadas ciertas presiones sociales a
favor de incrementos de la acumulacio´n de capital humano, las democracias
deber´ıan mostrar mejores resultados en educacio´n que los reg´ımenes dictato-
riales.
El argumento teo´rico de esta tesis sugiere, sin embargo, un mecanismo
causal distinto mediante el cual las instituciones pol´ıticas influyen sobre los
resultados educativos. Partiendo de la idea de que los grupos sociales pueden
tener distintas preferencias por la pol´ıtica relacionada con la educacio´n, las
instituciones funcionan como instrumento de resolucio´n de conflictos al dis-
tribuir el poder de decisio´n entre los grupos en oposicio´n. Sobre la base
de un modelo pol´ıtico de clase, mi tesis aboga por una distincio´n entre los
reg´ımenes dictatoriales en funcio´n de las clases sociales a las que apelan los
dictadores para forjar sus bases de apoyo. De acuerdo con dicha distincio´n,
se asume que las autocracias populistas defienden los intereses de los pobres,
mientras que los dictadores de derechas actu´an esencialmente en beneficio
de los grupos ma´s ricos de la sociedad. Las instituciones democra´ticas, a su
vez, tienden a poner en pra´ctica la pol´ıtica ma´s deseada del votante mediano
-que pertenece a la clase media.
Puesto que las preferencias pol´ıticas de los grupos no esta´n fijadas de
antemano y tampoco permanecen constantes bajo los distintos contextos
econo´micos, se espera que los efectos de las instituciones o las diferencias
educativas entre las mismas cambien con tales contextos. Ma´s concreta-
mente, los modelos formales examinados en la tesis predicen que las al-
ternativas pol´ıticas ma´s deseadas por las clases sociales pueden variar en
funcio´n del desarrollo econo´mico y la desigualdad de renta. De esta manera,
las instituciones ejercen un efecto indirecto sobre la educacio´n que cambia
tambie´n cuando estos dos factores econo´micos var´ıan. Dicho de otra forma,
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los reg´ımenes pol´ıticos mediatizan las respuestas educativas de los gobier-
nos ante incrementos del ingreso per ca´pita y la desigualdad de riqueza.
Adema´s, esta tesis propone y comprueba emp´ıricamente la idea de que las
consecuencias sobre las pol´ıticas de un aumento en el grado de desigualdad
pueden variar dependiendo de en que´ parte de la distribucio´n ocurra dicha
dispersio´n. Un cambio en la distancia econo´mica entre la clase media y los
pobres tiene implicaciones distintas para las preferencias pol´ıticas que un
cambio en las diferencias de ingreso entre, por ejemplo, la clase media y los
grupos con ma´s recursos en la economı´a.
La evidencia emp´ırica que se aporta en esta tesis corrobora, en general,
las hipo´tesis planteadas en los cap´ıtulos teo´ricos. Respecto a la interaccio´n
entre instituciones e ingreso per ca´pita, el efecto del desarrollo econo´mico so-
bre las tasas de matriculacio´n es siempre positivo y ma´s fuerte en dictaduras
de izquierdas que en los otros dos tipos de reg´ımenes: democracia y dictadura
de derechas. Este hallazgo emp´ırico se obtiene sistema´ticamente con inde-
pendencia del me´todo de estimacio´n empleado y la especificacio´n del modelo
econome´trico. Sin embargo, el impacto del ingreso por habitante bajo sis-
temas pol´ıticos democra´ticos y de derechas parece diferir de acuerdo con el
me´todo de estimacio´n. Cuando el marco institucional es una democracia, los
resultados estad´ısticos son ma´s estables e indican una relacio´n positiva entre
el PIB per ca´pita y las tasas de matriculacio´n. Sin embargo, en dictaduras de
derechas, la evidencia emp´ırica no es tan estable: el ingreso per ca´pita o bien
tiene un efecto no significativo sobre la educacio´n o bien tiene un efecto sig-
nificativamente positivo que no difiere del que se predice en democracia. En
l´ınea con las hipo´tesis, los patrones educativos de las instituciones pol´ıticas
fluctu´an en funcio´n del desarrollo econo´mico, lo cual viene a corroborar la
teor´ıa propuesta en esta tesis de acuerdo con la cual las instituciones ejercen
una influencia indirecta que var´ıa con las condiciones econo´micas. Concreta-
mente, la evidencia muestra que la naturaleza del re´gimen pol´ıtico no parece
tener ningu´n impacto en pa´ıses muy pobres. Pero conforme la economı´a
crece, el tipo de re´gimen pol´ıtico importa en los resultados educativos: las
dictaduras de izquierdas tienden a incrementar ma´s las tasas de matriculacio´n
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escolar que los otros sistemas pol´ıticos.
En cuanto a las hipo´tesis que tratan de la desigualdad econo´mica, los
resultados emp´ıricos obtenidos en esta tesis demuestran que la relacio´n en-
tre desigualdad de renta y educacio´n es condicional al ingreso per ca´pita.
Por otro lado, estos resultados tambie´n confirman que la interaccio´n entre
desigualdad y desarrollo econo´mico cambia con el tipo de re´gimen pol´ıtico
y la parte espec´ıfica de la distribucio´n donde ocurre la desigualdad. Dada
una razo´n particular de desigualdad entre las proporciones de ingreso que
tienen diferentes clases sociales, la asociacio´n entre este factor y las tasas
de matriculacio´n es diferente dependiendo del re´gimen pol´ıtico. En te´rminos
generales, la evidencia emp´ırica logra discriminar entre los varios modelos for-
males examinados, al estar ma´s en l´ınea con el modelo de Perotti (1993). As´ı
pues, los hallazgos encontrados en el ana´lisis emp´ırico confirman la hipo´tesis
segu´n la cual las instituciones pol´ıticas determinan las respuestas educativas
de los gobiernos ante variaciones en la desigualdad y el ingreso per ca´pita.
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